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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The Amir Amatmllah was fascinating personality of 
the kingdom of Afghanistan. The present work deals with 
the life and career of Amanullah, an ill-fated champion of 
modernization in Afghanistan during the 1920's. He is 
remembered for his endeavours to reform Afghanistan and 
change it from a "medieval looking and tribal oriented 
country" into a modern state. Afghanistan could not have 
lived in isolation from what had been taking place in 
other parts of the world in particular in the Muslim 
countries of West Asia. He was inspired by enlightened 
ideas. 
We seek to examine all the aspects of his great and 
mysterious personality, a revolutionary in thinking who 
challenged the existing norms and custom of a tribal 
society. 
In the first chapter, on the land and the people, 
We have discussed the geographical features and principle 
regions of Afghanistan. In such a setting lived the -
heterogenous tribal group that comprised the Afghanistan. 
The inhospitable terrains, inaccessible mountains 
the principal rivers and lakes which shapes Afghanistan's 
topography as quite a distinct land unlike the other 
central Asian region, where a particular race dominated 
the region compared to them Afghanistan was inhabited by 
variety of ethno-lingual races, quite distinct from one 
other and made Afghanistan turbulent country. There 
have been intermittent struggle amongst themselves. 
Further study of Afghanistan's geography is also 
important from the point of view of understanding its 
geopolitics; as the region had emerged as one of the 
hottest-battle ground in history. Afghanistarfslocation is 
quite strategic and thus a lure for the expansionists 
designs of Russia and the British. 
The second chapter attempts to have a glimpse of the 
past history of Afghanistan from the time of Ahmad Shah 
Abdali, the founder of modern Afghanistan in 1747. The two 
hundred years history enables us to understand that it had 
never been easy for Afghan rulers to rule this country and 
enjoy the loyalty and support of his subjects. 
There have been challenge to the rulers and its 
culmination could be seen in the life and times of 
Amanullah. 
The feudal tribal structure of the society and 
state overthrew him, visualising threat to their vested 
interests through the reforms and changes introduced by 
him. 
The third chapter is a study of Amanullah^ as a 
person and attempted to scan the paradoxial personality of 
the Amir. There is dearth of reliable source material on 
the early life of Amanullah. We have relied upon the 
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available sources and documents to weave a fair fabric 
of his life and times to enable us to draw conclusions 
from a distance and in proper prespective. 
The fourth chapter deals with the years of Amir 
Amanullah in power and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. 
Amanullah had to make himself secure on the throne after 
the assassination of Amir Habibullah in 1919. We have 
discussed the family lineage and the domination of the few 
tribes in the Afghan power structure. Amanullah achieved 
initial success in stablizing himself and embarked upon 
the mission of liberating the country from the British 
tuteleage, something which the earlier Afghan rulers had 
not been able to achieve rather had never tried to secure 
it. We have discussed the Anglo-Afghan War and the 
diplomatic victory over the British in Peace negotiations. 
The chapter on "Reform Movement" enumerates all 
possible details and analysis regarding its ideas and 
actual implementation. The viability of such dynamic 
reforms in the feudal-tribal society and its possible 
impact on the conservative subjects. These reforms led to 
final rebellion and the ouster of Amanullah. 
We have discussed the Khost Rebellion of 1924 in 
the next chapter. It offers a critical and analytical 
description of the measures taken by Amanullah to deal 
with the situation. 
Vll 
The "Grand Tour" of Amanullah is the theme of my 
seventh chapter. The visit to a number of European 
countries and modern Asian countries, was an eye opener to 
the reforming and revolutionary zeal of Amanullah. The 
tour had a lasting impact on Amir and in a way acted as 
catalyst to undertake similar reforms in his country. He 
was impressed by the advanced and industrialised west and 
the developing East. He was prompt to emulate those 
ideas and transform his own country. The tour had added a 
new dimension to his reform. 
The chapter on Rebellion and final ouster "takes 
note of Amanullah's last days, how he faced the rebellion 
by his own people, led by the religious groups and the 
tribal chiefs. We have endeavoured to examine the role 
played by the foreign elements and their complicity in the 
overthrow of Amanullah. 
In a separate chapter, we have surveyed and 
analysed the diplomatic ties of Afghanistan during 
Amanullah's time. 
The discussion mainly deals with the Anglo-Soviet 
interests in Afghanistan. It would be interesting to 
examine how the helpless Afghans were caught in between the 
two expanding imperialists ! It also studies the growiftg 
German interests in the region for strategic 
considerations. 
VXil 
We have given in the appendices the genealogy of 
the Afghan rulers. The principal tribes and races of 
Afghanistan, the languages etc. It would enable us to 
understand the constituents of the Afghan nation. 
We have used both archival and published material 
in preparing the work on "A Political Biography of king 
Amanullah". 
CHAPTER - I 
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 
"A simple boy am I far from the hills 
of home" - Afghan Song. 
Afghanistan, the land of Afghans, forms the 
north-eastern portion of the great Iranian plateau. The 
present name Afghanistan, is not the original name of the 
country. A Classical Writer had called it Arriana - the 
2 land of the Aryans . The early Muslim writers and 
historians named and referred it as Khorasan - the land of 
the Rising Sun. In the middle of the 18th century AD, 
Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-73 AD) came to power since then 
the country is known by its modern name Afghanistan. 
Although Ahmad Shah had founded the Durrani empire in 1747 
yet he did not extend his authority to the tribes for 
fears of their resistance. Afghanistan to quote 
Gregorian was^ *"not a state but a tribal society* 
In shape, Afghanistan is an irregular quadrilateral 
territory, located in the north temperate zone between 
29°30' and 38°30' N latitude. It is bordered on the north 
by Russian central Asian "republics" of Uzbekistan, 
1. V. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 
1969, Stanford, p. IFI 
2. For a highly amusing account of a journey in this area. 
See Eric Newby's A Short Walk in the Hindu Rush, 
London, 1958. ~~~~~ ~~~ 
3. The best modern account of Afghan origin is in Caroe, 
Olaf; The Pathans, London, 1958. 
Tadjiskistan and Turkeministan. On the west and south east 
are Iran and Iranian Baluchistan. In the northeast a long 
slender salient of Afghan territory touches China but on 
very high altitude. Afghanistan forms the eastern section 
of the raised land mass knovm as the Iranian Plateau. In 
the north it slopes toward the Amu Dariya (Oxus River) , 
in the east towards the Indus plain, and in the south 
towards the desert of Baluchistan. The three fifths of its 
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total area is mountainous namely by the massive Hindu Kush 
and its allied ranges like the Karakorams, Pamirs, and the 
Himalayas. The mountain ranges made up of young mountains 
composed largely of granite with associated gneiss and 
mica slate^The Hindu Kush is tree less through much of its 
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extent. But the passes like Anjuman Khawak, Parandev, 
Salang, Khaoshan, Chahardev, Kharzar, Shinan, Hajigak, and 
Ak Robat make the Hindu kush accessible. The section of 
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the range to north of Kabul is called the Kohi-i-Baba 
1. Greeks called it Oxus. 
2. Hindu Kush means "dead Hindu"; it may refer to some 
long forgotten disaster to a Hindu army attempting to 
invade Turkistan, or alternatively to the export of 
Hindu slaves to Central Asia. 
Hindu kush mountain in the east rises above 21,000 
ft. high. 
3. The description of Hindu Kush mountain ranges and the 
geographical region comes in detail with Rowland, 
Felix; Crossing the Hindu kush. Geographical Review,XXX 
pp. 272-278. 
4. An extension of the Hindu kush mountain is Kohi-Baba. 
(father mountains). The extreme plateau part is known as 
Parapomisus where -horthern ridge farther to the east is 
known as the 'Safed Koh' (white mountain). 
The Sulaiman range which runs along the eastern 
frontier and separates the Afghan highlands from the Indus 
Valley. These mountains are peierced by fanned passes like 
the Shorawak, Gomal^ Tochi, Paiwar, and the most famous 
being Khyber and Bolan. 
Afghanistan is dry, with an average rainfall of 
only about ten inches and for irrigation it depends upon 
the rivers- The Amu Dariya (Oxus river) forms the border 
between Afghanistan and the Russian Central Asia for 
hundreds of miles. Other important streams are the 
Kokcha, Hari Rud, Helmund, Arghandeb, Murghab, and Kabul. 
Among the important lakes Sarikul is closed to the USSR 
border and the Ban-i-Amir consists of series of small 
lakes. 
Apart from the administrative division of any 
nomenclature, Afghanistan by and large is made up of eight 
large and distinct section namely viz. Bactria, the Hindu 
kush the Hazar jat, the Arachosia Plain, Kabulistan the 
Hari-Rud Valley, Jalalabad, Nangarhar and Badakhshan. 
1. The Amu Dariya is one of the Principal rivers of 
Afghanistan covering a large tract of land. See for 
details on the Rivers. 
Qasim, Rishtiya; Syed Mohammad, "The Rivers of 
Afghanistan", Afghanistan (Kabul) 1946, p. 1. 
Bactria is vast level plain, lies north of Hindu 
Rush, Mazar-i-sharief falling in this region. The 
Hazarjat is vast tableland broken by innumerable scattered 
mountain ranges in the centre of Afghanistan. The region 
is inhospitable, bleak treeless and desolate area. The 
south western Afghanistan known as Arachosian plain, are 
2 the relatively fertile district of Kandhar region. The 
region is watered by Helmund and Arghandeb rivers. The 
3 
southern section, Sistan is sandy desert, sparsely 
populated and unproductive. Kabulistan is the collective 
name of a number of plateau, surrounding the capital city 
of Kabul. Watered by the Kabul river the entire region is 
fertile and densely populated. Badakhshan is in the 
extreme north-east mountainous area and much of which it 
is covered with forest. Wakhan touches the China border 
whereas Katayhan is the cotton producing region. The 
valley of Hari Rud lying in the north-west of Afghanistan 
is extremely fertile area whose largest city is the famous 
1. See for detail on this region, Ali Mohammad; A new 
guide to Afghanistan (Kabul, 1958), p. 3. 
2. The name Kandhar is almost certainly a version of 
Iskander, the Persian form of Alexander. It is probably 
the city he founded under the name of Alexandria 
Arachosia. 
3. It is in the southwest corner on the borders of 
Afghanistan and Persia which was once fertile plain. 
The region is variously known as Sakasthan, Sijistan, 
Seistan, and Sistan, and was also once called Nimruz. 
Herat. Jalalabad or Nangarhar (Gandhara) lies in the 
eastern Afghanistan falling Pakistan. It has a number of 
fertile areas and climate like that of India. 
The overwhelming majority of Afghans are 
agricultural and pastoral but only about 10% of its total 
land area is under cultivation. Wheat is the most 
important crop and bread is staple diet of Afghans. Some 
other cereals and vegetables are also grown. Sheep is 
mostly reared by the people apart from goats and Bactrian 
camel. Dogs and donkeys are common sight. The wolf , the 
libex, Markhor, and tigers are also found there. 
Such a varied geography of Afghanistan it's 
location, topography and climate has left a deep impact on 
the people who inhabit this area. 
We find that Afghanistan means literally the land 
of Afghans. It has been a hard land and it bred hard 
people. The qualities which the Afghan pride derive partly 
from the tough physical environment, partly from the 
influence of Islam - a passionate love of independance, 
family loyalty and solidarity, physical courage and high 
developed sense of personal honour and hospitality. Chief 
among the people of Afghanistan are the Pushtoon who are 
often described as the 'true Afghan'. These Pushtuns 
1. Herat is the classical Areia, Alexander's city of 
Alexandria-Ariana, deriving its name from Aryan 
invaders en route to India. 
constitute an estimated fifty to sixty per cent of the 
population. They have been the dominant people in 
Afghanistan since its beginning as a nation and the 
country is infact a Pushtun creation. Inside Afghanistan 
they are largely concentrated in the east and south. 
Regardlesls of their dispersal, Pushtuns exhibit strong 
similarities both of custom and of ethnic personality. 
They are identified as Wajiri Mohammadzai, Sulaimankhel. 
Loyalty to the tribe or class varies from group to group 
but is usually strong at the same time all Pushtun have an 
extreme pride in their pushtun identity. They are nomads 
and sedantry agriculturists. 
The second largest ethnic category in Afghanistan 
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consists of the Tadjik who are scattered throught the 
courty but concentrated mainly in the north-west. They 
have considerable population in Iran, the republics of 
Tajikistan and the Chinese province of sinkiang. They 
constitute various groups like Heratis, Parsiwans etc.. 
Their main language though is Tadjiks. They are mainly 
agriculturists often working as tenant farmers or 
1. See for detail, Fletcher Arnold; Afghanistan, Highway 
of conquest, Cornell Univ. Press, 1965, p. 13. 
See also Olaf Caroe; The Pathans; London, 1958. 
2. They are supposed to be originated from Graeco-
Bactrian Population supplanted by Alexander in the 
region. 
labourers, although some are to be found engaged in trade 
or handicraft in Afghan cities. They are not' belligerent 
except for the mountains Tadjiks of Kohistan north of 
Kabul who are considered aggressive as the Pushtuns. 
In northern Afghanistan between the Russian border 
and the Hindu Kush, live the third most important group 
known as the Uzbegs. They are supposekd to be the mixture 
of Turko-Mongols. The Uzbegs are mostly sedantry 
agriculturists, merchants and artisans. Their language is 
a form of Turkish called Uzbeki apparently derives from 
the Chaghtain Turkish of medieval times. In Afghanistan 
the Uzbegs have a reputation for indolence and 
procrastination. They intermarry freely with their Tajik 
neighbours but rarely with Pushtuns. 
The other important group who lives among these 
people of Afghanistan is called the Chahar-Aimak (four 
tribes). They are divided into the Jamshidi, Frazkohi, 
Timuri and Taimani tribes. Many of the Cha-har-Aimak, 
those of north living in the familiar yurt of Central Asia 
and those of south favouring a yurt like tent. They speak 
Persian of a type known as Heratis and are member of 
Sunni Islam. 
1. Originally Turkic tribesmen who entered the region 
around 15th Century A.D. 
2. See for detail, Shurmann, H.F.; The Mongols of 
Afghanistan (S. Gavers Hage, 1962) pp. 49-73. 
The Hajaras of Afghanistan are interesting people 
whose homeland the Hajarjat or Hazaristan, is the central 
mountain massif west of Kabul whereas smaller groups are 
found in Bamians, in the Koh-i-Baba Range, and in 
Badakhshan. Hazaras have Mongoloids features. They are 
generally linked with Mongoloid origin. They resemble the 
Mountain Tadjik in customs, though not in built. They are 
like the Buriats of Mongolia in having coarse black hair, 
yellow to yellow brown complexions, brachy cephalic heads, 
broad faces, prominent check bones and a heavy incidence 
of the epicarthic eyefold, Hazarijat are divided into 
tribes like Besud, Dai-Kundi, Polada, Dai-Zangi, Jaghuri 
and Uruzgani. Almost all are sedantry agriculturists and 
speak a peculiar persian dialect called Hazargahi. 
The Hazaras are members of the Shia sect of Islam, 
more precisely of Ithna Ashariyah, whose beliefs they 
share with the majority of Iranians. Hazaras have a 
reputation for physical strength, endurance and industry 
in task that does not require mental ability. 
The Turkick group in Afghanistan the Turkomen are 
found mostly in the northwest. Most authorities belief 
they are descended from the Orghuz Turks who entered the 
area in the 11th century. They speak Turkish dialect of a 
western type. They game name to the region as Turkistan. 
1. See for detail, Josia Harltom, Central Asia (London, 
1939), p. 82. 
Turkumen are still pastoral, tribal nomads, the most 
important tribes being the solar, sariq and Tekke. 
They have a distinct economic role as breeders of 
the Karakul sheep, whose pelts - known as karakul 
astrakhan, or Persian lamb - and constitute the main 
export items of Afghans. Turkomen women are weavers and 
dyers of the deep red "Bokharan" rug which is another 
noted product of the region. 
The other interesting people in Afghanistan are the 
Kafirs, now Nurs and Nuristan after becoming Muslims. The 
Nurs consists of two main groups - the Black coats and the 
White coats, who are subdivided in turn into 9 member of 
2 
tribes. They speak language closely related to Dardic. 
The Nurs who live in villages and carry on mixed 
3 
agriculture and pastoral economy. 
In addition to these main racial groups there were 
a number of smaller groups - Baluchis, Hindus, Jews, the 
Turki speaking Uzbeqs of the northern plains and Brahuis 
from Baluchistan. None of them exhibited any significant 
political influence with the exception of the Kizzilbash 
1. The Kafirs were forcibly converted to Islam by Abdur 
Rahman who decreed that the name be changed to 
Nuristan-
2. See for detail G.S. Robertson; The Kafirs of the Hindu 
Kush (London, 1896). 
3. Ibid. p. 86. 
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(meaning red headed) a small, Persian speaking group 
centred in Kabul. 
The political structure of the country always found 
to be based in past upon the tribal system and partly upon 
a system of feudal obligations not unlike that of medieval 
Europe. The tribe served as the basic unit, led by chief 
(Sirdar) elected for life from amongst the leading tribal 
families and the whole tribe followed him. They followeld 
the tribal code of Pushtunwali which is essentially based 
upon the concept of Badal (blood venegeance), Melmastia 
(hospitality) and Nanawatai (the right of asylum). Such a 
nature result in the persistent instability of the Afghan 
political life. Nevertheless, they helped the Amir in 
Kabul during wars, mostly impelled by religious or 
xenophobic emotions to take-up arms against an invader and 
offered stiff resistance in spite of apparent diversity 
and disunity among them. 
The complexity of Afghan custom and traditions have 
received the greatest influence of geography, topography 
as well as from India, Iran and Turan. All these are 
reflected in some degree in Afghanistan. Yet the strongest 
influence is that of Iran and the Middle East. Moreover it 
1. Pushtunwali worked as a cultural system in which notion 
of "Silai" equality of all male Pushtun was the basis 
of the conventional ideology of Pastunwali. For detail, 
see, Dupree, Anderson; The Cultural basis of Afghan 
Nationalism, from I.W. Boesen (Honour in Exile), p.164. 
11 
is the Pushtun who have exercised unique impact on the 
political and cultural life of Afghanistan. 
*** 
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CHAPTER - II 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT 
The history of Afghanistan during the last two 
hundred years is the history of Abdali tribes. Ahmad shah 
Abdali was the natural choice of the tribal chiefs, 
following the assassination of Nadir Shah when chaos and 
2 
confusion prevailed. Ahmad Shah known as Ahmad Shah Baba 
(father of the Nation) was a tribal unifier,the leader of 
3 
a powerful tribal confederation which by conquest became 
an empire. Ahmad Shah Abdali was elected Amir in 1747. 
Thereafter nearly all the rulers of Afghanistan belonged 
to the Abdali tribe, with the exception of 
Bacha-i-Saqqao's rule. He not only unified the country 
but also organised raids into neighbouring 
territories. Within the short span of a quarter of a 
1. Abdali tribe later came to be known as Durrani tribe. 
2. When Nadir Shah was assassinated by his mutinous 
soldiers, Ahmad Shah took possession of his vast 
treasure and commanded well his troops. Formore detail 
on the event See. Harold Josif, "Political stability on 
the North-West Frontier of South A^sia", Mimeographed 
(Washington, D.C.; Deptt. of State Foreign Service 
Institute, August 1951), p. 53. See also Lockhart; 
Nadir Shah (London : Luzac, 1938). 
3. For detail study on tribal formation in Afghanistan and 
its role and impact on Afghan history. See. Olaf Caroe; 
The Pathans (550 B.C--A.D. 1957), London, Macmillan,1965 
4. Bacha-i-Saqqao, has been described by many English 
writer as "Bandit" whereas Amanullah himself termed him 
a common thief while addressing to Koh-i-Daman People 
during his final revolt. Aman-i-Afghan, X no. 66, Jaddi 
1307, January 1. 1929. 
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century Ahmad Shah was not only able to liberate 
Afghanistan from foreign yoke but carried his victorious 
arms from Meshhed to Kashmir and from the Oxus to the 
Arabian sea. 
2 
„. „ m,.„„^  cv,=v, ascended the throne after his 
His son Timur Shah 
death in 1793. He was not an able ruler like his father 
and lacked the energy and farsightedness. He could not 
exert himself and gave rise to many problems and 
dissensions.The tribal chiefs exploited the situation to 
free themselves as much as they could from the Amir of 
Kabul and that was the pattern throught the Afghanistan. 
The shifting and vascillating policy and easy going 
temperament of Timur Shah Paved the disintegration of the 
Afghan empire which was founded and consolidated by 
3 
Ahmad Shah. 
1. For the Invasion and conquest of Indian territories by 
the Durrani's. See. Macmunn, George; Afghanistan. 
London 1929, pp. 87-103. 
2. Timur Shah was the favourite son of Ahmed Shah and thus 
was chosen as the heir apparent and later on king 
though he could not exert much influence on Afghan 
history. For the account of his reign See G.T. Vigne; A 
personal Narrative of a visit to Ghazani, Kabul and 
Afghanistan London, iB4U, p. J/6:. 
3. It is not suitable to a successor of a great king to 
rest upon his father's laurels and enjoy perfect 
tranquality and without exerting himself for it. See 
Ali Mohammad; A short History of Afghanistan, Kabul, 
1970, p. 17. 
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After the death of Timur and following the contest 
of succession, Timur Shah's fifth son Zaman Shah was able 
to occupy the throne with the help of Sardar Payenda Khan. 
The powerful chief of Barakzais. As Zaman Shah had 
inherited several problems; a significant features of his 
reign was the civil war among the various constituents of 
the Afghan empire and his relations. Humayun and Mahmood 
both thinking themselves the lawful heirs to the throne, 
took up arms to fight for the throne- However by the end 
of 19th century Zaman Shah could consolidate his position. 
Zaman Shah consolidated his position in Afghanistan and 
was viewed by the British as a serious problems and 
2 
threats to their interest. Zaman Shah turned his 
attention to India with the sole object of turning out the 
British from that country. He had problem back home of his 
own security, no significant success was expected in his 
adventure. The British were alarmed by intention and plans 
against them. The British began to prepare for countering 
any Afghan advance towards the British Indian Empire. 
1. Zaman Shah was the eldest son of Timur Shah, but was 
always harrassed by his half brother Mahmud. The gain 
from this was directly to the Sikhs who by 1798 seized 
Rawalpindi, Multan and most of Punjab. 
2. A policy very soon to be complicated with the designs 
of Russia which had birth before even the days of 
Napolean and his ambitious schemes. See, Macmunn, Sir 
George; Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah, London, 
1929, p. 74. 
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Mahmud Shah the contender of the throne was extended help 
by the British. Captain Malcom deputed Fateh Ali Shah 
Kajar to bring the downfall of Zaman Shah. 
They besieged Kabul and then advanced upon into the 
other strategic locations of Afghanistan. Zaman Shah then 
in Lahore hurried back to retrieve the losses but was 
deceived by his own commander Ahmad Khan Nurzai. Due to 
this treachery the cause of Zaman Shah became almost 
hopeless in Afghanistan. Zaman Shah was blinded and on the 
order of Mahmud shah was sent to jail. Thus came to an end 
of Zaman Shah's reign. 
The reign of Mahmud Shah started from 1800 AD and 
continued only for short three years. He was incapable 
selfish and indolent ruler. He took no interest in the 
welfare of his people rather emptied the treasures 
accumulated by his father and grandfather and had left the 
entire affairs of the state in the hands of his powerful 
and resourceful Vazir Fateh Khan. Fateh Khan was rival to 
Akram Khan Alizai and their internecine conflict made 
people to believle that the ruler was weak. It also 
fuelled the hostilities of the other various chiefs of the 
Afghan society. The influential chiefs then decided to 
invite Shah Shuja (a brother of Zaman Shah) and place him 
on the throne. Zaman Shah remained imprisoned at Bala 
Hissar. 
1. Mahmud was little fit to sit in the saddle of Ahmad 
Shah For detail See. Macmunn, George; Afghanistan from 
Darius to Amanullah, London, 1929. 
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Shah Shuja (1803-1809) had come on the throne 
through popular support, was incapable of restoring peace 
and prosperity in the country which was in the impact of 
dissension. 
Afghanistan's weakness was exploited by the British 
India, the powerful neighbour including Persia and other 
European powers. Against the designs of Napolean and 
Russia, the British had sent a mission to Kabul under 
Eliphinston for discussing mutual defence and succeeded in 
entering into a treaty of friendship in June 7, 1809. 
Nevertheless, Afghanistan was again beset by turmoil. 
Kabul was occupied by Mahmud and Fateh Khan and marked the 
rise of Barakzais. 
Shah Shuja after making a futile attempt to recover 
his throne was at last imprisoned at Peshawar and carried 
off to Kashmir. Though in 1810 he was able to make good 
his escape but could not be successful in recovering his 
throne. 
The notable feature of the decade was a period of 
civil war, anarchy and increasing involvement of Russia 
See. ^li Mehrunissa; .Pak-Afghanistan^_, Discord., ^  A 
Historical Perspective (Documents 1855-197 9), Pakistan 
Study centre, karachi, T.990. 
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and Britain and their intense rivalry in the region. Such 
was the condition till the coming of Dost Muhammad on 
Afghan throne. Dost Muhamad (1826-39) gave stability to 
the country and started campaigns against neighbouring 
powers, starting with raids against Sikhs on the question 
of Peshawar. But the Sikh ruler cleverly had avoided any 
2 
confrontation and remained in a advantageous position, in 
Nov. 1837 Mahmud Shah of Persia's seige of Herat and 
Russian design further complicated the situation of 
Afghanistan. Moreover the British in India were 
apprehesive of the Russian design and decided to sent the 
famous "Burnes Mission". However it was aptly check-mated 
by the Russian Mission of Viktovitch at Kabul about the 
same time. 
The failures of Burne's Mission provoked Lord 
Auckland to the extent that he launched in 1838 the 
invasion of Afghanistan popularly known as the First 
1. Following the Napolean defeat at Waterloo in 1815 the 
Anglo-Russian rivalry for sphere of influence in Asia 
was intensified Persia's Weakness and Afghanistan's 
fratricidal civil war, provided fertile ground for 
their machination. See. Ali Mehrunisa; Pak-Afghan 
Discord, A Historical perspective (Documents 1855-1979) 
Karachi, 1990, p. 2. 
2. The long civil war in Afghanistan preceding Dost 
Mohammad had cost Afghanistan dearly in terms of 
territory lost. Punjab was permanently lost in 1801, 
Kashmir in 1819, Baluchistans eastern province by 1823 
and Peshwar in 1834. All these above areas conquered by 
Ahmad Shah were lost and when Dost Muhammad became Amir 
his control was confined to Kabul and Ghazani only. 
Inspite of all his efforts he could not succeed in 
regaining Peshwar from Ranjit Singh. 
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Afghan War (1839-1842). In August 1839 they restored Shah 
Shuja to the throne in 1839, and kept the British forces 
ostensibly to strengthen the Monarch's position, despite 
the fact that Dost Muhammad after being defeated had fled 
the country. The presence of strong factors i.e. the 
occupation of the country, the presence of unpopular. Amir 
on the throne and the discontinuation or reduction of 
subsidies of the tribal chiefs, led to such an insurgency 
in (1839-40 >v*iich it was difficult to contain. That followed 
the British nightmare on January 3rd 1842, in which whole 
British garrission of 16,50 0 men were massacred. The event 
has been described as "Aucklands' folly" which has 
astonished the Imperialist. The New Governor General 
reversed the British India's Afghan policy and with drew 
all his men from Kabul. Dost Muhammad, the, ex-Afghan Amir 
was also released and reinstated- There after Dost 
Muhammad ruled till 1863. He was succeed by his son Sher 
Ali Khan (1863-79) who was also constantly troubled by his 
own brother Afzal Khan and Azam Khan. British greed and 
2 their "forward policy" once again created an atmosphere 
for the second Afghan war of 1878-81. Sher Ali had to face 
the British army which had crossed the famous (Khyber and 
1. Quoted from, Patrick A. Macrony; The Fierce Pawns, New 
York; Lippincolt, 1966. 
2. For "Forward Policy", See. Bilgrami, A.H.; Afghanistan 
and British India (1793-1907), Sterling Press, New 
Delhi, 1972, pp. 236-7. 
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Bolan) passes into Afghanistan on Nov. 21, 1878. Though 
Amir Sher Ali died after that in Feb. 21, 1879. 
Sher Ali Khan had during his rule started a Persian 
papers called "Shams-ul Nihar" and had introduced modern 
postal system. He had started reorganising the Afghan army 
on Modern lines. 
Sher Ali Khan son Yakub Khan called for ending the 
2 
war and negotiated with the British on May 20, 1879. Thus 
by the treaty of Gandamak (26 May 1879) Yakub Khan agreed 
3 
upon to give a number of concession to the British. 
For the time being, the British Government's 
forward policy seemingly helds its sway. But Yakub Khan did 
not reign for long and due to weak physique, he could not 
take active part in the functioning of the Government. 
1. For the details of Second Anglo-Afghan skirmishes and 
the role play by Amir Sher Ali, See. Lady, Betty 
Bolfour; Lord Lytton's Indian Administratioa. London 
1899 p. 313. 
2. The intricacy of the Yakub Khan's giving up to British 
for a negotiated settlement can only be understood 
after the thorough study of circumstances and later on 
term of treaty. See. R.S. Rastogi; Indo-Afghan 
Relations; Appendix (i), pp. 217-219. an3 Also Tn 
Aitchmson, C.U.; A collection of Treaties Engagements 
and Sanads Relating to India and neighbouring countries 
(Cal. 1933), vol. XIII, p. 240. 
3. For the circumstances and terms of treaty. See, 
Bilgrami, A.H.; Afghanistan and British India 
> 1793-1907 : . Sterling Publication, New Delhi, 1972, 
p. 195. 
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Disorder and chaos became the order of the day and 
in Kabul Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British envoy, was 
murdered (Sept. 1879) while led to the British opening up 
of the hostilities and forcing his abdication. 
After his abdication Ayub Khan, the son of Amir 
Sher Ali Khan continued with the Afghan resistence which 
culminated in the famous battle of Maiwand (27th July, 
1880) in which he routed a British Army at Maiwand. It 
was the first major attempt to drive out the British. The 
British faced extreme hardship during the war and decided 
to retreat. ^ 
Though British withdrawal could not bring peace and 
again Afghanistan reverted back to internecine conflicts. 
2 
Amir Abdur Rahman of the Barakzai lineage, was able to 
defeat Amir Ayub Khan in the ensuing civil war and sat 
on the throne of Kabul in 1880. The New Amir with great 
1. See for detail Dodwell, H.H.; Cambridge History of 
India, VI, p. 422. It was the time when Amir Abdur 
Rahman was consolidating and this battle infact helped 
him to set his feet strongly against the British 
designs. 
2. Son of Amir Afzal Khan and grandson of Amir Dost 
Mohammad Khan, was in exile in Central Asia as the 
quest of Russian Government. 
3. While marching from Kabul to Kandhar, Abdur Rahman had 
instructed his chief in Turkistan, Sir Kudus Khan to 
march upon Herat which was sure to have been left 
insufficiently guarded by Ayub Khan. Kuddus occupied 
Herat, Ayub eventually fled to Persia. See for text in 
Abdur Rahman Khan's Autobiography, 1, pp. 193. 
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energy and determination established peace and 
determination and a strong Central Government. During his 
reign the boundaries of Afghanistan was fixed with the 
neighbouring countries. On Nov. 12, 1893 the Amir was 
forced to relinquish his control over the border tribes 
and to accept a new line of demarcation so called "Durand 
line". The Amir till the end of his life bitterly resented 
the high handedness of the British because their 
intervention had deprived Afghanistan; control of over one 
third of its population.. 
Amir Abdur Rahman had liberalised the Government by 
constituting a Royal council with the most powerful chiefs 
as its members. In this way he tried to check the powerful 
2 tribal chiefs. He had also thwarded Russian attempts to 
penetrate in Afghanistan in 1882 and in 1884 and kept the 
British at bay. Cttrzon described Amir Abdur Rahman as an 
outstanding man of his times. Whereas a modem historian 
3 
calls him a hard man who ruled a hard people. 
1. On the boundary settlement during Amir Abdur Rahman, 
both the powers i.e. Russia and British India played 
their shrewdest policies reflected in diplomacy through 
boundary commission. For details see. Correspondance 
respecting the demarcation of NW Afghanistan III, pp. 
43-60, and Also Tikekar, S.R.; 'The Durand Line', 
Indian Quarterly, Oct. - Dec. 1950. 
2. For the nature of the Government during Amir Abdur 
Rahman reign. See. Amir Abdur Rahman; The life of Abdur 
Rahman (Biography), ed. by Mir Munshi (London I John 
Murray, 1900). 
3. Quoted from Fletcher, Arnold ; Afghanistan, History of 
Conquest, Cornell University Press, 19^5, p. 154. 
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Amir Abdur Rahman Khan died in Oct. 1901 and was 
succeeded by his eldest son Habibullah unlike previous 
occasions the succession this time was peaceful and with-
out any conflict. It is said that his reign was an added 
tribute to the rule of Abdur Rahman, not only Habibullah 
ascended the throne peacefully but also because of 
cautions and steady pressure he put on the tribes, the 
available relation he maintained with both Russia and 
2 
Britain and the able manner in which he preserved Afghan 
neutrality during world war I. Amir Habibullah Khan was an 
enlightened monarch and a man of mild nature. He wanted 
to encourage education and modern ways of living for the 
Afghans. Habibia High School was opened up in Kabul while 
Siraj-ul Akhbar began to infuse a new life and a new 
spirit of nationalism into the country. Modern small 
industries were installed and road construction was 
3 
started on a large scale. 
1. The credit must go to Amir Abdur Rahman himself in this 
kind of situation as he had foresightedly sought to 
avoid the mistakes of his successors. See Abdur Rahman; 
Abdur Rahman (Biography) ed. by Mir Munshi (London, 
John Murray, 1900) II, Chap. I, pp. 1-13. 
2. The first thing Habibullah did after ascending the 
throne was maintaining constant pressure on the tribes 
then onwards maintained a tactical relations with the 
two powerful neighbours. See, for details the initial 
stage of Hibibullah's tactical maneouvers - A.H. Grant: 
A winter at the court of an Absolute Monarch", 
Blackwoods Magazine (LXXX (Nov. 1906). 
3. For the talk between Amir Habibullah and British India 
Government. See, A.U. Aitchinson, A collection of 
Treaties, Engagement and Sanads Relating to India and 
neighbouring countries (Cal. 1933) vol. XIII, pp. 
45-60. 
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In 190 7 the Amir had visited India at the 
invitation of the British Indian Government. He observed 
strict neutrality on the question of World War I, even 
after the presentation of joint German-Turkish Mission of 
Kazim Bay and Neidermeyer. Afghanistan was the area where 
the Europeans had conflicting interests. For long the 
British were engaged to stop the expansion of Russia in 
the region. The new entrants were Turkey and Germany. In 
such a fluid situation Amir Habibullah demonstrated his 
attributes, tact and diplomacy. 
In Feb. 1919 feeling that time had come when he 
might claim the reward for his stead fastness during the 
war and indicate his policy to his people, he wrote to the 
viceroy by the peace conference of Afghanistan's absolute 
2 liberty, freedom of action and perpetual independence. 
Even before the World War I Anglo-Russian convention, of 
31 August, 1907 mentioned the various aspects of relations 
concerning Afghan and both resolveld to stay away from 
interference in the Afghan affairs, in a way giving 
1. For Turko-German Intrigue and Amir Habibullah's role 
during the World War See. R.K. Trivedi; The Critical 
Triangle, India, Britain and Turkey (1909-1.924}. 1994 
Publication Scheme, Jaipur, India pp. 167-179. 
2. As Amir Habibullah himself had assured the neutrality 
of Afghanistan during the War, he now wanted the 
reward. See. Habibullah postscript in his own 
handwriting in his reply to the Viceroy. Viceroy to 
India office, 11 august, 1915, p. 2930/1915, L/Ps/10/ 
478, Part III, lOL, as quoted in R.K. Trivedi, The 
Critical Triangle, India, Britain and Turkey, Jaipur, 
1994, p. 185. 
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Afghanistan enough room for deciding her own policies. 
Though Amir Habibullah could not live to see the 
day and was assassinated while at shooting camp at Kala 
2 
Ghosh in the Laghman Valley on the 20th Feb. 1919. As 
unlike his father Amir Abdur Rahman, Habibullah had not 
designated his successor to any one, a possible civil war 
3 
was imminent, with Amanullah deciding to seize power. The 
Amir was survived by a number of children, only two were 
adult and legitimate. The first son Inayatullah, though 
had inferior position due to her mother being non-Pushtun 
4 
and a concubine. Whereas Amanullah who was 29 at the time 
of Habibullah's death, was born of Ulaya Hazrat or "first 
queen" who held enough halo around her to command the 
harem politics. She was the daughter of Loyanab Sherdil 
Khan, the leading chief of the Barakzai Durrani and the 
5 
most powerful tribal leader m the country. 
1. For a detail text on the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
31st august 1907 concerning Afghan. See Phillip, C.E.; 
Evolution of India and Pakistan, Oxford University 
Press, 1962, op.cit., pp. 485-86. 
2. The court, according to usual custom, was in winter 
residence in Laghman, north of Jalalabad. 
3. Habibullah's sudden death without having named any 
successor, and the absence of primogeniture in 
Afghanistan meant a renewal of the once customary 
scramble for the throne. Quoted from Fletcher, Arnold; 
Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, Cornell University 
Press, New York, 1966, pp. 185-86. 
4. For the detail family lineage of the Sons' s of 
Habibullah, See, Leon, B. Pollada; Reform and Rebellion 
in Afghanistan (1919-1929) Cornell University Press, 
1973. pp. 37-58. 
5. Cf. Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan (London; 1906, p. 362. 
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Apart from these two the third contender was 
Nasrullah, the brother of Amir Habibullah, Asadullah, the 
younger half brother of Amanullah, who was the son of 
another royal queen, the Ulya Janab, presented a threat as 
her mother Ulaya Janab was the sister of Nadir Khan, of 
the influential Musahiban family, and she was somewhat 
equally powerful as that of Amanullah's mother i.e. Ulaya 
Hazrat. 
Then the actual contest for the throne was to 
start. Nasrullah, the brother of the deceased Amir and 
Inayatullah the younger son of the Amir were with then at 
Paghman (the place where the Amir was assassinated), they 
alongwith the deceased body of the Amir returned to 
Jalalabad, where at a meeting with the courtiers and 
tribal leaders Inayatullah and Nasrullah both put forth 
2 
claims to the throne. 
But the real contender for the throne. Amanullah 
was groomed in such a way as he was to emerge enough 
powerful during the time of the claim of the throne. Ulaya 
Hazrat had exerted all her considerable skill* 
intelligence, and influence in preparing Amanullah for the 
1. Cited from Leo B. Poullada; Reforms and Rebellion, 
Cornell University Press, 1966, New York, p. 38. 
2. A great detail of the ensuing contest for the throne 
can be gathered from Fletcher Arnold; Afghanistan, the 
Highway of Conquest, Cornell University Press, New 
York, 1966, pp. 185-186. 
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throne. The same lady had put Amanullah through a 
rigorous course of training in the arts of political 
intrigue and government. 
While Nasrullah's declaring himself Amir at 
Jalalabad had hardly affected Amanullah's prospect of 
seizing power, who had previously served as regents as 
well as commander in chief of the Royal force. Apart from 
that, Amanullah by chance happened to be at Kabul and 
3 
seiged the Arg (a combination of royal residence, fort 
and treasury) and enlisted the army's support by doubling 
4 
the salaries of the soldiers and promised them of 
improving their lot. With all these in Amanullah's favour. 
1. As cited by Leo B. Poullada; Reform and Rebellion in 
Afghanistan, 1919-1929, CornelF" University 1966, from 
All Ahmad, 'The fall of Amanullah', manuscript, 
translated by R.N.G. Scott, lOL, LPS/10 P53/1285/1929, 
Parts 1 and 2, p. 38. 
2. The role of Ulaya Hazrat in shaping Amanullah in the 
arts of politics and government was immense, for more 
elaboration on the same Cf. Confidential letter from 
Major W.A.K. Eraser to secretary of State for Ind a 
dated 20 July 1929, lOL, LPS/10/1232 P50/1929. See 
also Obituary of Major General William Archibald 
Kenneth Fraser in the Royal Asian Journal, LVI, Part II 
(June 1969). 
3. Arg (citadel) was itself the symbolic seat of power and 
who ever controlled the Arg was controlling the capital 
Kabul. 
4. Cf. Siraj-ul-Akhbar (Kabul), Feb. 19, 1919. 
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he took no time in despatching contingents against 
Nasrullah and Inayatullah. Although Nasrullah and 
Inayatullah promptly withdrew their claims in favour of 
Amanullah, they were arrested and brought back to Kabul 
along with other family members and associates. Those 
found guilty of conspiracy were put to death and others 
were released and restored to their position. Nasrullah 
died in jail whereas Inayatullah was released. On 13 
April, 1919 Amanullah held Public Darbar and was 
recognised as full fledge king of Afghanistan. 
1. For a detail sketch of Amanullah's contest for the 
throne. See Rhea, Talley Stewart; Fire in Afghanistan 
(New York, Doubleday, 1973). 
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CHAPTER - III 
AMANPLLAH ; EARLY DAYS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING HIS 
PERSONALITY 
King Amanullah was born in 1892 at Paghman near 
Jalalabad Province. The third son of Amir Habibullah, he 
was rightly groomed by his able mother Queen Ulaya 
2 
Hazrat. Amir Habibullah apart from contracting marriages 
with numerous tribal leaders daughter, had among them one 
queen Ulaya Hazrat from a powerful Barakzai lineage of a 
Pushtun family, daughter of Loyanab Sher Dil Khan and 
sister of Loyanab Khushdil Khan. Habibullah's harem was 
exceptionally large with four (nikahi) wives and numerous 
3 
concubines (surati). These alliances were of political in 
nature and thus wives .were drawn from different ethnic 
4 
races hailing from different parts of the country. Apart 
from Amanullah other Elder Princes included Inayatullah 
1. Paghman is famous township just near to Jalalabad the 
winter capital in those days. 
2. Ulaya Hazrat or the first Queen in the harem of 
Habibullah. Ulaya Hazrat was very powerful lady due to 
her being connected with "Dil" tribe and her Pushtun 
extraction (Brakzai clan). Cf. Poullada B. Leon; Reform 
and Rebellion, p. 36. 
3. Though strictly speaking surati was considered a legal 
wife but below the rank of "royal" queen. Cf. Poullada, 
op.cit., p. 37. 
4. Firstly it was exclusively from the Pushtun that the 
lady would come then non-Pushtun also included such as 
Nuristani, Hazara, Badakhshi, Shognani and Chitrali all 
of whom produced numerous offsprings. Cf. May Schinasi, 
Afghanistan at the Beginning of 20th century, p. 169. 
5. His mother was queen Ulayajah, called Badr-ul-Harem, 
was a daughter of Abdul Majid of Tagaw; her name was 
saheb jamal. She died in Kabul on 12 Nov. 1918. Cf. 
Seraj-ul-Akhbar, VIII 4, pp. 9-10 as cited by May 
Schinasi, A Study of Seraj-ul-Akhbar, Naples, 1973, 
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(born 1888), Hayatullah (born 1888) while Mohammad All 
(born 1907), Abdul Majid (born 1908). Asadullah (born 
1910) and Mohanunad Amir were still minor during the time 
of contest after the throne in 1919. With the superior 
2 position of her mother Ulaya Hazrat , Amanullah was given 
undue favour over his elder brothers, as only the son of a 
Pushtun queen was to acquire the throne. Thus Amanullah 
would not feel scared of his brothers except that of his 
uncle Nasrullah and his younger half brother aisadullah 
who by virtue of being from the Pushtun extraction and 
Musahiban lineage was being backed by his mother Ulaya 
4 
Janab who was second only to Ulaya Hazrat. 
According to Ali Ahmad the Ulaya Hazrat put 
Amanullah through a rigrous course of training in the arts 
of political intrigue and government. She also summoned 
1. At his death in 1919 Habibullah had more than twenty 
sons and as many daughters- See Appendix 1. Table 4 
from May Schinasi, op.cit. p. 109 & 258. 
2. Her real name was Sarwar Soltana and the title was 
Seraj-ul-Khawatin. Ibid. 
3. Amanullah's grand title of Aynud-dawlat "Eyes of the 
state" suggests that right from the beginning he was 
unduly favoured over his brother. May Schinasi, 
op.cit., p. 114. 
4. Ulaya Janab being the sister of Nadir Khan and from 
powerful Musahiban family, contained to exert pressure 
to the extent that this phenomena continued down to 
Amanullah's final ouster. Paullada, op.cit., p. 37. 
5. Cf. Ali Ahmad, "The fall of Amanullah", Presents a 
contemporary accoun'ET Manuscript translated by R.N.G. 
Scott, lOL, LPS/10 P53/1285/1929 Parts 1 and 2. 
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her most experienced kinsmen to act as Amanullah's tutor. 
Though Amanullah was not apt pupil and learned little of 
about the tribal political warfare, but deeply engrossed 
his mind in Anglo Phobia Psycosis. 
Not much more is known with certainty about 
Amanullah's boyhood. He is said to have been fond of 
2 
outdoor sports, especially hunting , but later shifted to 
playing tennis. His formal education seems to have been 
3 
acquired in the military school which king had setup for 
young Afghan Aristocrat and which from all reports left 
much to be desired in quality. He had deep love for 
reading but due to his kingly duty abondoned later on. He 
was of a sharp bent of mind a good listener and keen 
4 
observer in the International affair. He was deeply 
interested in religion question and after engaged in 
lengthy consultation with Mullahs. At the early age of 15 
1. Right from the beginning Amanullah was anti-British and 
was always busy in activities against the British which 
manifests his orientation. See May schinasi,op-cit.,p.25 
2. Hunting was his favourite pastime like his father 
Habibullah. He was already armed at the age of 10 with 
a rifle. See about his childhood Wild Roland. Amanullah 
Ex-King of Afghanistan, p. 19. 
3. The two princes Enayatullah and Amanullah were among 
the first to graduate from the first Afghan Military 
school set up by King Habibullah. May Schinasi, 
op.cit., p. 210. 
4. See Leon B. Pullada. Reform and Rebellion, p. 37. 
5. It was the practice of the royal court to organise 
religion function which was headed by the top person 
from royal family. Amanullah used to head such 
religious gathering on various occasion. See for detail 
May Schinasi, Qp.cit., p.118. 
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he confided to one of his aids that he was deeply ashamed 
of the backwardness of his country, and manifested great 
frustration had been denied the greatness it deserved and 
much disliked ignorance of the Afghan people. 
His first two marriages brought unhappy 
experiences. He apparently married first when he was 15 
with a girl with whose name mystery prevails. After few 
days the marriage ended in a divorce. The second marriage 
was contracted with a lady of noble lineage named Shahzada 
Khanum, who died of wile giving a birth to only son 
2 
Hidayatullah. At 21 came the third marriage of his own 
3 
choice with a talented and lovely Soraya Tarzi , the 
4 
daughter of Mahmud Tarzi , she was educated in Syria. Her 
own sister got married with Inayatullah, the half brother 
1. Cited from Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, p. 
39 in which he based his information on the basis of 
interview with the Afghan officials of Amanullah's 
reign who survived till 1968. 
2. The first two marriages of Amanullah was arranged by 
his mother queen Ulaya Hazrat. See Leon B., op.cit., 
p. 40. 
3. Later on she became the most important person in 
Amanullah's life and exerted lot of influence on 
him. 
4. For detail on Mahmud Tarzi comes from Wilber, pp. 20ff 
Fletcher, pp. 180ff. Dupree, "Mahmud Tarzi, A''Forgotten 
Nationalist" Sorab Katrak, Through Amanullah's" 
Afghanistan. Vartan, Mahmud Tarzi and Siraj-ul-Akhbar. 
Middle East Journal XXI (1967) 343-368. 
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of Amanullah. 
Influences on Amanullah 
It is to be noted that one of the persistent 
influences in Amanullah's early life was the anti-British 
sentiments to which he was exposed, first from his 
mother. Later on with the associations from the likes of 
Tarzi's and the Pan-Islamic, anti-colonial propaganda of 
2 
the Siraj-ul-Akhbar. He had also good companion m the 
War Party. This anti-British feeling continued to grow and 
flourish during his entire reign. 
About the influences of Mahmud Tarzi it is widely 
agreed that he exerted more influences than any one else. 
Tarzi an exiled man who was deeply drunk in the fountains 
of young Turk was worldly, early 20th. C liberal in older 
in the most dignified sense of term. He had bitter dislike 
for colonialism and for Britain in particular. He was a 
Brilliant writer a fine conversationist, fluent in Pushtu 
1. During his early youth he was so anti-British that when 
asked the reason of Afghanistan's backwardness his 
reply was "delibrate imperialist policies of Britain 
toward Afghanistan". Cited from Leon B. Poullada, 
op.cit., p. 39. 
2. Siraj-ul Akhbar used to appeared every two weeks 
between 1911 and 1918 during the prime youth of 
Amanullah, and advocated anti-colonial Pan-islamic and 
modern outlook. Amanullah was avid reader of this 
newspaper. See for detail Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 
41 and also May Schinasi, "Afghanistan at the Beginning 
of the Twentieth Century", Nationalism and Journalism 
m Afghanistan, A study of Seraj-ul Akhbar (1911-1918). 
Naples 1979. 
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Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Urdu and French. After returning 
from exile ftabibull^h permitted Tarzi to publish his 
liberal newspaper Siraj-ul-Akhbar which had theme of 
modernization with motto of "Muslim must modernize or 
Perish, colonialism and imperialism must go". Siraj-ul 
Akhbar provided the most powerful single impetus to Afghan 
modernization published every two weeks between 
(1911-1918). Amanullah read it faithfully and during his 
formative years and his marriage to Tarzi's daughter gave 
him ample opportunity to discuss the idea of and 
2 programmes set forth xn the privacy of his own family. 
Right from the beginning Amanullah was among the 
voice of "young Afghan Party" which was a group of 
intellectuals and of young nobles who rallied around 
Tarzi's banner which included such diverse personalities 
1. For detail on Tarzi's influence and association with 
Amanullah, See Vartan Gregorian, Mahmud Tarzi and 
Serai-ul-Akhbar, "Middle East Journal, x5(T (1967), 
345-368; May Schinasi, Nationalism and Journalism in 
Afghanistan. A study of Seraj-ul Akhbalr (1911-1918) 
Naples 1979, Chapter on Mohammad TarzT and Afghanistan. 
2. Amanullah aided by his queen Soraya Tarzi and family 
members of the Amir were very much involved in the 
various aspect of spread of modern outlook and 
conducted compaign for "liberation" of women. 
Amanullah's own sister Qubra Jan was leading the 
women's protective Association (Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-
Niswan) in the mid 1920's. Cited from Leon B. Poullada. 
op.cit., p. 85. 
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1 2 
as Abdul Hadi Dawi and Abdul Ghani etc. But due to the 
beginning of the World War I, Amanullah was included in 
the War Party which wanted Afghanistan to enter into the 
3 War from the side of the central power where as Amir 
Habibullah had sought to maintain neutrality or to have 
secret dealings with the British which definitely had 
antagonised the Pro-Turkish elements or Pro-War Party of 
Tarzi Dawi and Ghani and more significantly young 
4 
Amanullah. The situation was more aggravated when a joint 
Turkish-German Mission headed by Niedermeyar and Kazim Bay 
had visited Kabul on September 26, 1985 and had sought 
Amir's help in attacking British India from Afghanistan's 
side. But the Amir's neutrality had not given any 
1. Young Intellectual, called "Parishan" born in 1895, 
from the Dawi tribe of Qandahar, a Journalist 
(moharrer) and translator (motarjen). Long career in 
Afghan government. See for detail May Schinasi, op.cit. 
p. 66. 
2. Abdul Ghani was an Indian Doctor who was called by 
Habibullah for treatment. May Schinasi, op.cit., p.110. 
3. At first the young Afghan operated openly and always 
met to discussed their ideas. But due to forced 
neutrality of Amir Habibullah drove most of young 
Afghan underground. Cited Poullada,op-cit.,p.l25 . 
4. See L.W. Aamec. Afghanistan (1500-1923) 
A diplomatic history. Berkeley University of 
California Press. 1967. For detail on diplomatic 
implication regarding Habibullah's neutrality. Also 
O.Von Niedermayer, tJnter der Glutsonne Trans, Hamburg, 
1925, pp. 124 et req : and W.O- Von Hentig, Mein Leben-
eine pienstreise Gottingen, 1962, pp. 130 et req. cited 
from Schinasi, pi 7TI 
5. For Turko-German Intrigue against India See the whole 
Chapter VI. Turko-German Intrigue in India during World 
War I in Trivedi, R.K. : Critical Triangle, India, 
Turkey and Britain, Jaipur, 1994. 
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indication of the design to be successful. All these were 
enou gh for antogonising the young Afghan Party including 
Amanullah. This led to an attempt on the life of the Amir 
in 1918 by a student of Habibia college, from that times 
onwards the young Afghan Party had fallenintodisarrear and 
official disfavour. With the assassination of Habibullah 
is 1919 the suspicion of complicity in the murder is 
pointed towards young Afghan and hence some blame goes on 
Amanullah . 
With support from the influential young Afghan 
Party led by Tarzi and of course from her mother, 
Amanullah had ascended the throne of Afghanistan after 
2 
Amir Habibullah's assassination. He also had the support 
of intellectual and the army because of his promise of 
higher pay. Then came a chance of his show-down with the 
Habibullah was assassinated in a mysterious 
circumstances while on hunting trip to Jalalabad. His 
assassination is very much link with the failure of 
Tyong Afghan War Party who wanted him to attack India 
along Turco-German collaboration during the war, but 
his neutrality caused much harm and antagonised a 
section of Afghan Intellectuals. The Prime suspects 
are (Young Afghan and hence Amanullah) Ulaya Hazrat (as 
part of Harem Politics) and one Shujaud-daullah who 
rose to higher position druing Amanullah's reign. Cf. 
Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 
(1919-1929) p. 215. 
During Amir Habibullah's assassination in Jalalabad 
Amanullah was luckily at Kabul acting as regent 
incharge of the fort, treasury and of call importance, 
the army. And thus he was able to overcome other 
contender's for the throne very easily. Cf. Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit. p. 11. 
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much hated neighbour i.e. the British India. He declared 
the war with british India as the "holy war" and launched 
a war which ended in a military stale mate, but the peace 
negotiation at Rawalpindi gave the Afghans the right to 
control their own foreign affairs and thus he had erged as 
the champion of Afghan freedom in the so-called "the War 
of Independence". He also got lot of respects from the 
"Pan-Islamicist" for that during task in out smarting the 
British. His anti-British feeling generated during the 
world War I and later on the "War of Independence", 
continued unabated as the friction in tribal areas 
2 (touching British India) never lessened. His anti-British 
feelings is also reflected from the numerous reports of 
3 
Sir Francis Humphrys, the then British envoy to Kabul. 
1. The description of the Third Afghan War and its 
various implication has been dealt in detail in the 
Chapter at tTie~ same" title i«-this work. 
2. Amanullah being the active member of Young Afghan Party 
was instrumental in according warm welcome to 
Turko-German Mission of Kazira & Neidermeyer. As the 
mission failed he became more antagonistic to the 
British. Later on he fought a war with the British and 
continued the hostility in the name of Border 
Settlement in NWFP. See Leon B. Poullada, p. 46-47, 
237-241. For Boundary Dispute see D.S. Franck, 
"Pushtunistan' Disputed Disposition of a Tribal land", 
Middle East Journal, VI U952), 49-62; Louis Uupree, 
"Pushtunistan ; The Problem and Its larger Implication" 
American University Fieldstaff Reports South Asia 
Series V. 2, 3 and 4. Leon B. Poullada, "Some 
International Legal Aspects of the Pushtun Disputes", 
Afghanistan (Kabul), XXI no. 4 (Winter 1969) pp. 10-38. 
3. Cf. Confidential Reports from Sir Francis Humphrys to 
Mr. Arthur Henderson, July 15, 1929 lOL LPS/10/1289, 
Pt. 6, 1929. 
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The most glaring aspect of Amir Amanullah 
personality is better reflected in his role as the 
"modernizer". The successful tour of the most of the 
European countries (England, France, Italy, Germany etc.) 
and Asian countries (Turkey, Egypt and other Middle 
Eastern countries) in 1927-28 made him more resolved than 
ever to modernize his country at forced draft. It was his 
stay at Turkey with Ataturk and in Persia with Reza Shah 
gave more boost to his revolutionary thinking. The brain 
behind the modernization programe was an experience felt 
for years rather than a sudden thinking. 
The Amir is widely accepted among modern writers as an 
intelligent man, intense and full of vibrant energy apart 
from a gifted innovator and believer in change. Abdul 
Ghani gives a vivid picture of the Amir saying him a 
handsome, well built, amicable and a polite man apart from 
human and a very hard working. Ghani says him a democrat 
2 
and as man proved of his country. Though his support for 
democratic ideas in a tribally dominated country was of 
1. See for detail on Amanullah's "Grand Tour" F. 
Taillardat, "Le voyage du Roi Amanullah", Le Asie 
Francaise, Sep-Oct. 1928, Gregorian pp. 256-258, 
Fletcher 213-215, Fraser Tytler, pp. 207-210. 
2. Abdul'Ghani, Dr. was an Indian Doctor who came to Kabul 
during Habibullah's reign on the Amir's request. He was 
an scholar too and wrote extensively on Afghan issues. 
See Ghani, Abdul A.; Review of the Political Situation 
in Central Asia, Lahore^ ^ n.p. 1921, p"! 143. 
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course the biggest mistake which costed him dearly. This 
gesture of the Amir equating himself with the ordinary man 
in the street, was of course misunderstood by many and 
proved disasterous during the final, revolt. He wanted 
Afghanistan to be an industrialised beautiful, advanced 
country where all modern amenities would be available, 
apart from every Afghan fully educated. He used to reward 
meritorious student and was bent upon educating the whole 
2 
Afghan nation. 
While Lowell Thomas also found him jovial, vital and 
agressive man. But points out that man had not gone 
3 through such hardship as like that of Amir Abdur Rahman. 
Whereas Pernot finds him more a man with modern vision who 
had resolved to ensure the political and economic fortunes 
4 
of his country. Writing m 1929 one of his own kinsmen is 
1. He after insisted that he was no better than any other 
Afghan and that the government must be one of laws and 
not of man. See Leon B. Poullada, op.cit., p. 51. 
2. Cited in Lowell Thomas; Beyond Khyber Pass New York 
Century 1925. P. 206; Rossanne Klass, Land of the high 
flags (N.Y. Random house 1964), pp. 195, 197, also Cf. 
Secret Report by Major E.T.R. Wikham, July 17, 1929, 
IOL/LPS/10/1232/P4656/1927 (Major Wikhan was especial 
escort for the Amanullah Party during the Indian 
portion of the Royal trip). 
3. Lowell Thomas; op.cit. p. 207. 
4. Cited from Pernot, Mourice, En Asie Musulmane Paris, 
Hachette, 1927, pp. 37-38 as quoted by Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit., p. 52. 
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extremely critical of the Amir cites him as a "rash" 
headstrong and more a fool who never applied his reason 
and thus dug his own grave. Contrary to this, a more 
temperate assessment of the Amir' s person is done by 
Najibullah Khan the Amir's brother in law who points him 
as a "patriotic nationalist, a supporter of the freedom 
movement of the East which made him a popular figure in 
Islamic would but hated by the Imperialists". He also 
point out the lacunae in his personality as "emotional", 
inexperienced in European diplomacy and impatient in his 
plans. He accuses the aim of having had a band of unworthy 
2 
men who would not guide him properly. Joseph Castagne 
writing at during initial years of Amanullah was more 
optimistic of the Amir performance when he finds him an 
energetic man, a patriot, a man of spiritual force, 
courageous for seeing, engaged in the great work of 
3 
uniting all muslims together. Leon B. Poullada while 
examining the British confidential reports and official 
1. Cf. Sardar Gul Mohammed Khan (formerly Amanullah's 
envoy in India), "Secret Memorandum of conversation", 
lOL, LPS/10/1292, 1929 at cited by Leon B. Poullada, 
op.cit., p. 53. 
2. See for detail, Najibullah Khan, "Afghanistan in 
Historical Perspective" in current Problems in 
Afghanistan (Princeton). Princeton University 
Conference, 1961, pp. 1-14. 
3. Cited from Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 5 5 as quoted 
from Jos eph Castagne "Notes sur la Politique Exteriure 
de 1'Afghanistan depuis 1919". Revure de Monde 
Musulman, Dec. 1921, 23. 
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correspondence of the period finds them unfavourable and 
more biased to Amanullah."'' Though W.K. Fraser Tytler, who 
served in the British legation in Kabul at that period and 
later became a historian describes the Amir in a balanced 
way. He says a "difficult and baffling personality and 
finds him a patriot, hard working and zealous in promoting 
the interest of the country. While pointing out his 
weakness he finds him an incapable man in choosing good 
advisers, a rash, an absurd, conceit, the man with 
arrogance of disposition. George Mac Munn, the British 
historian is also puzzled by the fact that a man of such a 
high dream had proved to be "a weak and virile leadership" 
wh? n he had to face the toughest task of countering the 
3 last revolt which had ousted him. Several instances 
through supports the view that he was quite bold and had 
enough physical courage. He roamed in the market 
unprotected and had faced a number of attempts on his 
life. 
1. Poullada Leon B., Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 
(1919-1929) Cornell 1973, p. b4. 
2. Cited from Fraser Tiytler; Afghanistan, A study of 
Political Development in Central and South Asia, Jrd 
ed. London Oxford lybv, pp. ^ 00-^ 101: 
3. Cited from George Macmunn. Afghanistan from Darius to 
Amanullah. London, G. Bell & Sons, 1929, p. 35. 
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A number of other commentators have pointed out towards 
the two important traits of the man which had affected the 
political outcome of the events during his reign. His 
reported arrogance and susceptibility to flattey were two 
big weaknesses- He was far sure of himself and quite 
unaware of the opposition he was arousing even among his 
close associate. It is clear from the evidence that he 
tended to carry a chip on his soulder toward any one he 
felt was patronizing him or displaying disrespect 
towards him as a sovereign or towards his country. His 
able advisers like Tarzi and Nadir Khan had been replaced 
by the flatterers like Muhamad Wali Khan, Muhammad Sami 
and Ghulam Siddique. His most of the courtiers were men of 
inferior talents and by all accounts venal and disloyal 
into the bargain. 
As far as religious belief is concerned the Amir 
undoubtedly was a deeply religious man, believing in its 
substance and had little regard for its outward form. In a 
religious orthodox section who is more fascinated by the 
outward form, Amanullah had to face criticism. Even he was 
2 
accused of being Kafir and anti-Muslim. During the final 
1. Cited from Fraser Tytler; Afghanistan : A study of 
Political development in central and south Asia, 3rd 
ed. rev. London, Oxford, 1967, pp. 201-203. 
2. During the final revolt mullahs were able to assuage 
the conscinces of the conservative tribes men by 
assuring them "that they would be fighting against" a 
kafir king, an unbeliever who would defile women's 
modesty traduce the tenets of Islam, and thus destroy 
the very bases of tribal society", cited from Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit. p. 165. 
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revolt the religious propaganda had cost him much more. 
Another penetrating thought somewhat biased graph of 
his personality comes from Sir Henry Dobbs who had gone to 
Kabul in 1921 to negotiate a treaty between Great Britain 
and Afghanistan. He found him the Amir as an interesting 
and complex character" a JOcular, mixing royale whose life 
style were simple. T\ie Amir believed in the Afghan 
brotherhood theory of "Primus interpares". Apart from 
being a hard working, Dobbs found him to be easily 
flattered and swayed with emotions. Another description 
about the Amirs personality comes from Maurice Fouchet "the 
first French Minister to the court of Kabul writing more 
in Panegyric vein, the Amir is potrayed as a man with an 
"astonishing political sense" combined with vigour and 
masterful arts and showing enough courage and self 
control. 
Lastly examining the writing of Major E.T.R. Wikham 
of British Legation in Kabul (1926) we find from him Amir 
Amanullah to be "courageous" who had failed in his mission 
of modernization of the clumsy country. Amanullah is said 
to be the gifted person with many contradictory facets to 
1. Secret Report on the Kabul Mission by Sir H.R.C. Dobbs 
to the Viceroy of India, dated Jan. 9, 1929. lOL/LPS/ 
10809/1919 Cited from Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 61. 
2. See Maurice Fouchet, Notes Sur 1'Afghanistan (Paris : 
Maisonneuve fre res, 1931) pp. 164 ff. Cited from Leon 
B. Poullada, p. 63. 
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his character. He was both bold and brilliant and a proven 
innovator . In short he may be termed as a complicated 
human being who voluntarily assured the responsibilities 
of reshaping his country externally and internally 
simultaneously - which makes us believe in his greatness 
rightly or wrongly. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
AMIR AMANULLAH'S ASSUMING OF POWER AND THE THIRD 
ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
Amir Habibullah was assassinated on Feb. 19, 1919 
and with that the race for the throne begun. Nasrullah the 
brother of Habibullah, and Inayatullah were two powerful 
contender who had been with the king in Jalalabad afnd had 
declared themselves the kings. Whereas Amanullah who had 
often served as the regent in his father's absentia, and 
had been taking independent decision was fortunately at 
Kabul during the event. He captured the Arg (a 
combination of royal residence, fort and treasury) and 
3 
spent the money lavishly for getting support of the army. 
The army though was in his command was rejoiced with the 
improved condition and increased salary, gave him 
overwhelming support. Nasrullah was captured alongwith his 
1. for detailed sketch of Amanullah's contest for the 
throne. See Rhea Talley Stewart; Fire in Afghanistan 
(New York. Double day, 1973). 
2. He had been helped by the circumstances of his being is 
Kabul while every possible claimaint was in the south, 
as quoted from Wild Roland; Amanullah, Ex-King of 
Afghanistan. Hurst and Blackett Ltd. London, TJTTT 
3. Army seeing the prospect of freedom from British 
tutelege supported Amanullah, see for detail in this 
regard Abdul Ghani; A Review of Political situation in 
Central Asia, Ch. 4; See also. Ikbal Ali Shah, The 
Tragedy of Amanullah (London : Alexander, 1933). 
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family members and brought to Kabul. Those, who were found 
guilty were put to death, some were confined to prison and 
those found innocent were freed including Inayatullah.l 
Amanullah in this way seized the throne of 
2 
Afghanistan on April 13, 1919 and held a Public Darbar 
and was recognised as the full fledge king of Afghanistan. 
Before that Amanullah^ a few week ago vowing to bring the 
murderer of his father to justice^ had steered the people 
3 
by his public oratory. He claimed that his legitimacy and 
his mandate to rule emanated from the Afghan nation. 
Personal popularity of Amanullah in the army and among the 
Barakzais provided him an added strength from the start of 
his reign. 
After the arrest of his uncle Nasrullah and most of 
the members of Habibullah's entourage, kept in pending 
investigation of the assassination. This was an astute 
move that immobilized the leadership of the traditional of 
forces. Nasrullah died in jail and the other members of 
1. Nasrullah was put to confinement and died in jail. 
Whereas Inayatullah who was found innocent freed. 
2. "Darbar" is common among Afghan tribal chiefs and 
particularly during such occassion as coronation of new 
king powerful tribal chiefs from all over are invited 
to attend. 
3. 5iraj-ul-Akhbar (Kabul) Feb. 19, 1919. 
4. During the Habibullah's regime (called Serajiya) the 
court was divided into two faction, one was Pro-reform 
other opposing it. The Pro-reform was led by Amir 
Habibullah, while Nasrullah being very religious led 
the orthodox conservative faction. Getting rid of 
Nasrullah, meant a big relief for the new dynamic Amir 
who wanted no such hindrances. See May, Schinasi, 
Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century; 
A study of Siraj-ul-Akhbar (1911-1918) Naples, T919. 
pp. 34-35. 
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Musahiban family who were found innocent were 
released. 
Amir Amanullah then with consolidating his position 
at home began to unfold his maneouvres in foreign 
affairs. He lost no time in indicating a complete change 
in the Afghan politics as he had spoken in his coronation 
speech of complete Afghan independence on March 1, 1919. 
One of the Amanullah's first acts after seizing the throne 
. was to write a letter on March 3, 1919 to the viceroy, 
of India, Lord Chelmsford, declaring Afghanistan to be 
2 
entirely independent and before that he had declared 
himself and his country as entirely free/ autonomous and 
independant country internally and externally in his 
coronation speech. 
It appears that the British did not view these 
development with any seriousness and attached no 
1. Among the four leading families of Afghanistan, the 
Amanullah family, Charkhi, Tarzi and Musahiban played 
important role in Afghan history. Amir Abdur Rahman had 
Tarzis and Musahiban exiled in turkey and British India 
repsectively. Though Habibullah permitted both of them 
to return. It was Nadir Khan from Musahiban family who 
succeeded Amanullah. Leon B. Poullada, Reform and 
Rebellion, Cornell University Press, pp. 35-36. This 
family is also known as "Peshawar Sirdar family" Cf. 
Caroe, p. 30 7. 
2. Appendix to document no. 98, NAI foreign Political 
files. Frontier 6, 1919. 
3. Ludwig, Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs to the Mid 2(m> 
century. University Arizona, Press, 1974 p~. 46. "&ee 
also East India (Afghanistan). Papers regarding 
Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, Presented to 
Parliament, London, 1919, pp. 4-5 for detail. 
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significance apparently. They were aware of the new 
2 
ruler's Barakzai lineage and tradition and hence possibly 
were convinced that this was a pretext for seeking an 
increase in his stipend. The viceroy of India in a letter 
offered no comments on his declaration of Independence. On 
the contrary, praised Amir Amanullah and expressed the 
hope that the good relation established by ancestors with 
3 the British would be continuing by the new Amir as well. 
Amir Amanullah's declaration of independence and 
autonomy had come at a time when the British were facing 
4 
problems in India. On 13 April 1919 hundreds of peaceful 
political demonstrator had been massacred by the army at 
Jallian walla Bagh in Amritsar. The protest which 
1. Cited from Raja, Anwar; Tragedy of Afghanistan, Verso 
London, 1988, p. 18. 
2. Amanullah's mother Queen Ulaya Hazrat belonged to this 
tribe of Barakzai who had considerable influences. See 
May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the Beginning of the 20th 
century, Naples, 1979, pp. 109-110. 
3. Cf. Anwar Raja, Tragedy of Afghanistan, Verso London, 
p. 18. 
4. Before that during the World War I Britain had managed to 
keep India fairly quite by a combination of military 
controls and vague promises of post war liberal 
reforms- See, Holden Furber; British Conquest and 
Empire, in W. Norman Brown, ed.^ India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1951), p.167. 
5. The Hunter commission found that General Dyer had 
ordered his troops to fire into a packed crowd of 
15,000 confined in a stadium resulting 379 dead and 200 
wounded (Annaul Register, 1919, p. 272). 
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followed had swept across India's major cities of Bombay, 
Delhi and Lahore. An Afghan declaration of independence at 
this point could only be viewed by the Indian as an 
example to be followed. 
As soon as the reports reached Kabul of serious 
roiting, in the Punjab, the Afghan government took steps 
2 
to put pressure on the British m India. On April 13, 
1919 Amanullah invited a number of influential frontier 
chiefs to Kabul and told them that the holy war was 
imminent? He also ordered concentration of Afghan Army on 
the eastern border, where one section under General Swaleh 
4 5 
Khan , proceeded to Dakka near Khyber, second under Nadir 
Khan to Matun (Khost) and third commanded by Abdul Quddus, 
was posted at Kandhar. 
1. Cited from. Raja Anwar; The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 
Verso/London, p. 18. 
2. Cited from, Fletcher Arnold; Afghanistan /Highway of 
Conquest, Cornell University Press, New Yorlw 1966, 
p. 189. 
3. Quoted from, Arnold Fletcher; Afghanistan, Highway of 
Conquest, Cornell, 1966, p. 189. 
4. Swaleh Khan was the commander-in-chief of the Afghan 
army. 
5. Dakka was~an iii^ ortant"military:xmtp:ost'"f<^ ^ iriiles'away 
from Khyber Pass. 
6. Nadir Khan, the Afghan war Minister during the Afghan 
•war of Independence had succeeded Amanullah as king. 
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The British Government of India deployed 7,50,000 
troops all along the Durand line in an operation 
involving some 400,000 transport animals. Facing this army 
were 38,000 Afghan infantry men (one half of them with 
small bore rifles and the rest with 19th century Martinis 
and Sniders) 8,000 cavalry men and 4,000 artillery men 
2 
with low quality guns. The Afghan army had neither 
aircraft nor mechanised units. 
The stage was set for the Third British Afghan 
3 
War , which began on May 6, 1919. From the beginning it 
was the most uneven contest ever fought. The British 
forces were fifteen times strong in size to that of the 
Afghan Army. They were armed with mortars, tanks and 
aircraft. In addition to it had behind it the experience 
of four year's of first World war. Compared to the British 
they had outdated weapons. The British bombed Kabul. The 
fighting began on three major fronts. At Khyber the tribal 
1. The drawing of this "boundary" the so-called Durand 
line had often belen challenged by the Afghan at 
various times. See D.S. Franck; Pushtunistan : Disputed 
Disposition of a Tribal Land; Middle East Journal Vi 
(1952) p. 49-62, Louis Deupree; Pushtunistan V.no. 2,3 
and 4. Poullada B.L., Some International Legal aspects 
of the Pushtunistan Disputes; Afghanistan (Kabul) XXI 
No. 4, 1969, pp. 10-36. 
2. A good account of the type of the guns, and other war 
machinery can be found in Molesworth, G.N. (Lt. Gen.) 
Afghanistan, 1919 (N.Y. Asia Publishing House, 1962) 
Chap. VII. 
3. A detailed description of the war is recorded in 
Government of India, "Official Account of the Thirc 
Afghan War, 1919" (Calcutta : General Staff Army 
Headquarter, 1926). See also G.N. Molesworth, 
Afghanistan, 1919 (N.Y., Asia Publishing House, 1962). 
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militia raised by British rebelled and occupied the area. 
However British counter attacks had not only regained 
control, but pushed back the Afghan nearly 20 km. into 
their own territory. In the Qandhar sector also British 
attack was successful. There was heavy fighting around the 
afghan post of Spin Bolaak which the British eventually 
captured. 
At Khost the Afghan army fought valiantly and 
advanced as far as the contonment of town of Tal. In this 
engagement the military governor of Paktia General Nadim 
Khan, emerged as hero. As hostilities began he pressed the 
local tribes into service. Thirty thousand armed Waziris 
3 
tribesmen , who were settled in British occupied 
4 
territories marched to him and they were joined by other 
tribesmen. Emboldened by the success, tribal parties began 
to carryout daring raids into the British territories. In 
1919 according to one estimate a total of 611 raids took 
1. Spin Baldak was an importlant Afghan fort north west of 
New Chaman, a strongly built fort. 
2. Many of the tribal militia armed by the British 
including powerful Waziris and Mahseed tribes revolted 
in ensuring war. See the series of Secret Telegrams 
from the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, to the Government of 
India, lOL, LPS/10/808/1061, 1919. 
3. Wazirs a highland tribe speakers of soft Pushtun wear 
long hair, not true Afghan. See Olaf Caroe; The 
Pathans, for detail Macmillan. 
4. For detail see, Sadat, Asmat; Afghanistan, Land of 
Jirgas, Kabul, 1986, p. 38. 
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place, resulting in 298 killed, 392 wounded and 463 
abductions, property worth 300,000 rupees was damaged and 
of the invading tribal fighters 119 were killed, 60 
injured and 40 taken prisoner. Most of these raids were 
carriedout behind British line and the main targets were 
2 
British and Indian officers. 
On May 24, Amanullah responded to British feelers 
and the government of India accepted an end to the 
hostilities, as the situation all along the NWF had 
3 
rapidly deteriorated. The hostilities in the third Afghan 
war lasted only a few weeks yet the relations between them 
had deteriorated considerably. Now that the tribes were 
roused last, British would have met far more serious 
opposition if the war had continued. In fact the ferocious 
Darwesh Khel Waziris alone could have done considerable 
damage to the British army. Moreover an epidemic of 
cholera broke out in the British army, with heavy 
4 
mortality. Thus war was to- end, though as a military 
1. See for detail Saunan Island, India, Pakistan and 
Pakhtunistan, Stockholm .1981 , p. 7W. 
2. The detail comes from, Spain, J.W., The Pathan Border 
land, Hague, 1963, p. 186. " 
3. See the series of Secret Telegram from the chief 
commissioner NWFP, to the Government of India, lOL, 
LPS, 10/808/1061, 1919. 
4. All this led to afghan attack more furiously as their 
main tactic was guerilla warfare. See Arnold Fletcher; 
Afghanistan,Highway of Conquest, New York, 1966. 
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stalemate. The viceroy. Lord Chelmsford and his delegate 
Sir H.R.A. Grant were keen for a peaceful settlement of 
the issues. 
Thus on May 28, while the army of Nadir Khan was 
investing Thai, the viceroy received a message from 
Amanullah Khan, who wrote that the action of Swaleh Khan 
had been misinterpreted and that the Afghan had not 
contemplated attacking India. He also requested for 
armistice.In the British reply, the condition under which 
an armisticewould be granted, were "that the Afghan's were 
to withdraw all tropps from the border that the 
British tropps should remain where they now are in Afghan 
territory British troops will not bomb or machine 
gun Afghan localities or troop [;] further that you will 
undertake that your people won't fire upon or molest 
British aircraft. Amanullah's response was the show of 
defiance and challenge. He pointed out that the civil and 
military forces of Afghanistan as identical and that it was 
impossible to move the tribes from the border. He also 
wrote "the spirit of freedom has nearly brought to 
its death, agony, oppression and domination among the 
2 
various nations. 
1. Swaleh Khan, the commander-in-chief then at Peshwar 
commanding the army, could not wait for the expected 
uprising of the tribals against the British and jumped 
the gun before. Through he was dismissed later on. 
2. As cited from Iqbal Ali shah; Afghanistan (London, 
1938), p. 118. 
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Whether the British government was impressed by the 
New Amir's philosophical defiance or forced by 
circumstances, they now agreed to a peace conference. But 
the die hards in the imperial structure both in India and 
England wanted to see the upstart young king of 
Afghanistan, who had dared to challenge British power, eat 
dirt. They objected even to cease fire and were outraged 
at the suggestion that Britain should relinquish control 
of Afghanistan's foreign affairs. 
The British agreed to the peace conference^ which 
was to be held at Rawalpindi. The Afghan delegation was 
led by Ali Ahmad Khan, one of Amanullah's cousin and the 
2 
British by Sir Hamilton Grant. The discussion lasted for 
about a forthnight (from July 26 to August 8, 1919). The 
discussion lasted a longer and were acrimonious in the 
extreme. To the astonishment and the anger of the British 
the Afghan did not behave in the least like a Vanquished 
3 
nation. They put forth the claims to all of waziristan. 
1. See Naftula, Khalfin, British Plots against Afghanistan, 
Novosty, 1981, pp. 92-93. 
2. Sir Hamilton Grant, the foreign secretary to the Govt. 
of India assisted by the Viceroy's personal secretary 
and nine civilian officials and military men. The nine 
member Afghan delegation was led by Ali Ahmad Khan, 
commissiary for Home Affairs. Cited from Naftula 
Khalfin. British Plots against Afghanistan / Novosty, 
1981, pp. 92-93. ' 
3. More on the Afghan approaches see the Report by Sir 
Hamilton Grant to the Government of India no. 108 Sept. 
6, 1919. NAI, Foreign Political Files Frontier B, nos. 
15-138, Oct. 1919, as quoted from Leon Poullada; 
Reform and Rebellion, pp. 250-51. 
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to a much larger subsidy, and to their own independence 
and sovereignty and in their spare time they made 
inflammatory speeches for the benefit of an admiring 
audience of Indians. On August 8, treaty was concluded. 
Its five articles called for the withdrawl of British, 
the cessation of British subsidies and a stop to the flow 
of Afghan war materials through India. No mention was made 
of Afghan sovereignty, but at the request of the Afghan 
delegation a rider to the effect,that it had been implied 
1 
was attached to the treaty. 
Compared with the previous wars the Third Afghan 
War was less bloody yet the British Government of India 
had to spend a huge sum of about £ 16,50 0,0 00. It was a 
drain on them immediately after the end of the World 
war I-
The question needs to be examined as to why did 
Amanullah go in for a war against the British? Fraser 
Tytler holds' that the flood of popular sentiment which 
had swept Habibullah his throne swept Amanullah on to 
it But the Afghan like other young people are liable 
2 
to be volatile". 
1. As cited from, Aitchinson C.V., A collection of 
treaties, Sanads and engagement relating to India and 
neighbouring countries (Cal. > 1933), vol. Xiii, pp. 
45-60. 
2. Fraser, Tytler, Afghanistan, op.cit, p. 35. 
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Within a few weeks of his accession Amanullah had 
antagonised the powerful religious factions by 
imprisioning his uncle Nasrullah for his complicity in 
2 the murder of his father and incurred the resentment of 
the army by releasing the distinguishing Musahiban 
family. Therefore when Amanullah felt his position was 
endangered he sought to reunite his people and bring them 
under his fold. The opinion prevails that war resulted 
primarily due to domestic Afghan causes. Amanullah needed 
independance. Though the British viewed relation with 
Afghanistan in the same way as was concluded with 
Habibullah but Amanullah look it differently. But with the 
emerging of situation^ Amanullah wanted to concluded a new 
agreement with Britain, in which complete independence a 
major term, and which Britain was reluctant to grant. 
British Government was inclined towards Nasrullah. These 
all made Amanullah hostile towards the British. 
1. Nasrullah as has been stated earlier was extremely 
orthodox person opposed to Habibullah's modernizing 
programme. He had a powerful factions of religious men. 
See May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the Beginning of 20th 
century, Naples, 1973, pp. 34-35. 
2. Nasrullah at that time of Habibullah's murder was with 
him in Kalla Ghosh. (Laghman Province) and this is 
suspected of complicity. 
3. Musahiban family along with Nadir Khan (the Minister of 
War) was disliked the Proturkish group in the army. 
There was a kind of schism in Amanullah's cabinet later 
on as Pro- and anti-Turkish factions opposed each 
other. See, the Secret Reoport on the Kabul mission by 
Sir H.R. Dobbs, lOL, LPS/10/809, 1909, for military 
reform controversy. 
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To sumup it can be said that the most important 
reason for the Third Afghan War were Amanullah's fear that 
Afghanistan would again be subjected to the British 
tutelege if he was to practice the policy of his 
predecessors. Amanullah emerged from the conflict as the 
champion of Afghan freedom and Afghan looked upon this 
war as "war of Independence". Amanullah emerged upon the 
war with enormous prestige, not only as nationalist 
fighter who had successfully twisted British lion tail, 
but as one who had done in the name of jihad. 
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CHAPTER - V 
AMIR AMANULLAH'S REFORM MOVEMEMT ; EVOLOTIOH AND CAUSES 
OF ITS FAILURES 
Afghanistan has been for long a closed tribal 
society. A tradition bound and conservative social 
organization. Unlike the other Muslim states it was slow 
in responding to reformist movement going in Persia (Iran) 
and the Ottoman Turkey. The wind of change was accelerated 
by Amanullah. The process of modernization and programmes 
initiated by him, coincided with the complex national and 
international developments. 
Enjoying the glory and growing popularity 
after the Third Afghan War, Amanullah began his programme 
of reform without any ideological overtones. Having 
2 . . . 
acquired independence he was to take up his position as 
an anti-British nationalist as well as a new centre of 
3 
attraction for the Pan-Islamicist who began to see him as 
1. Amanullah's personal prestige was very high with his 
own people as a result of his diplomatic victory in the 
aftermath of the Third Afghan War. Cf. Leon B. 
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, p. 66. 
2. The third Afghan war is known among most of the writers 
as the "War of Independence" which gave Afghanistan a 
kind of freedom from any external control. 
3. Amanullah was involved with the anti-British and 
Pan-islamic activities right from Amir Habibullah's 
days. For a detailed discussion, see. Trivedi, R.K.; 
The Critical Triangle : India, Britain and Turkey, 
1908-1924, Jaipur, 1994, p. 174 ff. ' 
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a new leader particularly after the break up of the 
Ottoman Empire.Amanullah assumed to play a role of a leader 
in the Muslim world. But faced with the responsibilities 
of power, forced him to assume a milder tone on both 
nationalistic and Pan-islamic problems, thus opening up 
for nominal friendship for both the powerful neighbours. 
2 
The abolition of Khilafat led Amanullah to play ma^or 
role and save himself avoiding question on which Muslim 
world was emotional and quite agitatedr Amanullah m the 
changed scenario concentrated on internal reforms in his 
country. 
The tribal society of Afghanistan appeared to be in 
a state of lull and resembled more of a confederation of 
4 highly autonomous tribal units. Such was the political 
climate in which Amanullah launched one of the most 
revolutionary and daring modernization programme, ever to 
be attempted in Asia. 
1. Cited from Fraser Tytler, W.K.; Afghanistan A Study of 
Political Development in Central and Southern Asia, 3rd 
ed. rev. London, oxford University Press, 196/. 
2. For details on the abolition of Khilafat, See Trivedi, 
op.cit., pp. 5-12. 
3. Cited from Sykes, Percy; A History of Afghanistan, 
London^MacmilIan, 1940, p. 2. 
4. The tribal amalgamation into one national stream was 
perhaps never complete. But their living in peace 
during that time itself was amazing which gave 
Amanullah a opportunity to divert his energy towards 
modernization. See for tribal integration. Leon B. 
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, pp. 267-68. 
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Amanullah's reform movement could be divided into 
three phases -
1. The first phase from 1919 to 1923 characterised by the 
formation of a legal judicial and administrative 
framework of his government. 
2. The second phase from 1924-1928 was a transitional 
period from first phase - some new reforms. 
3. The third phase began after Amanullah's return from 
European tour in (July 1928 - Jan. 1929) till his final 
ouster from power. 
He interested himself in initiating reforms in his 
country. He even once remarked that he was ashamed of the 
backwardness of his country and people. Afghanistan as was 
constituted with strong Islamic fabric along with the 
diverse conservative and rigid cultural structure, custom 
and tradition, his task was by no means as easy one yet he 
was clear in his mind. He had seen similar attempts of 
reforms were being made in some of the West Asian 
countries. So his attempts was not an unprecedented 
considering Afghanistan itself the situation was • in many 
ways different from the West Asian countries. The task of 
reform was quite challenging and Amanullah had taken into 
account all these impediments into considerations. 
The code for dress was promulgated. New western 
dress for court functions was introduced. The practice of 
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wearing veil by women was of fipially discouraged. Women 
2 
were given freedom of choiceable marriage. The 
3 
marriageable age for girls was made 18 years. He 
prohibited polygamy, slavery and begir (foced labour). A 
major step towards the initiation and modernization of 
Afghanistan. He started the social welfare projects like 
the re-establishment of Orphanage, General hospitals. Red 
crescent. Midwifery training centre. Mobile hospital got 
underway. Pure Water supply to Kabul was started. 
The reform concerning Education spread the whole of 
his reign starting with the first phase of reform 
(1919-1923). We have got a long list of reforms. A 
significant feature of educational reforms was the secular 
carriculae put into - -actice. School for Clerks and 
1. Ban was also put on wearing Kulap (cap or turban) and 
the karakuli (Karkuli Hat). 
2. As early as 1923 Legislation had assured Afghan women 
certain hitherto desired rights such as freedom to 
marry a man of their choice. See . Nizamnamah-i-Asuri 
Nikah-wa-Khatnasuri (Law concerning engagements, 
marriages and circumcission) 20 Aqrab li02 (Nov. 11, 
1923) Article IV. 
3. Though an attempt to obtain the same : lal saction was 
summarily re -ted in 1928. See The mual Register, 
1928 repoi xng on some of the procee ings of August, 
192B ^je also Sykes, vol. II, Chap. 56. 
4. Begir a kind of forced labour something equivalent to 
corvee especially by the tribal chiefs,was abolished by 
Amanullah in 1922. 
5. The old curriculum contained religious teaching and 
selection from <~ adi, Jami and Paanch Kitab. For 
details see the • cle of A.H. Waleh, 'Five Books and 
the old curriculu Kabu? Times, June 1, 1968. 
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Accountants were started. The pushtun Academy (Pushtun 
Tolana) and abroad educational programme for the young 
Afghan boys were started during this phase. In the second 
phase starting from 1924 to 1928 more reforms regarding 
education were started. Police Academy was founded in 1924 
along with schools for governors and lower ranking 
officers. Stress was also put on the girls education by 
opening up new school and sending batches of students to 
Turkeyf By 1927 a substantial progress had been made m 
that direction as the years budget had provided for 27 new 
primary schools for boys and 3 for girls as well as 
schools for Agriculture and technology. Foreign language 
schools in French (Amaniyah, Istiqlal) German (Nejat) 
British Indian (Ghazi) were established.^ 
In the last stage^ school of vocational training , 
Medical school were opened. During the same stage^colleges 
were started of English, French, German, Languages. Roman 
alphabets and Arabic numerals were required to be used in 
the doctor's prescription. Many Provincial colleges too 
were setup. 
1. The school was known as "Maktab-i-Usul-i-Daftari. 
2. See for detail for the measure. Annual Register, New 
Series (Afghanistan) London, Longman, Green 1919-1930. 
.3. A number of young students were sent to France, and 
other European countries. Among them prominent being 
the Amir's Amanullah's eldest son Hidayatullah, 
Aman-i-Afghan, II no. 18 (1822-23) 1-8 describes the 
elaborate ceremonies for the departing students and 
lists of their names. 
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He took interest in introducing reforms in the 
sphere of culture. Archeology received strong impetus with 
signing of an agreement with France by establishing the 
Delegation Archeologique Francaise en Afghanistan (DAFA). 
A museum was established in Kabul. The solar calender was 
adopted in 1922. There was the expansion of Press and a 
number of papers and journals were started? 
An interest in painting, music and sculpture was 
taken. The art of carpet weaving was imparted to the 
Afghan artisans in 1928 by inviting master craftsmen from 
Persia (Iran) and Turkey. The task of building a massive 
library received a setback when Amanullah was ousted from 
power. 
Amanullah's political reforms were very extensive. 
The reform which covered general governmental reform had 
mostly been covered in the first stage. Afghanistan's first 
written constitution^^was promulgated in 1923. It was made 
1. Early details of work of Archeological mission comes 
from the contemporary work by Macmunn, G., Afghanistan, 
London, 1929, pp. 322-323. 
2. Apart from semi official journal Amani Afghan, a number 
of small journals like Anis, Nasim-i-Sahar, Nawroz, 
started to appear some of them were special issues like 
Haqiqat published by the Ministry of War. Leon B. 
Paullada, p. 73. See also Dupree, op.cit. p. 440. 
3. The constitution of 1923 was a landmark document which 
was modelled on the Iranian Constitution of 1906 and 
the Turkish administrative code of Kemal Ata-turk 
according to Joseph Schawager a recognised authority on 
constitutional law, it was the result of meeting of 
loya jirgah called by Amanullah. See Nizamnamah ye 
Asasi Aliyah-e-Afghanistan (the constitution of 
Afghanistan) 20 Hamal 1302 (April 9, 1923) as quoted 
from Leon D., p. 74. See also Dupree, op.cit., p.462. 
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after consulting the loyal Afghan Jirgah by Amanullah. It 
defined the basic organisational structure of the state. 
The objective of all these reform was^ centralization of 
power. The original constitution was drafted in Pushtu. 
Whereas in the first stage the Provincial and local 
governments were organised and people were granted civil 
rights. The organisation of political parties was 
proposed. In order to identify the foreigners and the 
Afghan citizens an identification system was introducedr 
Legislative reforms got underway with the establishment 
of a legislative council (Mahfil-i-Qanun) in 1919. In 1923 
states were provided with provincial legislative council. 
3 
In the last stage a bicameral legislature was proposed. 
1. Amanullah personally directed the entire operation and 
checked all the laws minutely. Thus first legal code 
was promulgated in Afghanistan. See Mir Ghulam Mohammad 
Ghobar, Afghanistan-dar-Maasir-Tarikh , (Kabul) 
Government Press, 1967. 
2. British foreign office records the causes of revolt, 
the centralization policy of Amir Amanullah. See 
(Despatch no. 712 dated May 31st 1924 IOL/LPS/10/1112 
PO 1360/1924) Cited by Poullada op.cit., also 
Aman-i-Af ghan, V. nos. 9 & 10 (14 Sumbula 1303), 5-6 
contain loyal jirgah report. 
3. Articles 39 to 49 of the constitution concerned the 
establishment of the state council and of Provincial 
Council. Their functioning were spelled out in a law on 
the basic organisation of the Government of 
Afghanistan. See, Nizama-namah-ye-Tashkilate-Asasiyah-
-i-Afqhanistan (Law concerning the basic organisation of 
the Government of Afghanistan) 15 Jauza 130 2 (June 5, 
1923) . 
64 
Judiciary was established with trial courts to 
Appellate Tribunals. The general law on courts were 
compiled (known as Nizamh-ye-Mohakim) in 1923. 
The Executive Reforms included good foreign 
relations. Amanullah took up cudgels against wide spread 
corruption in Afghanistan by doing away with unnecessary 
custom rites etc. The Military reforms were equally 
important and a number of changes were introduced. These 
were necessary for changing the Afghan army hitherto 
organized on tribal identity. The idea was to raise a 
truly national army for his country. The basic objective 
was to free the dependance of the Amir on the tribal 
chiefs for military support. The reforms were begun by 
making a reduction in the size and pay of the army. A 
2 
military Academy was established. In 1921 the Afghan Air 
Force was organised. All these planned reforms needed guts 
and determination to face resistance and opposition of the 
custom bound structure of militia. Amanullah succeeded in 
his efforts. 
1. According to Franz schelegelberger by 1928 Amanullah 
wanted for reaching changes of judicial arrangements 
specially civil and criminal laws. Cf. Franz 
Schelegelbergar, Rechsveraler Cheveles Handwort buch 
fer das zivil and Handel Screcht des in und aus landes 
(Berlin F~. Wahlrm 1927. Cf. also Julius Magnus, Die, 
hochesten Gevichte der welt (Leipzig W. Moerser 1929, 
Part IV, Asian Afghan. 
2. Amanullah heavily depended for military advice on 
Turkish help- Military Veteran like Jamal Pasha, Fakhri 
Pasha and Kazim Bay were pressed into service. Cf. 
Telegram from Secretary of State to his Majesty, London 
no. 32 January 12, 1929, IOL/LPS/10/1238 P.53 Part 5, 
1929 See also Lowell Thomas, op.cit., p. 230. 
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For the modernization of the army he heavily relied 
upon the Turkish help and support. 
Equally important were the religious reforms, 
introduceld by him. The notable changes were the reduction 
in Allowances and subsidies to Mullahs abolition post of 
Muhatasib (religious censor), establishment of school for 
mullahs (Qazis) and a secular school of law. The Pir and 
Murid system in which a particular religious (spiritual) 
person was to become the spiritual guide of a large number 
of his followers, and thereby more adhering to his command 
2 
rather than to the Commander in the army, was abolished. 
The nationalisation of Waqf Income, baning of Deoband 
Graduates from attaining to act as religious leaders, were 
some other steps taken in this regard. The reforms and 
changes had far reaching consequences. So much so that it 
provided the nucleus for protest and revolt against 
Amanullah. Such reforms require time to percolate and take 
the advantage. 
1. The text of Turco-Afghan treaty may be found in Adamec, 
Afghanistan pp. 192-193. The Annual Register , 1925 
Reports of Amanullah's purchase of planes from Russia 
and his plans to send fifty officer from Pilot training 
to USSR. 
2. It was during the revolt, 6th January 1929 he issued 
proclamation in which he offered to release the 
religious leaders to reinstate Friday as the day of 
rest, and to close the girl's school, to cancel the ban 
on the Deoband Mullahs and to cancel the restructions 
on Pirs and Murids in the army. Cf. Melia, Jean; 
Visages Royaux d'orient. Paris, Bibliotheque 
Charpentier, 1930. Official Gazette of January 7, 1929. 
also Cf. Telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Kabul 
to the Secretary of state for foreign affairs in London 
no. 19 January 6, 1929, IOL/LPS/10/285/1929. 
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The economic reform were aimed to bring prosperity 
to the state. These were for reorganization and rationali-
sation of the tax structure which came into effect into 
1920. The custom and Tariffs were rationalised. He 
introduced the system of taking census of livestocks. He 
introduced the system of preparing Government Budget in 
1922 modernization of Accounting system in 1922. Among 
these other reforms were the introduction of metric system 
of weights and measurements, new units of currency, 
proposal for a National Bank. Chamber of commerce was 
established in 1928. He undertook a massive construction 
work programme which included the building of new roads 
telegraphs and postal buildings and the construction of 
Franco German railways in 1928. The telephones were 
installed. Large Public construction work included also 
2 
the public buildings, capital cities playgrounds, 
colleges hostels, jails etc. College industries were 
1. The Annual Reai^er, 1927 reports new Budget 
proceedings adopted in July 1928 referring previous 
practices. See also, Aman-i-Afghan, II no. 35, 305 for 
a revealing Article what a budget is. 
2. During his European tour Amanullah bought machinery 
which were to help in building small or big industries 
of taning, gun powder, cement, soap, oil, textile stone 
and wood working, ice making, vegetable oil^ sugar 
dairies apart from the source of Industrial powers the 
electricity. Cf. Aman-i-Afghan, V. no. 22 (7 Jaddi 
1303) which reports the opening of a new hydroelectric 
plan for Kabul. 
67 
encouraged side by side under proposed industries. Mineral 
resources wertf exploited on a large scale. The agriculture 
sector was targeted for higher yield and better quality of 
products. 
1. For a detailed economic review during Amanullah's time 
See, Amalendu Guha, "The Economy of Afghanistan during 
Amanullah's Reign" (1919-1929), International Studies 
(N.D.) IX no. 2 (Oct. 1967) 161-82. 
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EVOLOTION OF AMIR AMAWDLLAH'S REFORM PROGRAMME AND CAUSES 
OF ITS FAILURES 
The full development of the modernization programme 
was certainly cut short by the revolution which deposed 
the very champion of modernization in Afghanistan. But 
that does not mean the reforms themselves were failures 
unless it can be shown that they caused the revolution in 
a very direct way. 
Amir Amanullah's modernization plan was certainly 
integrated, grandiose and bold in a conservative and 
tradition bound tribal society. To put such a grand design 
into operation under even most favourable circumstances 
would have required the combined talents of a gifted 
innovators a brilliant administrator and a master 
politician. Amanullah was amply endowed with the first 
requirement but deficient in the other two. 
The linkages between the rebellion and reforms are 
always sought out as these were singled out as the 
principal source of rebellion. Among those reforms social 
reforms were the most controversial which accordingly 
1. Amanullah's statement amply reflect the nature of 
reform when he says, "he desired a revolution in every 
phase of national work and life" as quoteld by Eraser 
Tytler, op.cit., p. 213. 
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sparked suspicions. Of these measures the dress codes , 
women's rights and familial customs (such as marriages and 
funerals) were of having more pronounced affects. Thor 
most of the critics donot see any base in this argument. 
This is amply clear from the fact that most of the reforms 
had primary impact on the urban population and reached the 
rural and tribal areas more via the route rumour and 
gossip than through any meaningful application or demand 
for compliance. Even in the urban groups the impact of 
these measures were on the upper classes. Thirdly there is 
considerable evidence that even the classes affected by 
2 the social reforms were not altogether opposed to them 
and soon adopted to the new mores involved. 
If the social reforms affected relatively narrow 
strata of the Afghan society and were not especially 
resented by them then why did the myth developed that the 
revolution against Amanullah was caused by resistance to 
1. Measure concerning women's code required that theymust 
discard burqa (Veil) and wear modest light dress. 
Outside decision rested on their choices. As cited in 
Leon B. Poullada, Reforms and Rebellion, op.cit., p.82. 
Cf. Secret despatch from the British Minister in Kabul 
to the Secretary of state for foreign affairs, London, 
no. 107, Oct. 31, 1928. IOL/LPS/285, 1929. 
2. A few of the better educated and more liberal ulema 
continued to support the king, but they tended to be 
revered scholarly devout and gantleman. Cited from 
Louis D upree. The Political use? of Religion : 
Afghanistan, in K .  Silvest, ed., Cf rches and Stjates; 
The Religious Institution and Modernization (N.Y., 
American Universities Field staff, 1967). 
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these measures. Even though the programme of social 
modernization made superb propaganda material with which 
to excite, threaten andfrighten the inhabitants of rural 
and tribal areas. 
The political/ military and religious reforms were 
linked to the revolution in different way. His ideal 
pattern of government were beyond the capacity of the 
political culture of his time which was difficult to 
assimilate. The political system and the power structure 
were hardly affected by the constitutional and formal 
legal reforms. Though in long run, these reforms 
undermined the position of tribal local leaders and their 
special privileges. The religious leaders perceived the 
same danger as these tribal leaders as in Amanullah's 
religious reforms contained a similar threat to their 
2 position and prestige. Though Amanullah did not want to 
1. It was clear that the Primary cause of the rebellion 
was tribal separation and bellicosity. See for detail 
Mustafa Chokhaieve, "The situation in Afghanistan", 
Asiatic Review, XXVI, 1930, 324-330. 
2. According to Deupree the extreme stubborness of tribal 
and regional interests cannot be easily broken by 
imported technique of centralizing power and in that 
case also Amanullah failed miserably. See for the 
reason in detail. Louis Dupree, Tribalism Regionalism 
and National Oligarchy in K.H. Silvert Ed. Expectant 
people : Nationalism and Development (N.Y. ) American 
Universities field staff 1963, pp. 207. 
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destroy the religious leaders, he wanted to educate them 
and convert them to his gospel of modernization. That 
turned out to be impossible as these ulema started 
collaborating with separatists tribal leaders. They found 
their most useful role as propagrandist , a role in which 
their vocal talents and their natural advantages of 
closeness to people and communication could enjoy full 
2 
play. Military reforms too, whose goal was to transform a 
loose tribally based rabble into compact, professional, 
and efficient army, succeeded only in alienating most of 
the officers and men who were not yet ready to exchange 
their privilege and kinship ties for the professional 
loyalities of a professional service and who deeply 
1. Since army had a chaplain's corps "who served as pirs 
also for them thus even army wals also under the 
influence of the religious establishment which 
permeated all strata of Afghan society. They had 
effective communication with the populace. Cf. Louis 
Dupree, 'Political uses of Religionj Afghanistan in 
K.H. Silvert ed. Churches and STates : The religious 
Institution and modernization (N.Y. American Univ. 
Field Staff, 1967). 
2. The reputed fanatiasm and access to word to mouth 
communication of the Mullahs, was unmatched by the 
governments, meagre technical facilities. See for 
detail, M.E. Yapp, Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 
1839-42 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, XXV, 1962, 499. 
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resented the intrusion of foreign military expert. 
Military reform tp a certain extent created political 
turmoil and dissension within the armyt 
Soviet writers viewed Amanullah's economic reform 
more as a new method for enhanced imperial power's^exp-
3 loitation and oppression. Nevertheless the available 
evidence indicates a successful economic venture of 
increased national income, expanded trade and commerce and 
a sound base for developments in Public works 
communication, mining and industry as a consequence of the 
reforms- At the same time, there was quite a heavy 
taxation, extravagant expenditure on construction 
projects. The development of light industry was seen as a 
wasteful expenditure. Criticism of Amanullahs 
modernization programme, much of the criticism appears to 
1. It is said that Amanullah's military reform was 
ineffective and successful. See Cf. Fraser Tytler, p. 
206. Fletcher, p. 207 and Louis Dupree, "Mahmud 
Tarzi,Forgotten Nationalist. America Universities Field 
Staff Reports, South Asia Series VIII no. 1 (Jan. 1, 
1964) . 
2. Due to induction of Turkish elements in the army 
resulted in the formation of Pro- and anti-Turkish 
factions and serious schism in the Amanullah's Cabinet 
as cited by Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion. Cf. 
The secret report on Kabul Mission by Sir H.R. Dobbs 
lOL, IPS/10/8090/1919 for a contemporary documentation 
of the military reforms controversy. 
3^  According to Gregorian who has examined the Soviet 
sources, the Soviet saw in AFghan scoio-economic 
condition a situation ripe for exploitation by British 
Imperialism, see Gregorian Vartan. The Emergence of 
Modern Afghanistan, Palo Alto, Stanford Press, l9b?, 
pp. 266 ff. 
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have been due to bias, to some extent due to lack of 
knowledge and half truth. 
However, we can see that some of the economic 
programmes had politically undesirable side effects. The 
livestock census and particularly the live stock tax on 
nomadic and traditionally independant and war like group^  
enraged them. The Maliks and Khans detested the change in 
the tax system which were their profession and basic 
livelihood. Such reforms required a ground preparation 
before being launched or introduced. Merely on assumption 
that the people would acknowledge and welcome them would 
be an assumption far from the ground realities. However 
were these reforms the cause of the rebellion that 
overthrow Amanullah.? 
While examining the sources on reform and rebellion 
one may conclude that several scholars and writers 
supports the view that the social and religious reforms 
had caused the rebellion to some extent. 
A critical and analytical examination of the 
developments leads us to hold the view that there was lack 
of political experience of Amanullah as well as of his 
advises. Untill 1928 both Amanullah and Mahmud Tarzi had 
1. The Queen Soraya's Photograph episode and the stories 
of atrocities against religious leaders were 
manufacture and passed from Bazar to Bazar. Cf. The 
Daily Express (London) March 7, 1929 contains a typical 
example of this kind of propaganda in a story allegedly 
written by a colonel Ghulam Nabi Khan describing 
Amanullah's summary Execution of many innocent 
Mullah's-
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not experienced the nature of tribal politics and its 
reaction. Nor they had calculated the impact of such 
changes will have on his people- They had not assessed the 
changes of modern world for his country. 
Dupree had aptly observed that where there had been 
no colonial occupation to create over-arching interest 
groups and unifying centralized administration the extreme 
stubborness of tribal and regional interest cannot be 
easily broken by imported technique of centralizing power. 
Amanullah's lack of realization about the need for 
a strong political foundation on which build a modern 
state is difficult to comprehend. More particularly after 
the Khost Rebellion of 1924 had nearly made him to loose 
his throne. It is believed that it was due to his intense 
patriotism which surpassed his imagination for any revolt 
by interest groups. His surprise over the rebellion that 
was to cost him his throne, itself manifests that he did 
not understand clearly the nature of internal political 
dynamics of his own country. 
Rebellions were a feature of Afghan history since 
the days of Ahmad Shah Baba. 
Further his political naivete is demonstrated by 
his failure to build a political appratus that would have 
provided him with proper communication with his people and 
replaced the tribal linkages which he sought to dismentle. 
More importantly his under estimation of the power of 
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tribe took a toll of his staying in power. He lacked the 
dedicated and pervasive group of political activists to 
spread the gospel and elicite popular understanding for 
what is known as his modernization programme. 
Besides Amanullah's political myopia, the 
fundamental reason for the revolt was the political 
fragmentation of the country as manifested by the 
resistance of the tribes to the unifying forces of central 
administration and authority. According to an article in 
the Modern Review of Calcutta in April 1929, the cause of 
revolt was based on geographical and ethnological features 
of the country. The numerous dimensions of tribes and no 
uniting factor made the country a hetrogenously populated 
one. Afghanistan was not a full national entity till then, 
without homogenity. 
Other factor like the legitimacy of Amanullah's 
accession his erratic character, traits, the sycophants 
who surrounded him and general impression of softness and 
weaken created a weak impression of the Amir, in a tribal 
society accustomed to harsh rules. The Amir used reason 
and persuation rather than force as a means of securing 
compliance which was not good. 
The rebellion of 1928 was essentially a tribal 
revolt in the classical pattern. It began in the tribal 
areas least affected by the modernization programme. Urban 
people who were more affected by the reform, remained 
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loyal to the government. The modernization programme as a 
whole was not the proximate necessary or sufficient cause 
of the rebellion. The irritation, resistance and 
alienations of loyalities generated by the modernization 
were tangential to the basic conflict. 
The fact that the revolution closely followed the 
modernization programme in time along with the misleading 
propaganda which accompanied the conflict, has led to most 
writers on the subject to fall into the fallacy of 
post-hoc, ergo propter hoc. Two events closely connected 
in time and space need not necessarily have a classical 
connection. The primary cause of the rebellion was tribal 
separatism and bellicosity. The modernisation programme 
was more the victim than the cause of the revolution. 
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I** . . i*f CHAPTER - VI 
^ " ' ' ' THE KHOST^REBELLION OF MARCH 1924 
Amir Amanullah's launched Reform Programme had 
started to tale a serious effect on certain section of the 
tribal society. It was so early as only within 5 year's of 
his rule, a section of the populace felt antagonised with 
the kind of the Reform Movement which was to modernize the 
old tribal based society. Though some reform movements 
were very popular with the populace but some especially 
the religious reform was especially felt to be in 
voilation of the Islamic principles based on Shariat. The 
2 
new Nizam-namah , the new administrative code drafted by 
Bedil Beg, a former chief in the Constantinople and close 
associatle of Jamal Pasha were felt by some to be in first 
3 
conflict with the Shariat. Hast Nafari System (a system 
of conscription of soldiers) was also much hated measures. 
1. Khost Rebellion was basically confined to the Mangal 
tribes inhabiting the region through some support had 
come from Jaji also. See Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan, 
The Highway of Conquest, Cornell University Press", 
1965, p. 205. 
2. Nizam-namah (special code for reform in customs and 
traditions) was enacted by the State ouncil in the 
first phase of reform starting from 1919. See for 
detail on Nizam-namah, Pernot, Maurice, EN Asie 
Musulmane, Paris : Hachette, 1927, p. 20. 
3. Hast Nafari system was the system of conscription of 
soldiers, introduced by Amir Abdur Rahman, modified by 
Habibullah (call of eight men from a tribal village) 
whereas Amanullah wanted fair representation of All the 
nationalities. See for detail Leon B. Poullada, Reform 
and Rebellion (1919-1929), op. cit., p. 115. 
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This was resented by the rich who had to pay for exemption and 
by the poor, who could not escape. 
Among other things that code (Nizam-namah) 
attempted to liberalize the position of women and to 
permit the government to regulate various family problem, 
formerly dealt with by the local mullah, which they 
thought that were contrary to the spirit of the Holy Quran 
and Shariat. According to them the code deprived men of 
full authority over the wives and daughters or authority 
that had been sanctioned by time honoured customs. They 
2 disliked opening of Public schools for girls. 
Under these circumstances, the uprising began in 
mid-March 1924 and continued without fail through the 
summer in the eastern Mountainous regions of Khost led by 
Abdullah, the Mullah-i-Lang {or Pir-i-Lang ) and his more 
rigrous assistant, the Mullah Abdul RAshid. The local 
Afghan Press referred to the two leaders in the following 
Liberal outlooks towards women mean education for the 
girls, abolition of purdah system fixing of the 
marriageable age to 18 years. Freedom to marry the men 
of their own choice. See for detail, Nizam-namah-ye-
Asuri, Nikah-wa-Khatnasuri [Law concerning Engagements, 
Marriages, and Circumecision], 20 Aqrab 1302 (November 
11, 1923), Article IV. See also Delia and Ferdinand 
Kuhn, Borderlands (N.Y.: Knopf, 1962), p. 2 68. Annual 
Register, new series (Afghanistan) London, Longman, 
Green, 1919-1930, also Pernot op.cit. p. 20. 
Accordingly they foresaw a dangerous trend in 
education of the girls, who would become independent 
which was contrary to the traditional bond of society. 
See for more detail on opposition to women's education 
by the religious section, Sykes, Percy. Afghanistan, 
vol. II, p. 298. 
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rhyming manner : (Mullah-i-Lang-wa-rafiq-i-dalang) 
"Inflexible friends". 
The rebellion was confined primarily to the 
mountain area between Khost and the Altimur Pass, pockets 
between Hisarak and Wardak valley south of Ghazni. The 
Afghan Government was forced to employ a force of about 
2 15,000 men who were led by the leaders of his Government. 
Accordingly in order to gain support of important 
Ghilzai tribes the Government officials tried to remind 
them of the Mangal's previous treachery towards them. 
On April 22nd (1924) Afghan reinforcements were 
ambushed, with some natural entrance to Khost from the 
direction of Kabul. By this time garrison of the Afghan 
outpost in Khost had either surrendered or been driven 
into central forts of gardez and Matun, which had been 
3 loosely invested. 
The garrison of various AFghan posts were forced to 
flee across the Afghan frontier, but on April 27, near 
1. Cited from Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton 1973, 
p. 449. 
2. See Percey Sykes, Afghanistan II, p. 298 and "The 
Present Position", p. 155 See also A.W. Tarzi, 
Afghanistan, vol. 1, p. 169. 
3. See Vartan Gregorian, op.cit., p. 255. and also Mac 
Munn George, From Darius to Amanullah. London, 1929, 
p. 175. 
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gardez "the Qita Namuna (a regiment trained by Jamal 
Pasha's mission) ahticipated an attack by the rebels, and 
swiftly getting on their flank, defeated them with such 
disproportionate loss that the latter were driven to 
explain the reverses als due to treachery. Some view that 
the army was totally unprepared to deal with this threat 
and Nadir Khan refused to lead it into battle preferring 
to retreat into relative obscurity as Minister to France. 
The Turks had managed to form some of the young recruits 
into "model battalion". Some of which were thrown in 
against the Mangals, but they were new and untested and 
2 
their performance was unsatisfactory. 
The revolt continued intermittently and by August 
had assumed the dimension of a civil war when, Abdul 
Karim, a natural heir son of the former Amir, Yakub Khan 
(who ruled for a few months in 1878 and then accepted 
exile in India), tried to assume leadership of the tribes. 
2. Cf. Machonachie Report No. 300, p. 134 as cited by 
Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 205. 
2. See for detail on the Qita Namuna, Arnold Fletcher, 
Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, Cornell University 
Press, 1965, p. 208. Bachcha Saqqao later to become the 
Bandit King who deposed Amanullah received his military 
training in this "model battalions", called Qita 
Namuna. 
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The revolt continued intermittently and by August 
had assumed the dimension of a civil war when, Abdul 
Karim, a natural heir son of the former Amir, Yakub Khan 
(who ruled for a few months in 1878 and then accepted 
exile in India), tried to assume leadership of the tribes.^ 
On April 30, British official arrested with little 
publicity, two sons of ex Amir Yakub Khan when they 
attempted to cross into Afghanistan disguised as Ghilzai 
traders. 
The forces deployed on the Ghazni fort was led 
Abdul Aziz, the Deputy Minister of War which Interior 
Minister Ghulam Muhammad Khan, a native of Wardak was to 
rally support from the people. General Umar Khan commanded 
another contingent in this area. On the Hisarak front. 
Sirdar Shah wali Khan was sharing military leadership with 
eighty four years old Ex-Prime Minister, Abdul Quddus 
Khan. Ghulam Nabi Khan, son of Ghulam Haider Charkhi a 
native of the logarvalley, was to enlist popular forces 
there,2 
1. It is believed that Abdul Karim was being used by the 
British for anti-Amanullah insurgency by sending him to 
assume the leadership of the revolting tribes. See Leon 
B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, Cornell University 
Press, 1973, p. 249. 
2. See Gregorian Vartan. The Emergence of Modern 
Afghanistan, Stanford, 1969, p. 255. 
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In Gardez the minister of war Mohammad Wali Khan 
was in command while the troops of the Khel were led by 
Mohammad Siddique Khan, Governor of Kabul and a brother-
in-law of Amanullah attempted to mix the Kingdom in 
support of Government. 
The situation improved for the Government forces, 
when li-manullah Khan was able to convince Majlis 
(parliament) that the uprising had been instigated by the 
British. Furthermore the use of an aerial attacks 
began to have an effect on the tribes. When Dr. Weiss a 
german pilot andAliAhmad Khan, the deputy foreign minister 
circled over the tribal held area, the pressure on 
2 
Government trops was somewhat relieved. The Government 
planes dropped leaflets warning the tribes to retreat or 
face aerial bombing. In Jalalabad, Ali Ahmad succeeded in 
raising a lashkar (irregular troops) of six thousand five 
hundred tribes of men of Khugiani, Mohmands, Shinwaris, 
Waziris and Hazaras. On August 14, 1924, with the approval 
of Afghan parliament, holy war was declared against the 
1. See P. Sykes, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 299. 
2. The airplanes piloted by Russian and Germans created 
havoc among the ill organised tribes who had not faced 
such thing in the past. See Vartan Gregorian, op.cit. 
p. 255. Also Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan ; A study of 
Political Development in Central and Southern Asia, 
Oxford Press, 1953, p. 205. 
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rebels and for the capital was so dangerously exposed that 
Abdul Karim might have succeeded had he pushed on to Kabul 
after defeating the Government forces. By October 1924 
though the situation had sufficiently improved but the 
Sulaiman Khel in the south of Ghazni and the jardans in 
the area of Ali Khel appeared to be still in revolt. The 
latter had retreated into the mountains where they were 
beyond the reach of Government forces. 
In the beginning of January 1925, Abdul Karim was 
forced to flee across the Indian border and imprisioned in 
India. 
On January 30, 1925 Abdullah Khan and his 
lieutenant Mullah-i-Lang (the Lane-Mullah) were finally 
captured and brought to Kabul. The rebels suffered 
enormous losses. Some 3,500 houses were bombarded and 
burnt, 1575 rebels killed or wounded, and 450 women died 
of cold and hunger. The town of Khost was thoroughly 
devastated in the ensuing civil war. The booty and the 
prisioners were paraded in a bizzare victory parade. 
Mohammad Wali Khan led the victorious Government troops. 
The prisioners were primarily mangals. In the words of 
Grabba their descriptionss is as "wild men with sullen. 
1. Abdul Karim was well respected charishmatic tribal 
leader. He fled to India for refugee and returned only 
when confirmed of Amanullah's final ouster in 1929. See 
Manonachie's Despatch to Marquis of Reading No. 300. 
NAI, Delhi, p. 134-137. 
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taciturn faces who did not take the least notice of the 
Amir".-"-
Amir Amanullah surely was concerned about the event 
and did not expect such incident. In May 1925, he 
announced harsh measures for dealings such recurrence. The 
rebels were awarded severe punishment, in which 53 person 
were to be executed. They had to produce hostages for 
their release. 
The khost revolt was to have effect on Amanullah's 
enthusiasm for the rapid Reform Movement which was to 
transform the tribal Afghanistan into a Modern western 
Country. The Reform Movement got dampened and some of the 
religious issues could never then were touched upon. It 
was only after the return from the European tour that the 
3 
Reform Movement got started. 
The Khost Rebellion was important for two reasons. 
First it revealed the weaknesses of the afghan army which 
remained poorly trained, underpaid and sadly lacking in 
medical facilities. Furthermore there was increasing 
1. Dr. Fritz Grobba was the German Minister at Kabul who 
was witness to the event and has recorded in, Grobba, 
Manner und Machte im Orient. 25 Jahre diplomatischer 
Tatigkeit un Orient Gottingen 1967, pp. 14-59, lOR, 
L/P&S/12/1878, as cited by Milner Hauner, Indian in 
Axis Strategy", Stuttgart 1981, p. 73. See also, Lowell 
Thomas, Beyond Khyber Pass, new York, 1925, pp. 238-39. 
2. See for decree Lowell Thomas, op.cit., p. 240. 
3. See P. Sykes, Afghanistan II, pp. 298-99, also Mohammad 
Ali, Afghanistan, The Mohammadzai Period, Kabul, 1959, 
p. 161. 
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discontent among the older officers many of whom had been 
superseded by younger European educated men. They deeply 
resented the fact that various modernization schemes had 
depleted the Amir's meagre financial resources at the 
expenses of the army. The revolt started the disunity in 
the country, the deterioration of administration, 
especially in the provinces and to check the disorderly 
progress of development in Afghanistan. Amanullah's 
dependence on the tribe to put down the rebellion only 
increased their already considerable power. 
1. See for detail, Rushbrook W illiam, India, 1924-25, 
p. 12. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
AMANULLAH'S GRAND TOOK 
Having secured his position and stability in 
Afghanistan, Amanullah set out on a grand tour, between 
1927 and July 1928. The entourage was quite large and 
impressive, which included the Amir, the queen Soraya and 
an official party having the Minister of foreign affairs 
and finance, the governor of Kabul Province, the President 
of Afghan parliament and five senior officers. They paid 
an official visit to India and various other countries in 
Europe as well as the Middle East. Amanullah himself was 
aware of the significance and importance of this visit. 
This was a trip, first of its kind, undertaken by an 
Afghan monarch. He observed that the visits were "not a 
voyage of pleasures but one of study and social 
2 
exploration. Amanullah received invitations from several 
3 European countries. Amir Amanullah made Wazir Mohammad 
1. The full details and document of Amanullah's trip can 
be found in the volume of this subject in lOL, LPS/10/ 
285/1929. See also F. Taillardat in L'Asie Fancaise 
1928. 
2. Not denying the fact, that his motive was sincerely 
patriotic as he had rightly believed that he could 
materiallly benefit his people by a visit to Europe, 
op.cit. Wild Roland, , p. 95. 
3. In regular succession there came invitations from the 
powers of the West like Italy, France, Germany, Russia, 
Egypt and Switzerland, they also sent their programmes 
along with Great Britain. Quoted from Wild Roland, 
Ex-King Amanullah Khan, Hurst and Blackett , London, 
1932, p. 94. 
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Wall Khan to look after the affairs of Afghanistan in his 
absence as the regent. In spite of strained relations 
between India and Afghanistan due to recent events and 
developments. The visit was undertaken as a part of 
diplomacy. The Amir was a quest of Col. St. John deputed 
by Lord Irwin who was down with malaria. At Karachi king 
Amanullah attended a garden party where he made a speech 
dwelling on the friendly relation existing between the 
2 Afghan and British Government and peoples. Amanullah laid 
emphasis on Islamic solidarity. In turn he was hailed as 
3 
the king of Islam. His visit had aroused widespread 
nationalist and Pan Islamic sentiments and interests. Yet 
he was debarred from meeting Mahatma Gandhi, serving a jail 
term. 
He embarked from the S.S. Rajpootana at Aden where 
he was received by General Stewart and had a meeting with 
the prominent citizens there. He arrived at Suez on 26 
December. After landing at Port Saeed, he was received by 
a cousin of the king. At Cairo he was welcomed by king 
Fuad himself. He described him as "the champion of the 
1. Mohammad Wali Khan was appointed Regent by Amanullah 
when he was leaving for the tour. Cited from Leon B. 
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, p. 117. 
2. Amanullah referred British India as "his dear neighbour 
India" cited from Roland Wild. Ek-king Amanullah, 
London, 1932. 
3. See Muslim Outlook, Lahore, July 24, 1928, See also 
Indian national Herald, Dec. 6, 1928. 
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Orient in its struggle with the West" . The king honoured 
him again at a state banquet and conferred on him "the 
order of Mehmet Ali". The Amir also enjoyed the trip to 
Pyramid. In a statement to the Egyptian Press, Amanullah 
declared that Afghanistan's independance had been achieved 
because of the Afghan determination to be free. He 
remarked that the AFghan had gone to war five times in 
defence of their independance, even before the concept of 
father land was clear in their mind. 
He left Egypt on 5th January 1928. Amanullah's next 
2 
stoppage was at Naples. At Rome he was welcomed by the 
king Victor Emmanuel who decorated him with "the Collar of 
the Annunziata" . Amanullah also paid visit to the Pope at 
the Vatican and received the order of the "Golden Spur" 
from his Holiness. The Afghan Amir was well received by 
the people of Italy. During his stay the Royal party also 
3 
attended an air show at Campmo. 
The Amir was extended similar cordial countries at 
France and Germany. In France he was officially welcomed 
by the President Doumergue and Clemenceau of France. The 
Amir also visited several places of interests in France. 
1. Cf. Eraser Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 208. Les de buts du 
voyage, p. 54, P. Sykes, The Present Position, p.15 5. 
2. He arrived Naples by the S.S. Italia. 
3. For detail account of Amanullah's stay in Italy, See 
Taillardat, "voyages du Roi Amanullah", p. 67, Fraser 
Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 208, P. Skyes, Afghanistan, 
vol. II, 304 Wild, op.cit, p. 102. 
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He saw the Versailles Palace, the Hotel des Invalides, the 
Pantheon, the Louvre and Saint Cyr. The purpose of his 
visit was made clear in an official statement made by the 
Amir. He declared that "in order to meet the demands of 
modern age and achieve progress the Afghan have come 
closer to France. He had special praise for the "French 
Archeological Mission to Afghanistan" which proved 
invaluable in reconstituting [the] Afghan National Past" 
and expressed his hope that France would extend the same 
disinterested collaborative effort in the economic field 
to Afghanistan. 
On 2 3rd Feb. Amanullah was given rousing welcome by 
the President Hindenberg at Berlin on his arrival. During 
the visit the hopes were expressed by Hindenburg and 
other official^ that Afghanistan would make use of capable 
German doctors, teachers and Engineers. The Amir was also 
conferred an honorary Doctorate by the University of 
Berlin.^ 
1. In Berlin he was given pompous reception. See Wild 
Roland, Amanullah, Ex-king of Afghanistan, Hurst and 
Blackett Ltd. London, 1932, p. 104. 
2. For a detailed description of the visit See Taillardat 
"Voyage de, Roi Amanullah, p. 68. See also Le Temps 
(Paris) Jan. 27, 1928. 
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On March 13th King Amanullah was greeted at Dover 
by the Prince of Wales. At Victoria station he was 
welcomed by the king George V, queen Mary, the Prime 
Minister and other officials. He drove in a state 
processions to the Buckingham Palace. The Amir was 
honoured by the "Collar of the Royal Victorian Order" by 
the king George V. Amanullah also visited the Industrial 
and business centre of Manchester, Liverpool and 
Sheffield. 
The Oxford University conferred upon him an 
honorary "Doctorate of Civil Law". Amanullah was made an 
honorary member of the Royal Geographical Society. In a 
speech at Oxford, Amanullah spoke of his great interest, 
admiration for education and particularly for those who 
were engaged in the noble cause of developing and studying 
science. He expressed the need that his efforts to 
promote education in Afghanistan would have far reaching 
2 
and lasting results. 
1. The Vice Chancellor of Oxford University spoke of Amir 
and Queen Soraya as'*a second son and Moon that had come 
from the East to illuminate that distant kingdom in the 
Westl' 
2. The extensive tour coverage of Great-Britain comes from 
Taillardat, Amanullah en Angeltere; p. 184. also P. 
Sykes, Afghanistan p. 1209 and Wild, op. cit., pp. 
115-119. 
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Amanullah's ambition and desire to open up the 
Afghan society was recognised by London comparing visit to 
that of Peter the Great of Russia. Amanullah left on 5th 
April 1928, after an enthralling experience in United 
Kingdom for the Soviet Union. 
A visit of the Soviet Russia was, the next major 
objective of Amanullah's European sojourn. For three days 
stay at Warsaw while en route to Soviet Russia. He avoided 
his, presence on the May day celebration in Russia. This 
was a shrewd diplomatic move in order to avoid the 
embarassment of his hosts as well as for himself being 
representative of the old feudal, monarchial order. It has 
been argued that in this way, he sought also to mollify the 
2 
British. On May 4, the Afghan Royal Party reached 
2 
Moscow. They were welcomed by the President Mickhael 
Kalinin, Chicherin, Voroshilov, Lunacharsky and other 
Soviet Leaders. He also visited Leningrad, the Ukraine, 
and the Crimea, Critics have described Amanullah's visit 
to the Soviet Union as anti-climatic while other's have 
1. For influences of the Western tour on Amanullah see. 
Marshall Mcluhan, Understanding Media ; The extension 
of Man (New York) McGraw Hill 1964, p. 340. 
2. See for the reason of delay in entourage's reaching of 
Soviet Union. Taillardat, Fun du Voyage, pp. 320-21 as 
cited by Vartan Gragorian, op.cit., p. 257. 
3. In the way to USSR he met the reigning monarch of 
Belgium. Leon B. Poullada,op.cit., p.167. 
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contended that the visit had left a great impression on 
the Amir.- r.r 
Louis Fischer, the journalist writer had remarked 
that while in Russia the Amir interestingly saw "an East 
that was yet of the West... his ideal for Afghanistan.... 
Industrialisation, art, sports, military prowess, the 
2 lenin Institute all were displayed to him. He saw 
the planned endeavour to change the society. 
Towards the end of May Amir Amanullah embarked on a 
Turkish steamer at Sevastopol to Constantinople, escorted 
by Turkish men of war and by aeroplanes. Landing at Haider 
Pasha, he inspected the Turkish guard of honour and some 
fifty young Afghan officers who were being imparted 
3 
training at the Turkish Military Academy. On arrival at 
Angora he was welcomed by Mustapha Kemal. At a banquet the 
host referred to the common origin of the two people to 
their successful struggles for independance and he praised 
the work of social restoration undertaken by the Amir 
4 
Amanullah. In reply, the royal guest expressed his 
1. Cited from P. Sykes, Afghanistan, vol. II, p. 30 7; 
Daily Telegraph, May 8, 1928, Daily Mail, May 12, 1928. 
2. Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, London, 
1930, vol. II, p. 780. For account of the Amir's stay 
in the Soviet Union, See Izvestia May 5, 1928, Daily 
News, May 4, 1928; The Times, May 7, 1928. 
3. See, Vartan Gregorian, op.cit. p. 258. Percy Sykes, 
Afghanitan, vol. II, pp. 307-308. 
4. For the text of speech See, Taillardat, Fin du voyage, 
p. 322, as cited by P. Sykes, op.cit., pp. 307-308. 
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affection and admiration for Turkey and declared that "Our 
two sister nations have the policy and the same duties. 
Afghanistan he declared was ready to perform those duties. 
From Turkey Amanullah left for Tehran in the last 
leg of his tour, where he was warmly greeted by Reza Shah 
Pehlavi- The new order introduced by Shah was made evident 
to him when he personally drove the queen and her sister 
into the Bazars of the Iranian capital."'-
The climax of Amanulah's tour came on his way home, 
driving his Rolls Royce via Meshhed and Kandhar to Kabul 
where his return was celebrated by the declaration of 
three days of holiday. There was general rejoicings and 
2 illumination m Afghanistan. In this way ended the seven 
months journey made by a ruling Amir of Afghanistan to 
general European countries including Egypt, Turkey and 
Soviet Russia. 
The importance of the tour had great bearings on the 
future course of the Afghan history and Amir's actions in 
general. It is significant that the visit set a precedent 
- before him no other Afghan monarch had left Asia." This 
was an indication of his self confidence and the stability 
1. See Gregorian, op. cit. p. 258. Fletcher Arnold, 
Afghanistan ; Highway of Conquest, Cornell, 1965, p. 
214. 
2. See for detail on Return journey; F. Taillardat "La fin 
du voyage du Roi Amanullah", Bulletin Asie Francaise, 
Oct. 1928, p. 326. 
3. Cited from Arnold Fletcher, op.cit. p. 213. 
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provided to the systlem. The visit was mainly motivated by 
Amanullah's zeal for reforms which had been further 
induced and strengthened by the example of Mustapha Kemal 
of Turkey and Reza Shah Pehlavi of Iran. 
In Amanullah's own words this extensive trip, the 
first of its kind for any Afghan monarch, was "not a 
voyage of pleasures but one of study and social 
exploration" a trip that would enable him, to take back to 
his country the best things that he discovered in European 
civilizations and to show to Europe that Afghanistan had 
her place on the map of the contemporary world, said 
Amanullah. Amanullah also claimed that he had far tried 
to raise his country to the level of the western 
civilization having seen it himself about which he had 
hitherto learnt through books. He now had first hand 
2 personal experience of the west and its society. The Amir 
sincerely believed that his visit to Europe would result 
in a respect that would in the end contribute to the 
3 
country's commercial success and prosperity. 
Where as the critics have seen the Amir Amanullah's 
long sojourn in foreign land from a different angle. In 
1. See Taillardat, op.cit., p. 327. 
2. For detail on that, see Maconachie, R.R., A Precise on 
Afghan Affairs (1919-1927), Secret Document, Government 
of India Press, 1928, p. 82 on Afghanistan-
3. Ibid. p. 83. 
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their opinion the Amir's visit had cost a considerable 
amount of money. Most of the expenses had not been borne 
by the host countries, Amanullah also donated thousands of 
pounds to the poors in each capital he had visited. Above 
all his extourage made purchases for personal as well as 
official purposes. Nevertheless there was tangible benefit 
to Afghanistan in the form of military material providled 
by the British government; a complete battery of each of 
2.75 mountain guns, 3.75 Howitzers and 18 powder field 
guns, with 500 shells for each battery, 1,000 most upto 
date Lee Enfield 0.303 rifles and 100,000 rounds of 
amunition. 3 Rolls Royee, armoured cars and 6 Viskers 
machines. Britain also promised to train free of charges 
twenty Afghan Military cadets at the famous academy of 
Sandhurst. Expenses on this task paid by the Government of 
India. 
During the visit the Afghan official attempted to 
negotiatle loans with a number of countries. The positive 
response came in the shape of a loan of six million Marks 
from Germany to finance their imports to AFghanistan. 
On the other hand, a British Banker was contacted 
for raising a loan of £ 400,000 for which he was to obtain 
the monopoly of the sugar trade in Afghanistan. 
1. For the purchases by the Amir entourges see Sykes, 
op.cit. p. 308. Also Taillardat, op. cit. p. 328. 
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There was a report that a banking home had agreed 
to raise a loan of one million pound sterling at seven or 
eight per cent interest rate, guaranteed by the custom 
revenues of Afghanistan. 
The major achievement in Amanullah's journey was in 
regard to foreign affairs. It put Afghanistan on the map 
of the world and consolidated her independance from 
Britain. Amanullah was accorded reception befitting to a 
sovereign by European states including Britain. He was 
received with Royal honours. It could no longer be clouded 
that Afghanistan was, indeed an independant and sovereign 
state. Amanullah's visit to Italy put an end the virtual 
breakup of commercial and political relation between the 
two countries after the incident of an Italian Engineer. 
He prepared the way for a new start. Amanullah's 
warm reception in Britain came as a surprise to the 
several Afghans. The visit heralded establishment of 
cordial relation between the two countries. Afghanistan's 
relation with Britain could never have been cordial as 
long as the Government of India favoured a forward policy 
on the frontiers. However apparantly no guarantees or 
promises were given to the Amir in London that the policy 
1. On German and Italian commercial activities in 
Afghanistan before Amanullah's f al. See Pemot, LJ 
unquietude del' orient, pp. 40-41. 
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would be modified or stopped. A much more serious result 
of Amir's journey result of Amir's journey was that it 
increased his conviction that Afghanistan required far 
reaching and fundamental reforms. Thus when he returned to 
Afghanistan Amanullah was fully prepared to continue his 
reformist policy with increased energy not knowing that 
during his absence the forces of reaction and opposition 
had been preparing to strike at an opportune time. 
To sum up, we can say that Amanullah's grand tour 
was a personal trumph for him. He gained first hand 
knowledge of modern civilization and signed dozens. of 
treaties both important and unimportant that secured 
Afghanistan a place in the world community. Only his 
desire to gain recognition for Afghanistan can account for 
his eagerness to sign extradition agreements and formal 
treaties of friendship with Finland, Switzerland, Bolivia, 
Lativia, Liberia and Poland. He succeeded in generating 
German, Italian and French interests in the economic 
development of Afghanistan and in the country's strategic 
position as a window in India. 
1. See Macmunn, From Darius to Amanullah, p. 328. Fraser 
Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 211. he also concluded treaties 
of friendship with Persia (for the text; See also 
orient Moderno, March 1923, pp. 154-56, Turkey (for the 
text, see Ibid, July 1928, pp. 159-56, Turkey (for the 
text, see Ibid, July 1928, pp. 283-85 and Egypt, for 
the text see^La Bourse Egyptienne, June 8, 1928. 
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In the course of his travel, he purchased war 
i 
material and enlisted services of various Italian German 
and French technician. He also received generous gifts 
from his host countries^13 airplanes, 2 tractors and Rolls 
Royce. 
Amanulah's grand tour had broken the isolation of a 
land locked country. He had opened the windows for greater 
interest in Afghanistan by countries other than Great 
Britain. 
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CHAPTER - VIII 
THE LAST DAYS : REBELLION AND OUSTER OF AMANULLAH 
Kabul Town's blasted Place: 
Blow the bugle, draw the 
Sword. 
.... Ford O. Kabul, 
Do not grasp swordgrass, or 
if you do, grasp it tightly. 
.... Pushtu Proverb. 
Inspite of initial success in internal affairs, 
external support and personal popularity, Amanullah had no 
public support in his own country. The proposed reforms and 
paticularly increased taxation burden, had alienated him 
from his country men, particularly the r-^^  ^ yious 
establishments and Afghan tribes remained hostile. Critics 
propagated against him and spread misinformation. After his 
audience with the Pope, they even spread the rumour that he 
got himself converted to Roman Catholicism. The Amir's 
agreements with France.& Germany especially with Great 
Britain were interpreted as not in interest of Afghanistan. 
Similarly the Amir's visit to Europe was claimed to have 
cost one million pounds to the Afghan exchequer. Above all 
1. Contemporary writer Mohammad Ali described the feelings 
of the people against Amanullah's conversion to another 
faith or Christianity. See Mohammad Ali; Progressive 
Afghanistan. 1933. Lahore, p. 13. 
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the conduct of Amir during his tour in Europe was 
impious. The Queen had accompanied the Amir without the 
traditional veil and her pictures were published in 
several newspapers including Persian paper 
'Sittar-ye-Iran (The Star of Iran), 'Kaushes" (Effort) 
and ' Iran' . They also took an exception to an 
2 administrative order 'making Thursday a Public holiday. 
Amir was not well informed about such misinformation and 
adverse propaganda against him and objective of his 
'Grand Tour'.After his return from Europe there was 
extremely explosive situation with apparent calm on 
surface. In this background when he announced a set of 
reform programme the opponents got an oportunity to act 
against Amanullah.Two of the most prominent religious 
3 leaders of Afghanistan, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar and 
1. According to an estimate the so called "Grand Tour" 
had costed about £ 1,000,000 which was claimed to be 
a burden on a poor country like Afghanistan. Op. 
cit. p. 6. For a detailed study see, Taillardat, 
Revolte Afghane, p. 17. 
2. This was done against the conventional holiday of 
Friday.Cf. I.H. Shah; Tragedy of Amanullah, p. 178. 
3. Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar, was one of the most 
powerful religious families in Afghanistan. They 
belonged to the Mojaddidi family of Sirhind.When 
they moved to Kabul (they came to be known as Hazrat 
of Shor Bazar. He claimed to have hereditary right 
to Crown the Afghan Kings and had close relation with 
Ghilzai tribes. See Leon. B. Poullada; Reform & 
Rebellion . p. 126. 
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his nephew were jailed for agitation and for collecting 
signature for a petition against the Amir's reforms. 
The stability and authority of the Amir was put to 
severe test. Violent anti-government demonstration began 
from Oct. 2 in Kabul. Although the Afghan army supressed 
it for the moment. But the major revolt began in November 
1928 when the Shinwari tribes rebelled and soon joined by 
the other tribes like, Khugiani Mohmands, Jardan and 
and Jaji's. Some arrests were made on charges of 
sedition. In the Eastern province on Nov. 14, 1928, a 
tribal army (lashkar) of about three hundred sangukhel 
and Ali Sher Khel, Shinwaris attacked and looted Pesh 
Bolak and Achin, in the Khyber Pass regions of 
2 
Afghanistan. 
They indulged in subversive acts like cutting the 
telegraph lines between Dakka and Jalalabad and stopped 
all traffics between those towns. Small Afghan posts in 
the vicinity of Dakka-Jalalabad road were destroyed and 
the Afghan government treasury at Achin was looted. The 
1. When the relation between Mojadidi family with 
Amanullah were strained due to religious reforms, in 
Sept. 1928, Hazrat of Shor Bazar obtained signatures 
of 400 MUllahs Opposed to Amanullah's proposal of 
reforms. They were arrested on charges of sedition, 
see Leon B. Poullada, op.cit., p. 128. See for detail-
Tytler, Afghanistan, op. cit., p. 214. 
2. Cited from Leon B. Poullada, Afghanistan Military 
Report, Afghanistan Simla : Government of India 
Press, 1941, pp. 168 ff. 
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tribals were led by two shinwari tribal leaders Mohammad 
Alam and Mohammad Afzal who claimed to enjoy the support 
for their rebellious action from top political leaders in 
Kabul. Most importantly they received religious support 
from Hafiz Shahib of Fakirabad. 
Ali Ahmad asserts that Ghulam Siddiq a member of 
2 
powerful Charkhi family and one of Amanullah's favourite 
at court, had instigated Alam&Afzalto start a revolt, so 
that his aspiration to become the Prime Minister of 
3 Afghanistan could have been fulfilled. 
The shinvaris and the Moh mand bore a grudge and 
resented the government action to stop their traditional 
"bedraga" (protection charge to caravan passing through 
the Khyber). It was a kind of extortion from the 
4 
Carvanbash. In order to emphasize their threat the 
Shinwaris invaded the cities of Dakka and Jalalabad. The 
1. Hafiz Shahib of Fakirabad was a noted divine among the 
tribals and he was held with high esteem. Diary of 
Events from Nov. 15, 1928 to Feb. 28, 1929. NAI foreign 
Political Files 182 f. 1929. 
2. One of the few important families of Afghanistan. 
3. If this contention is true, then certainly Amanullah 
would have been facing troubles from his own 
confidants. Ali Ahmad, The Fall of Amanullah, 
manuscript translated by R.N.G. Scott, lOL, LPS/10 
P53/1285 Part 1 and 2, pp. 25 ff. 
4. Caravanbash is the term applied for the tribal traders 
who used to move with belongings and with clans and 
engaged in trading activity. 
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British Consulate in Jalalabad was looted by Shinwari 
tribesmen on Nov. 21, 1928. 
Amanullah hoped to gain time by negotiating with 
the rebels. He despatched a group of officials headed by 
Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi and Sher Ahmad to negotiate with 
them. Meetings were held on December 4 and 5, 1928, in the 
end the tribal council present the following demands : 
(i) Abolition of all social reforms, (ii) Abolition of the 
haft-nafari (one in eight) drafting system and an 
increase in the pay of the army, (iii) Recall of all women 
sent to Europe of education, (iv) Prohibition of state 
interference in the activities of Mullahs and Sayyids, (v) 
Prohibition of retatiatory measures against shinwaris. 
The council also offered to return all arms and amunition 
captured by the shinwaris from Afghan Government 
departments. The council further warmed that the tribes 
would resume their revolt and be joined by many others, if 
the Afghan government attempted to punish the shinwaris 
after they had made peace. All the demands were 
reactionary and conservative aimed against the reforms 
1. Hasht Nafari system replaced qaumi system in which each 
tribe or village was required to furnish a certain 
number of recruits. Habibullah modified qaumi to 
Hashl-i-nafari in which "eighth man" in a given village 
or tribe was called-up. 
2. Telegram from His Britainic Majesty's Minister at Kabul 
to the Secretaty of State for foreign Affairs, London. 
Dec. 29, 1928, lOL, LPS/10/285, 1929. 
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initiated by Amir Amanullah. The demands also aimed to 
preserve the hold of orthodox section on the Afghan 
people. 
In early Dec. 1928, Siddiq and Ahmad returned to 
Kabul to report their failure to counter the tribes. The 
set of demand^were largely socio-religious apparently, yet 
for all practical purposes political in nature. In 
addition to those, there were demands for the cancellation 
of reforms in dress. Purdah and Sharia. Amanullah was to 
divorce, banish the entire Tarzi family, reduce all 
taxation, and abolish all foreign legation except that of 
the British. A strange combination of interests which 
plagued the Afghan state. 
The rebels were taking all proper precaution, while 
their demands were being submitted to the Afghan kings, 
they took measures to win the southern tribes to their 
cause and welded their alliance by promising to obscure 
the following part (i) The Shinwari Mohmand and Khugiani 
were to remain united, (ii) They would not accept any 
tribute from the Government, (iii) None of them was to 
2 
conclude a separate peace with the Afghan governments. 
Faced with the "non negotiable" demand, Amanullah 
realised that a strong combination of diplomatic and 
1. Ibid. Source for this inference and information is 
based on British records. 
2. File 309 f. 1928, nos. 1-603, Notes 220-22. NAT, New 
Delhi. 
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military pressure would be required to extinguish the 
flames of revolt. Accordingly on Dec. 6, 1928, he 
despatched Ali Ahmad Jan, a relative from his mother's 
side to negotiate a truce and at the same time directed 
the Kabul garrison of troops to send a strong force to 
eastern province and to under the overall command of an 
old trusted adviser, Mohammad Khan Yawar. Ali Ahmad Jan 
reached Jalalabad on Dec. 1928 and with the help of 
religious leaders managed to arrange for a truce. 
They bribed the Mohmand to stay out of the revolt. He 
was backed up by a strong government force in his efforts. 
The troops movement under Yawar Khan was 
complicated further by a new threat. The Tajik bandit 
leader Habibullah by name but popularly known as the 
Baccha-e-Saqqao (water carrier). Baccha's early life is 
still shrouded in mystery and not much is known about him.2 
He had some army experience as a soldier in one of the 
Turkish trained Qita Namunas {Model Battalions) which he 
had deserted during the 1924 Khost Rebellion. He became 
the leader of the Tajik band who looted and defied the 
1. For detail on Bacha, See Raja, Anwar, The Tragedy of 
Afghanistan (Verso, London, 1988), pp. 21-22. 
2. His so-called Autobiography "My life from Birqand to 
King (London, Sampson Law, Maston, n.d.) is a distorted 
book and is considered by many writers as misleading 
treatise. 
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Government authority. Hearing of Shinwari's attack in the 
east he became active in the north. He organised a large 
scale raids against the government posts. Although the 
Amir had offered him the post of colonel in the army and 
lead the attack against shinwari, yet he deserted 
suspecting that Amanullah's real intention was to catch 
him. A traditional distrust between them sensing 
Amanullah's Pushtun treachery, Baccha launched massive 
attack on Dec 10, 1928 on Jabal-us-Seraj, a large 
garrison in the Koh-i-Daman. The 900 men garrison 
surrendered without firing a shot. The invader captured 
large stores of arms and loot. Now his contingent grew 
with more non-Pushtu (mostly Tajiks) joining his band. On 
December 14, 1928 Baccha made a direct attack on Kabul, 
although his attack was repulsed. Thereafter he retired to 
Qala Murad Beg in the Koh-i-Daman. However, army which 
pursued him was thoroughly routed. Kabul was left 
2 defenceless. Ghxlzai chief Ahmadzai Ghausuddm appeared 
on the scene whom Amanullah in the hope and desperation 
gave arms and money in order to take up his help, 
1. Amanullah wanted to kill Baccha at any cost, and the 
famous phone incident" is worth noting. See Leon B. 
Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, pp. 173-72. Also Louis 
Dupree, (Afghanistan) for folk lore of Tajik for 
Bacha's life. 
2. Ghilzai's were supposedly sworn enemy of the 
Durrani's. 
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Amanullah entrusted the task to a wrong and unreliable 
person. Ghausuddin escaped from the scene with money and 
arms and even raised his own recruits. Later on at Ghazni 
he declared himself the Amir, alongwith others. The news 
of his defection affected the morale of the army supporting 
Amanullah, and most of them left to defend Kabul against 
Baccha's final attack. The news of escape of the another 
claimant for the throne from the British Indian Government 
Surveillance of Mohammad Umar Khan his declaring himself 
the Amir, further complicated the deteriorating situation. 
Amanullah and his throne was in extreme peril. On December 
21, 1928 he evacuated by air most of the immediate family 
members/including Queen Soraya, Ulaya Hazrat, Tarzi and 
others, sending them in one of the Russian plane to 
Kandhar to await the final outcome. Though on January 7, 
1929. Amanullah freed Hazrat of Shor Bazar but even this 
religious gesture could not bring any gains. Shinwari's 
had alrelady issued a religious declaration by justifying 
the rebellion against Amanullah on purely religious 
grounds. 
1. With the same recruits he changed sides with Bacha and 
Nadir. See The rebellion series of volumes of documents 
in lOL, LPS/10 1283 P. 53 1929, cited in Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit., p. 128. 
2. He was the nephew of the exiled Amir Yakub Khan. 
3. For the text and details. See, Express letter from 
NORWEF, Peshwar, to Government of India, no. 9 P.S. 
January 3, 1929, lOL LPS/10/1288 P. 53, 1929 as cited 
by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit., p. 234. The basis of the 
manifesto revolved around violation of sharia, 
forcible divorce, removal of perdah, export of girls 
to Europe, change of Friday holiday as measures adopted 
against Islam by Amanullah. 
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Amanullah reasserted on 25 Jan. 19 29 declared by 
that he was the legitimate Amir. He desperately tried to 
convince his tribesmen of the fact that a Tajik king 
2 
could not be tolerated by the ruling Pushtun tribes. All 
3 
Ahmad Jan also appealed to the Pushtun for rallying 
around him. But Khugiani's having got handsome support 
from Baccha attacked Ali Ahmad around Jagdalak and 
. . 4 
shattered his ambitious plan. Now Amanullah wanted to 
take up the help of Ghilzai tribemen and entrusted the 
task to Shahibzada Muhammad Umar Jan.^ He was a Ghilzai 
and had been roughly treated during the khost rebellion 
of 1924, therefore he paid no heed to Amanullah's belated 
trust in him. Amanullah there upon played the religious 
card at the Mosque of the Robe of the Prophet (Da kharqa 
Sharif ziarat). Calling himself one of the orthodox and 
highly religious person against the Baccha's bandit 
background branding him a heretic. The emotional speech 
1. Pushtun had always been a dominating tribes who had 
utter dislikes for Tajiks and other tribes. 
2. Military Report, Afghanistan, p. 103 ff. 
3. Ali Ahmad Jan was related to Amanullah from his mother 
side and was ambitious person for the post of Amir of 
Afghanistan, and deceived Amanullah time and again. 
4. Ali Ahmad Jan was hanged by Baccha when he had 
captured Kandhar. Cf. Military Report, Afghanistan, 
pp. 182 and 205. 
5. Ibid., p. 128. 
6. One of the holiest shrine in Afghanistan. 
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of Amanullah had the desire effect on the Barakzais and 
drew them to his own side. About that time Nadir Khan 
with Wali Khan and Hashim Khan (the two brothers of Nadir 
Khan) returned from France with British diplomatic 
2 
visas. 
Amanullah and Baccha both approached him and tried 
to take his help. But he consist?; ntly refused to join 
anyone baffled both. Infact, Nadir had his ambition and 
plan. He was trying to make room for himself and thus 
sought support from tribes like Mangal, Jazi^ Jardan, 
Ghilzai and others in khost, Gardez Area. Initially Nadir 
faced immense difficulty in uniting the tribes, but with 
firm conviction and tact he kept them ready for the 
showdown. It seemed, he was going to succeed but due to 
notorious Ghilzai chief Ghasuddin's treachery he had eat 
dust when the gateway of Kabul was well within his grasp. 
Just about this time Herat which was under 
Amanullah's loyal soldiers fell to Abdul Rahim, one of 
the general of the Baccha' s army who had marched through 
1. See for detail, Ali Ahmad /OP-cxt. c-^ ^ also Military 
Report, Afghanistan, p. 186. 
2. The British used to issue visas for transit through 
India to Afghanistan to the Prominent Afghans which 
may be a gesture of favour to them. Secret Telegram 
from the Foreign Office London, to the Legation, 
Kabul, no. 32, Feb. 2, 1929, LOL, LPS/10/1288, 1929 
Part 5. 
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Mazar-i-Sharief in the north. Now it was the turn of Sher 
Agha,the Hazrat_ of Shor Bazar who rallied Suleiman Khel 
Ghilzai against Amanullah. On the other hand Amanullah 
started his move against the new Amir and marched to 
Ghazni. Ghulam Nabi who was Amanullah's Ambassador to 
2 Russia had tried to obtain soviet support but failed. 
Ghulam Nabi in the north rallied his supporters strongly 
and became a serious threat to Baccha. On the other hand 
Amanullah's attack on Ghazni failed and finally his plan 
was shattered when the Sulaiman Khel Ghilzai inflicted a 
crushing defeat on him. 
All was over for Amanullah,. He had lost~ Baccha' s 
forces were after him. He secretly left with a small 
party on May 23, 1929 Afghanistan. He along with his 
family members boarded a train for Bombay. On June 22, 
1929 Amanullah sailed for Europe.Amir Amanullah was in 
exile. 
The events moved swiftly in Afghanistan. 
Amanullah's sudden departure proved disastrous for his 
loyal army, which melted away in the absence of a leader. 
1. Ghulam Nabi was from Prominent Charckhi family of 
Afghanistan. 
2. It is not clear what led Russian not to extend their 
help to Amanullah who was obviously inclined towards 
Bolshevik. See Ali Ahmad Chap. 9, p. 2 51. 
3. The account of Amanullah's last days in Afghanistan 
comes from Ali Ahmad. 
Ill 
Now the tussle was between Nadir and Baccha. Finally 
Nadir was able to defeat Baccha and he was hanged on Nov. 
1, 1929 along with his ten leading supporters and members 
of his family. Afghanistan was freed from the menace of 
Baccha yet peace alluded for a while in the war tcrr 
kingdom of Kabul. 
Amanullah had adopted a new chapter of reforms and 
modernization in his tribal kingdom. He failed. The 
causes of Amanullah's downfall had been interpreted by 
the contemporary historian and journalists and have given 
a confusing and mostly speculative interpretations. Most 
of them have failed to see through the internal socio-
economic structure based on tribal loyalties. They were 
not prepared and willing for a rapid transformation 
envisaged in reforms of Amanullah and the events 
culminated in the rebellion of 1928. Without examining 
all surrounding factors to the "Rebellion of 1928", 
whether external diplomatic factors, or internal socio-
economic problems or simply the Amir as an odd man out 
among the hardy headed, medieval oriented orthodox 
Afghans, who had distaste for whatever was modern. 
Starting with the "External factors" we find that 
the soviet authorities them and now placed great emphasis 
on "external factor" attributing Amanullah's downfall to 
the British Mechanism. At that time Pravada charged that 
1. Pravada Daily, 1929. 15 June an article on Al[ghan 
Affairs. 
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Col. T.A. Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia, had 
masterminded the entire anti-Amanullah, uprising, while 
Izvastia , saw in the outbreak the spirit of Disraeli 
against the Soviets. Accordingly the they interpreted 
the overthrow of Amanullah as a British maneouvre to 
reestablish Britain's Pre-1919 hold on Afghanistan where 
to contemporary British observer the fall of Amanullah 
was attributed to the impatience of some Afghans and the 
2 fanaticism of others. Sir Michael O'Dwyer wrote in the 
Daily Mail and Sunday Express that Amanullah had 
attempted to "hustle the East" and had thus "brought his 
own ruin by reckless and ill judged attempts to upset the 
custom and religious rites of the conservative and 
fanatical tribesmen, most of them never paid more than a 
3 
nominal allegiance to Kabul. Almost an identical comment 
is from the writer Emmanuel that "The Afghans are perhaps 
the most fanatically people on earth and the Mullahs were 
4 
the principal agents m the overthrow of Amanullah. 
1- Izvestia, 1929, 18 June. 
2. Of Jallianwala Bagh, the retired Governor of the 
Punjab Province. 
3. Cited from Commyn-Platt, p. 297, Daily Mail and Sunday 
Express, January 20, 192. 
4. Emmanuel, op.cit., p. 2 02. 
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It would be interesting to examine the view of 
Amanullah himself about the events leading his failure 
and overthrow. He aptly observed that it was "a reaction 
and not a "revolution". Truly, Amanullah could not stem 
the reaction and quell the uprising of vested interests 
and intrigues. Hidayatullah Khan (one of the several 
contenders for the throne) agreeing twith the view of 
Inayatullah Khan offered a simplistic explanation that 
Amanullah's overthrow ought to be attributed to the curse 
of the departed soul of his father and on those 
responsible for his assassination. 
Afghan historian attributes to the course of 
revolt primarily on the short-sightedness, to the haste 
with which Amanullah acted and to the poor advise of his 
counsel, more so when the external intrigues played a 
major role. The British obviously would not like to have 
a man in the mould of Mustafa Kemal at the doors of 
India. The "Reform Programme" initiated by Amanullah, 
1. The statement of Amanullah and Hidayatullah can be 
seen in "La Guerre Civile", p. 268 and Taillardat, 
"Revolte Afghane", P. 50, Inayatullah's is in Morrish, 
p. 13. Afghan envoy to Paris was blunter; he accused 
Great Britain of inciting the Afghan tribes against 
Amanullah, See the Morning Post, January 17, 1929. 
2. Muhammad Ali, "Progressive Afghanistan", pp. 6f 11, 
I.A. Shah Tragedy of Amanullah, P. VII Kasimi Maroof, 
P. 397, and Pazhawak Afghanistan, p. 12. 
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was, no doubt a gigantic task in the tribal society of 
Afghanistan. 
Amanullah was up against both the feudal tribal 
leadership as well as powerful orthodox religious chiefs. 
In the face of tribal faudal-religious traditionalist 
coalition in opposition he was unable to find support 
from either urbanmiddle class or rural peasant class. 
Raskolinkov, the soviet envoy to AFghanistan at that time 
wrote in 1929 that**the basic organisational fault of all 
the reform of Amanullah lay in the fact that they were 
devoid of an economic basis'"'. Pravada Vostaka mentions 
the "peasants discontent in paying the raised revenue 
2 
demand" and thus they sided- with the rebels. In 1928 
about 80% of Amanullah's revenue was derived from land 
3 
tax. Wild writing about the same says that steadily 
mounting taxes in the name of house tax, education tax, 
war tax and other taxes simply labelled "development ", 
4 
brought much antagonistic feelings to the poor peasants. 
Urban population too were heavily taxed ranging from 
20-200% taxes on various articles. 
1. See Raskolinkov, War in Afghanistan, pp. 180-183. 
2. Pravada Vostaka, Jan. 1, 1928, as quoted by 
Chokhieve, Mustafa, Bolsheviks and Afhhanistan, p. 
507. 
3. Cited from B.Nikitin, La Asie qui Change, p. 75. 
4. Wild Roland, Amanullah, Ex-King of Afghanistan, 
p.70. 
5. Cited from I.A. Shah, Tragedy of Amanullah, pp. 162-63 
Katrak, p. 36, Fuson L'Afghanistan, p. 95, Trinker 
p.189. 
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Afghan, French and Soviets sources all agree that 
the combined weight of taxation and administrative abuses 
encouraged brigandages in the countryside and contributed 
to the social disturbances. One notable example was in 
1927, when the Finance Ministry was attacked by some 
thirty peasants. 
Although many of the Amir's reforms were 
progressive, large number of Afghans found them unsuitable 
for their purposes like his banking programme was put to 
debate in 1927 in a loya-jirgah, whether the function of 
2 banking conflicted the principles of Islam and shariat. 
His greatest failing was that instead of concentrating 
mainly on the economic development of the country, he 
exhausted his efforts and resources by introducing mere 
3 
symbols of progress. 
Amanullah's mistakes and failure have been aptly 
summed up by Mustafa Chokhaieve, when he says "Amanullah 
chose to follow in the footstep of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal 
but forgot that the Turks had been for centuries in 
1. See. Taillardat, "Revolte Afghane", pp. 18-19, See 
also Muhammad Ali, Progressive Afghanistan, pp. 8ff. 
also Habibullah, My life from Brigand to king, London, 
Sampsonlow pp. 50, 110, 112 and Chokaieve, "Bolshevik 
and Afghanistan, pp. 507-9. 
2. Joseph Polocki, op.'clt. , p. 113. 
3. For innovations, see L. Thomas,- Khyber Pass p. 234-5 3; 
Wild pp. 87, 95, 161, 172; Macmunn, From Darius to 
Amanullah, pp. 292, 296; Katrak, pp. 38f50-58 Possim, 
James pp. 122ff; Jackson Fleming "The Afghan-Tragic 
Comedy, Asia, June 1929, p. 330. 
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contact with the governing class in the western world and 
knew not the tribal regime and that she had a 
comparatively well ordered centralized apparatus of 
power, loyal...." 
Apart from the socio-economic factors the downfall 
of Amanullah may well be sought in political factor. The 
socio-economic factor served as the base for the 
rebellion where as ouster was only successful due to 
complex political situation. In this analysis the 
foremost which most of authorities agree was^ 'the attitude 
of the tribes''. The tribals also had shifting nature of 
loyalty, which decided the final outcome. The poor 
performance of the army during the revolt severely 
hampered his chance of getting through the crisis. The 
army which Amir possessed was not efficient, loyal, and 
strong enough to counter such a massive revolt of the war 
like tribes. Major TF.C.R. Dodd, the British military 
attache in Kabul during the revolt had predicted that the 
army would not only fail to oppose a revolt with any 
effectiveness but might infact support such a revolt. He 
had remarked that "The army is discontented, the Mullahs 
are hostile, the official class apathetic and the 
1. Mustafa Chokhaiev, "The situation in Afghanistan", 
Asiatic Review XXVI April, 1930 p.321. 
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reasury is empty". In number of cases Amanullah's army 
units deserted to the enemy this being particularly true 
when they were wrongly sent into battle against their 
2 
tribal kinsmen, as at Jagdalak. 
Again the disloyalty of Amanullah's own men took 
the heavy toll of the situation. The disloyalty of person 
like Muhammad Wali Khan (the regent) General Muhammad 
Sanis and Ali Ahmad Jan were the few examples of on what 
a weak foundation the edifice of his ministry was built 
3 
upon- High level of suspicion and intrigue prevailed 
when Amanullah was to face daunting challanges from the 
tribals. Even person like Nadir Khan did not support 
Amanullah in his hour of crises. This coupled with 
Anti-Amanullah propaganda mostly religious in tone and 
colour accusing him of being a heretic, pork eater and a 
drunk, did the real damage among the illiterate orthodox 
Afghans.Not only that misleading propaganda material made 
it extremely difficult of historian and political analyst 
to ascertain the actual reasons behind the rebellion and 
its causes of happenings. 
1. See Enclosure to Secret Despatch from His Britanic 
Majesty's Minister at Kabul to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, no. 90, Sept. 22, 1928. lOL 
LPS/10/1288, 1929. 
2. Cited from Military Report, Afghanistan, p. 17Off. 
3. For detail see. Confidential Despatch from Government 
of India to the Secretary of State for India, New 
Delhi. 5468-F/29, January 2, 1930, lOL LPS/10/1292 
P. 53, Part 13, 1929. Cited in Leon B. Poullada, op.cit 
P. 123. 
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Even though to sum up it can be said that the 
rebellion of 1928-29 had all the classical elements of 
historical tribal conflict. Tribal disunity, ethnic tri-
bal conflict (Tajik, Pushtun and Hazaras), the revenge 
motif, were all the features of this rebellion. Once 
again it was proved that relation between central 
authority &tribes which seem to be solid appeared to be 
based upon without any base. Afghanistan saw the wrost as 
the process of tribal fission and degeneration destroyed 
what Amanullah had built as a champion of modernization. 
Amanullah the progressive met with defeat from the 
hands of retrogressive forces who combined against him 
and succeeded - a fate from which Afghanistan could not 
get out hereafter. 
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CHAPTER - IX 
GEOPOLITICS AND DIPLOMATIC TIES OF AFGHANISTAN WITH THE 
GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND GERMANY 
Section - A 
Russio-Afghan Relations during j^anullah's Reign 
"My spirit will remain in 
Afghanistan though my soul 
90 to God. My last words to 
you my son and successor, we 
never trust the Russians". 
. Abdur Rahman Khan (d..l901) 
"That Central Asia and the 
State bordering on India are 
to Russia outposts from which 
the Soviet authority should 
be able to threaten England". 
LENIN, Times, Jan 1, 1923, 
p. 9. 
Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of three 
different cultural zones. The Islamic world, the Indian 
2 
culture and Chinese influence. For this reason 
Afghanistan had a long history of conflict in central 
Asia. Inspite of this Afghanistan owed much of its 
1. Abdur Rahman, Amir (d. 1901), Amir Abdur Rahman 
(Autobiography) ed. Mir Munshi (trans, from Persian 
into English), p. 201. 
2. See Rahul, Ram; Struggle for Central Asia, Vikas, 
1982, p. 45. 
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importance to its strategic location. Afghanistan had 
been the main route of invasions from the great 
Eurasian heartland to the Middle East and the south Asia. 
The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan can be 
understood by looking at the theories propounded by the 
British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder and by Captain 
2 Alfred Mahan of the U.S.A. , in which they have discussed 
the influence of geography on the political destiny of 
nations. The doctrine admirably apply to the situations 
of Afghanistan, which could act like a "wheelchair" for 
any expansionist power. 
It was due to occurrence of any weakness in the 
peninsular power the pressure from heartland broke 
through and that happened a number of times in the apprent 
case of Afghanistan. Due to this position, Afghanistan 
has traditionally been one of the great political 
unstable and contentious zones. The history of 
Afghanistan offers an appropriate examples of the theory 
put forwarded by the geopoliticans. Nevertheless there 
1. Afghanistan was a place where the territorial interest 
of Imperial and colonial powers i.e. Russia and 
British was to clash apart from interest of Germany 
and France. For detail on the same, see C.C. Davis, 
Frontiers ; A study in Imperial Policy, p. 1. 
2. The discussion of geographical factor is primarily 
based on Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and 
Reality (New York : Norton, 1962), _ ^ Alfred Mahan, 
The Problem of Asia (London, Sampsonlow, Marston, 
1900). 
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are many critics of such theories. 
Such propositions and theories may not exactly fit 
in the case of Afghanistan,, yet the area around 
Afghanistan had seen incessant warfare in the past and 
the "great game" between the Russian and the British 
interests in Central Asia, had been unparallel in 
history. 
The conflict in the region intensified with the 
British acquiring foothold in the Indian subcontinent and 
advancing towards Central Asia by the 18th century. On 
the other hand Russian too, had started their assertive 
poicy for their interest in Central Asia. The two 
empires then began territorial aggressions and occupied a 
large chunk of territories by 19th century. Their 
advances were rapid and so convincing that they had 
presumed their own clash at any point of time and the 
place which obviously occurred at Afghanistan in the 
1. For example, N.J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace (Nev/ 
York Harcourt, Brace, 1944) H.W. WeiWeighert From 
Mackinder's Heartland, American Scholar writer 
1945-46; and Leopold Amery in Geographic Journal 
(London), April, 19 04 p. 4 41. 
2. Russian interest in Asia (Afghanistan) dates back to 
1807 when Russians started enroachment and British 
could not help the Asian region particularly on the 
Persian Central Asian possession, which compelled the 
British to seek Afghan diplomatic support. See for 
detail, D.C. Boulger, England and Russia in Central 
Asia, London 1879, vol. II, p. 340. 
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later phase of their rivalries. Then "the great game" 
2 3 
with players like Arthur Corolly , Charles Masson , 
4 5 
Alexander Burnes , B. Vickovitch and other with their 
extremely intriguing conspiracies in the region. 
It was from the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali's 
succession, that the Russian had planned to expand 
towards the region, by establishing a military base at 
Orenburg near Ural Mountain by the border of the Afghan 
territory. The British too had started territorial 
occupations in India, swallowing one native kingdom after 
another until they occupied the Indus plain by August 
1843. Now it was the time when the two empires was to 
clash in Afghanistan in order to thwart each other's 
expansionist policy. The British fear against the 
Russian worked well and thus then moves resulted in two 
1. The "Great game" was the term coined by Sir John W. 
Kaye, A History of War in Afghanistan, 3rd ed. 3 vols. 
London, 1874. 
2. Arthur Conolly along with Colonel Stoddart the British 
agents before the first Afghan war, were beheaded in 
Bokhara in June 1842, Cf. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 374. 
3. Charles Masson was a deserter from the East India 
Company army, who was later on found to be American 
agent. See the Masson Papers, 631-657. Also Louis 
Dupree, p. 385. 
4. Alexander Burnes headed the Mission sent by Lord 
Auckland to Kabul in Sep. 1837. See Dupree, Op.cit., 
p. 371. 
5. Capt. Vicovich (also called Vickovich, Vitkievich)a 
Russian agent was sent to counter the Burnes mission 
came to Kabul in Dec. 1837. See Louis Dupree, op.cit. 
p. 371. 
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full scale wars, namely the Anglo-Afghan war of 1838 and 
2 in 1878. The two empires had been fighting m Balkans 
and in Turkey too apart from the high plateau of 
Afghanistan. Their intentions mainly emanated from their 
3 
fears and aspirations. They aad resorted to military 
4 
means as solution to . these issues. But to the outside 
world they manifested them as that of purely defensive in 
nature. Amir Abdur Rahman was inclined to the British 
sphere of Influence" yet he had aspired to free 
Afghanistan. Though he had to contend with balancing 
tact between the two empires and thwarted attempts from 
both sides for rail Road project. But the Russians had to 
say no to the "close border policy" and kept on 
1. For the first Afghan war the best modern explanation 
comes from J.A. Noris, The First Afghan War 1838-1842, 
Cambridge 1967. 
2. For a best detail work on second Anglo-Afghan war. See 
The Road to Kabul, Brian Robson 1986, Arms and Armour 
Press Limited, London. 
3. See for detail on the situation . Gopalakrishna, K., 
The Geography and Politics of Afghanistan. Concept 
Publication, New Delhi, 1982, p. 73. 
4. Both wanted to extend the boundaries which of course 
were ill-marked at that time. See A. 
Lobonov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, New York, 1951, 
p.113. 
5. A good summary of Russian and British views on the 
Central Asian problem is contained in G.N. Curzon, 
Russia in Central Asia in 1889 (London, Frank Cass, 
1967). For further detail see, Olaf Caroe, Soviet 
Empire, London, Macmillan 1954. 
6. For the game which the Imperialists played with Amir 
Abdur Rahman, See in detail, Gopalakrishnan, R., The 
Geography and Politics of Afghanistan, Concept 
Publishing, New Delhi, 1982. The Evolution of Afghan 
International Boundaries. Also Mir Munshi Mahmoud 
Sultan Khan, ed. The Life of Abdur Rahman - Amir of 
Af ahanstan. London 1900 > 2 vols, vol T~. no. 1 Qfi-Q. 
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interfering in Afghan affairs which culminated in the 
"Punjdeh Crises" and occupied a portion of Afghan 
territory. The incident, had far reaching consequences 
and aggravated the atmosphere, compelling the British to 
ask Russia for delimitation of Russio-Afghan border in 
1887. By that time the British wanted Afghanistan to 
behave as "unilateral buffer state"^against Russia. 
Amir Abdur Rahman was also subjected to a pressure 
tactice for agreeing to a border settlement with British 
India. They split the Pushtun tribe into two parts^ one 
part to British Indian side and other to Afghanistan. 
Abdur Rahman succumbed to the British pressure against 
Russian and accepted the British view of unilateral 
bufferstate. He was more scared of Russian aggressiveness 
and expected help from the British which was in order to 
contain Russia. 
Amir Habibullah followed the legacy of his father 
and wanted to play a balancing tactices between the 
1. The Panjdeh affair (1885) was of utter significance as 
for the first time Russians- did venture into Afghan 
territory and occupied it after a short battle. At the 
same time when Amir Abdur Rahman met Viceroy Lord 
Dufferin in Rawalpindi, he chided the viceroy for the 
lack of British armed assistance in their hour of 
need. See for detail Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 423. 
2. The Orenburg sand Tashkent Railways built by Russia 
near Afghan border touching kushk, was the disturbing 
sign for Abdur Rahman, . Apart from various other points 
of aggressiveness by Russians. See Curzon, Russia in 
Central Asia, p. 264 et sq. 
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Imperialists from 1901. But Russia's shattering defeat in 
1905 in the Russio-Japanese war, compelled Russia to come 
to term with the British on Afghanistan and signed the 
convention of St. Petersburg in 1907 and agreed on their 
2 
spheres of influence. The Entente led them to become 
allies during world war I. 
But after 1917 revolution the Anglo-Russian 
rivalry once again was revived. 
With the assassination of Amir Habibullah in 1919 
young Amanullah assumed the leadership in AFghanistan. 
Amanullah was about 28 years old when he succeeded his 
assassinated father. He inherited also the political 
intrigues, conspiracies and divided loyalties of the 
tribal leadership. These he sought to surmount and 
establish order in the state. Much more daunting were the 
geopolitical intrigues of the powers like the Soviet 
Russia and Great Britain. 
1. Habibullah's home task was alrelady finished by Amir 
Abdur Rahman who had placed Afghanistan on a strong 
footing both in external policy (by implying unilateral 
buffer state theory favouring British India) as well 
as the domestic peace. See, Bilgrami, A.H., 
Afghanistan and British India, p. 241. 
2. It was the convention which was favourable to the 
British as it guaranteed the British India's security. 
See for the text of the convention. Philips, C.H. The 
evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, Oxford 
1962, pp. 485-6. Also G.P. Gooch, British document on 
the origin of war, 1927. 
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With his accession whole diplomatic scenario was 
bound to change as the young Amir was a die hard 
anti-Imperialist in general and anti-British in 
particular. He worked for total independance for 
Afghanistan which culminated in Third Anglo-Afghan War. 
The Soviet saw the anti-British stand of the Amir, 
decided to give immediate recognition to him and even an 
assurance for future help. Amanullah's diplomatic 
initiative in writing to Lenin and the despatch of 
i Johammad Wali Mission to Moscow was soon reciprocated by 
the Soviets with great cordiality. This was the period 
when the Soviets were in desperate need of havinc, 
2 Muslim Allies. Lenin had despatched a Mission under K. 
Bravin with the offer of material assistance against the 
. . 3 British. With that Amanullah got relieved from the 
Russian pressure on Afghanistan. 
1. Just after the third Afghan war Amanullah wrote two 
letters to soviet union stressing the fact that 
Afghanistan was free and independent and pointed out 
that Afghan Psychology had always contained in it 
ideas of equality, humanity and liberty. Cf. Izvestia 
(Tashkent). May 21, 1919, Dokumentry II, 175, 
Tepliniski, pp. 7-10, Masson and Romodin II, 402-5. 
2. Lenin had replied on 27, 1919, congratulating the Amir 
and the AFghan people for the defence of liberty and 
accepted proposal for diplomatic ties. Cf. Izvestia 
(Taskent) May 21, 1919, The Times, June 13, 1919. 
3. Cited from, Adamec Ludwig, op.cit. pp. 144-148. 
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Amanullah exploited the opportunity and turned the 
military stalemate of the Third Anglo-Afghan war, into a 
brilliant piece of diplomatic triumph at the peace 
negotiations at Rawalpindi. The Afghans achieved the 
sought after "complete Independence". With this began a 
new era in Afghanistan. In the hectic diplomatic rounds 
Afghanistan had an upperhand. Negotiations with the 
British India were held first in Mussorie in 1920 and 
again in 1921 with Henry Dobbs in Kabul. Afghan now had a 
secret military dealings with the soviet union. A high 
water mark of success of the Afghan diplomacy under 
Amanullah like which had never been achieved before by 
any other Afghan ruler. Yet there were many snags as the 
Russian had continued the suppression of the Khanates of 
Bukhara and Khiva, the Russio-Afghan Relations received a 
set back and could not further improve thereafter. The 
relation also worsened due to soviet double standard in 
terms of maintaining good neighbourly relations. As per 
the terms of the soviet Afghan Treaty of 1921, they had 
to give back to Afghanistan's Punjdeh territory conquered 
by them and an economic subsidy of one million gold 
rouble per year. 
1. The treaty was quite advantageous for the Afghan as 
they were given (i) free transit of goods through 
Russia, (ii) 1 million gold Rouble aid annually and a 
promise of freedom for Bukhara and Khiva. Cf. Secret 
Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of India no. 
X-3061, March 6, 1921 (repeating messages from Dobbs 
in Kabul) lOL/LPS 912 P 5261, 1920. Also Reysner. 
Afghanistan, p. 207; Raskolinikov, Afghanistan, p. 
20. See the text in Documentary III, 550-55. 
2. Cited from Ludwig Adamec, op.cit., 157ff. 
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Russian also began to show cordiality towards the 
the British which caused an alarm to Afghans. The success 
of Soviet-Afghan relations depended upon the lesser 
contact between the soviet Union and the British India. 
The Russian realising more benefits from the British 
therefore they tilted towards them and even concluded the 
Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement , and to Afghans it appeared 
to have marginalised the terms of the Russio-Afghan 
Treaty. In turn the British gave recognition to the 
soviet union in 1924. Although the honeymoon between the 
two old rival was soon over and relations were once again 
strained-Consequently the British withdrew the recognition 
2 
of the USSR in 1927- As Amanullah had realised Soviets 
intentions of using Afghanistan as a launch pad for their 
adventure against the British India, he never became a 
Russian protege. During the tribal re volt of 1928, 
Soviets were reluctant to help Amanullah. In fact the 
Soviets had encouraged Amanullah for his reform programme 
1. Xenia Eudin and Robert Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy 
(1924-1934), Documents and Materials (UNiversity Park, 
Penn. State University Press, 1968, Document No. 32 
statement of Litivenoff on Oct. 4, 1929. 
2. See for the basic diplomacy involved behind the 
agreement, Ullamn, H. Richard, Britain and Russian 
Civil War, Princeton, 1968, p. 173. 
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and in his anti-British policies. At the same time the 
Soviets never wanted Amanullah to quit for he was 
thoroughly anti-British. The support from the Soviets 
never came and Amanullah was forced to quit. Amanullah 
had reported remarked that "the Soviets had instigated 
him into enemity with the British and then did not help 
2 him in the ctises". It was too naive for Amanullah to 
have expected such help from the Soviets. They had their 
own designs against Afghanistan and Amanullah failed to 
see them. 
1. Actually Soviets did not want to prejudice the 
Dovgalevsky-Henderson, Protocl of Oct. 1929 in which 
they had agreed upon for negotiated settlements to 
for any dispute. See for detail on the Protocol, Zelda 
and Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1945, pp. 355-356. 
2. Cf. Secret Telegram from Major E.T.R. Wikham to the 
Government of India, May 28, 1929. NAI foreign 
Political file 137-F 1929. As quoted from Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit. p. 231. He is reported to have said 
that "Soviet's instigated him into enemity with the 
British and then not lifted a finger to help him". 
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Section - B 
Anglo-Afghan Relations during Amir Amanullah's '^Reign 
From the British point of view it was the security 
of the prized colonial possession i.e. India which was 
the biggest concern for them. Their concern was of 
course based upon the fact that the period had seen the 
rising Bolshevick challange which aimed through 
2 Afghanistan towards India. 
Whereas from Amanullah's point of view 
Afghanistan's relation with British India was based upon 
the only concern "the complete Independance for 
Afghanistan"-
Keeping in view Afghanistan's strategic location 
the British on the one hand and the Soviets on the other 
hand wanted to use the hapless Afghanistan as a buffer 
state for their own ends. The British wanted to put 
1. See Ludwig Adamec Afghanistan (1900-1923) ; A 
Diplomatic History, Berkeley, 1967, who has 
extensively dealt with the diplomatic and strategic 
importance of Afghanistan as far as the defence of 
British India was concerned. 
2. The Russian's were more aggressive after the 
Bolshevick Revolution and by the time of Amanullah's 
reign they had already made encroachment upon the 
independant Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara etc. and now 
their target of-course was India through Afghanistan. 
See also Gregorian, Vartan, The emergence of modern 
Afghanistan-, Palo Alto : Stanford University Press, 
1969. " 
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pressure on by making Afghanistan remain tilted towards 
the British India which was of course used by the British 
for their "forward policy". 
For all Afghan rulers more or less the same pattern 
followed in terms of foreign policy. Amir Abdur Rahman 
was against this stereotyped pattern in foreign policy 
but he had no option but to do for them. Habibullah was 
the pro-British Amir and had been following the British 
design, which resulted in antagonising a large section of 
Afghan intellectual including young Amanullah. 
Amir Amanullah did not inherit anything from his 
predecessors in terms of foreign policy with the British 
and rejected the "British pattern". 
As Amanullah was nurtured in a atmosphere of 
Islamic nationalism which was purely anti-Imperialist or 
anti-British, he was solely guided during his regime by 
2 
that factor. Thus his first task was to declare 
"Afghanistan to be entirely independant by which a strong 
signal passed to the British India concerning 
3 Afghanistan. 
1. See for detail Singhal, D.P., India and Afghanistan 
(1876-1907), Queensland, 1963, p. 72. 
2. Sareen, Anuradha, India and Afghanistan (1907-1921), 
Seema Publication, Delhi 1981, pp. 107-108. 
.3. See Appendix to Document no. 98, NAI Foreign 
Political files. Frontiers B, 1919 as quoted by Leon 
B. Poullada j Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 
(1919-1929, Cornell, 1973, p. 234. 
132 
T^anullah's stern resolve to cast off all signs of 
British domination and contrdl at this particular 
movement in history, was especially menancing to the 
British interests in the area as the British India had 
been struggling with the Non-cooperation Movement and 
threat of Bolshevick Russia. Thus deteriorating 
political control in India, The Bolschevick menace 
combined with Amanullah's announcement of a new and 
independant foreign policy was bound to have telling 
effect on the morales of the British Government of 
2 India. Amanullah's UiiiiaLinclination towards the soviet 
for military help like raising soviet trained Afghan 
Airforce had raise .d British eyebrows as they would 
dislike any kind of Russio-Afghan ties. These moves and 
1. The period is marked with web of confusion and 
disorder for the British government of India as the 
seires of problems related to post-war settlement of 
the promises. The Khilafat question. The Non-coopera-
tion Movement had raised their dragons heads apart 
from more aggressive threat from the Bolschevik 
Russia. See for detail on the problems facing the 
British Government of India. Trivedi, R.K., The 
critical Triangle, Jaipur 1994, chapter on "Turco-
German Intigue in India during the World War I". 
Bamford P.C. Histories of the Non-cooperation and 
Khilafat Movement, Deep Publication 1974 and Zelda, 
Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, London, 
1945. 
2. The defeat of Turkey and the Neutrality of Afghanistan 
in the World War I led to the Afghan People develop 
anti-British sentiments. See Sareen Anuradha, op.cit., 
p. 107. 
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counter-moves by the Imperial countries had brought 
extreme diplomatic maneouvre for all the three parties 
concerned. 
But contrary to the past good relations^ the 
diplomatic relation with British India started with no 
less than the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Taking 
advantage of serious internal turmoil in India, Amanullah 
declareld an unprovoked war against the British in May 
1919. It was particularly rebuking in nature in British 
eyes, as Amanullah had proclaimed that war to be a 
2 jihad. Nadir Khan's Pushtun uprising m the NWF against 
the British and Amanullah's taking help from the British 
created havoc in the British rank and file as their 
3 
Afghan policy was to take different shape. The 
atmosphere of war though was created by the Afghans 
themselves as the available reports and secret letters 
1. The detailed account of the Third Anglo-Afghan war has 
been recorded in Molesworth G.N. Afghanistan, 1919 .New 
York, Asia Publishing House, 1962. 
2. Amanullah's proclamation of jihad was a means of 
working up public enthusiasm and at the same time 
diverting the attention of hostile elements in the 
country from his own person by the call of Islam as 
his accession was not very legitimate. See Maconachie, 
R.R. A Precis on Afghan Affairs, February 1919 to 
Sep. 1927 (Simla, 1928, n. 1, p. 14. 
3. Nadir Khan was sent for inciting the Pushtun's on the 
British side of the Durand Line against the British. 
Annual Register, 1919. 
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reveal. The attack was to start as a tribal incursion 
into tiny piece of disputed tetritory in the Khyber Pass 
and could coin":ide with the Indian nationalists uprising 
in Peshwar. The brain behind the Peshawar uprising was 
2 
the famous Afghan secret agent, Ghulam Hyder , but due to 
swift activity of the British spy system, they managed to 
thwart the attempt. It was from the time of Habibullah 
that a good number of Indian revolutionaries had been 
sheltering in Afghanistan and had already formed "the 
3 
Provisional Government of India in exile". Amanullah had 
managed to have close contact with these elements and 
wanted to use them as the big tools for war against 
India, and the same element led Amanullah to believe in 
the good reason to attack India as that could trigger a 
4 
big revolt in the already volatile atmosphere. 
1. It also struck deeply into the British pursue. 
According to the Annual Register, 1919, the one month 
Afghan war resulted in an increase of £ 14,750,000 in 
the military Budget of the Government of India. 
2. Ghulam Haider, the famous Afghan Post-Master at 
Peshwar was in fact operated as a secret agent and 
liasion with Indian nationalists as is revealed from 
the interpreted letters from him by the British. See 
correspondance related to Government of India lOL, 
LPS/10/808/1061, Part 3 and following 1919 as citeld 
by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 246. 
3. The government (Provisional) formed by Mahendra Pratap 
as President Barkatullah as Prime Minister and 
Obaidullah Sindhi as Home Minister. See for detail, 
Trivedi, R.K. The Critical Triangle, pp. 173-177. 
4. Cf. Secret Telegram from the Viceroy to the secretary 
of state for India, no. 793-S, June 2, 1919, lOL, 
LPS/10/808/1919; Sykes II 267ff and Ghani, Abdul, A_ 
Review of Political Situation in Central Asia, Lahore 
n.p. 1921, Chapter 5. 
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The developments were extremely resentful for the 
British Government of India as they considered that to be 
a blatant interference with Internal Indian affairs. As 
the third Afghan war proclaimed to be a jihad plus Amir's 
condemnation of the Rowllatt Act, were enough to creat 
disorders in India. 
In the ensuing skirmishes. Nadir Khan was through 
successful in leading a rising of the Pushtun tribes 
against the British. At one point of entire frontier 
threatend to explode against the British but due to 
superb handling of the affairs by the legendary George 
Ross Keppel and Sir Abdul Qayyum the situation was 
saved. 
Thus that way the Third Anglo-Afghan war started 
and the issues involved with the war, created a profound 
distrusts and prejudices against the new Amir of 
Afghanistan. But Amanullah exploiting the situation 
3 
managed to strike a peace treaty which enhanced his 
prestige - a very disgusting situation for the British. 
1. George Roos Keppel was the Chief Commissioner of the 
N.W. Frontier Province and Sir Abdul Qayyum a British 
agent. 
.2. Cf. The Series of secret Telegram from the Chief 
Commissioner, Government of India, LOL, LPS/10/808/ 
1061/ 1919., as cited by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. 
p.241. 
3. For detail on Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919), See Sareen 
Anuradha, Indian and Afghanistan (1907-1921), Chapter 
6, Seema Publication, Delhi, 1981. 
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On the British side there were divergent views 
with regard to their Afghan policy and Amanullah. Lord 
Chelmsford the viceroy wanted an entirely new game to be 
played in Asia. The policy towards Afghanistan would have 
to change. But the suggested new approach found in the 
bureaucratic and geopolitical thought of the imperial 
policy makers too deeply ingrained for a general attitude 
to change even in the changed scenario. There were 
conflicting and distorted perceptions of each others 
2 
policies. The real intentions were not clear, therefore 
game rise to misunderstandings and tensions between 
3 them. The Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Aman-i-Afghan the leading 
journal of Af9hanistan were vehemently, anti-British in 
the tone and content. These journals openly praised the 
1. Even Hamilton Grant, the then foreign Secretary of the 
British Government of India had suggested for a 
"relation based on real-friendliness and mutual trust 
with Afghanistan and for that advocated for treaty 
based on Afghan tenus". See. Foreign Deparltment, 
Secret Frontier October 1920, No. 705-806 as cited by 
Sareen, Anuradha, op.cit. p. 122. 
2. The socalled "New approach" in relation was not 
destined to succeed as Lord Chelmsford himself 
embarked a policy of "releasing Afghanistan from the 
leading strings of the British" in which though 
Afghanistan was free, and independant country but to 
be treated still as "dependency". Cf. Lord 
Chelmsford's secret Report to the Rt. Hon. Edwin 
Montagu in Despatch no. 73 Oct. 2, 1919. LOL, LPS/10/ 
808, 1919 as cited by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p.243. 
3. Amanullah, Tarzi and Yong Afghans proud of a new 
freedom they felt they had wrested from the British by 
skillful diplomacy and force of arms, deeply resented 
these patronising attitudes. Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. 
p. 243. 
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German efforts during the world war I. They published 
news against the British India. Seeing the trend the 
authorities of British India imposed restrictions on the 
circulation of these two journals. Amanullah too never 
lost any occassion to thrash the British for their 
colonial policies in India. 
He even interested himself on the British attitude 
2 towards Indian Muslims. Amir espoused the cause of 
Indian nationalist leaders. There was a close link 
between the exiled Indian nationalists' and Amanullah's 
3 
secret agents in India. Hakim Aslam and Maulvi Manzoor 
Afghan intrigues in tribal areas of the North west 
Frontiers had become a constant source of friction. 
Amanullah's tribal affairs department reported to give 
extensive subsidies to the tribes on the British side and 
1. See Adamec Ludwig W. Afghanistan (100-1923) Barkeley 
1967, pp. lOlff. Report by the CID on Amani-i-Afghan, 
NAI/ Home and Political Department, secret Deposit no. 
53, 1919 as cited by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p.245. 
2. Likewise Amanullah spoke on Indian Muslims question, 
The Rawllatt Act etc. See Adamec Ludwig, op.cit. 
p.114. 
3. Cf Captured or Intercepted Documents relating to 
Afghan conspiracy against the Government of India, 
lOL, LPS/10/808/1061, Part B, 1919 as cited by Leon B. 
Poullada, op.cit. 246. For a detailed discussion on 
subversive activities, see Trivedi, r.K. The Critical 
Triangle : India Britain and Turkey 1908-1929, 
Publication scheme, Jaipur 1994. also for "Provisional 
Government of India in Kabul. 
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goaded them to agitate and propogate against the 
British, On the Other hand the British activities in 
the tribal belt also raised the level of a conflict with 
Afghanistan. Britain had adopted modified forward or 
"close border policy" which involved gradual peaceful 
presentation with extention of roads and railroads upto 
2 
the Afghan borders. Later on Afghan attempt to 
negotiate the tribal problem with government of India 
3 
was ignored and given a cold reception. Afghan pride 
was hurt to see that the British: were not according 
them the respect due to a sovereign state. 
In 1920 a Afghan mission was not permitted to 
plead the cause of the Khilafat in London, Britain 
1. It was suspected by the British Govt, in India that 
the money was coming from Soviet Union. Cf. Telegram 
indicating Afghan-Bolshevik connection, lOL, LPS/10/ 
809, 1919 "Soviet Activities in India", NAI, Home 
Political Files, F-379, 1930 as cited by Leon B. 
Poullada, op,cit. p. 247. 
2. The policy involved more the diplomatic mraiieouvre 
rather than "aggressive forward policy" . See ior 
detail on the theory of close border policy. Spain, 
James W, The Pathan Borderland. The Haque, Monton, 
1963 p. 153; Annual Register, 1926; Eraser Tytler pp. 
203-204. 
3. On tribal question Curzon, Now heading the foreign 
office in London did not give any indication of 
enthusiasm in discussing the matter with the Afghan 
envoy, which created problem for both parties. See 
also Amanullah -Chamberlain discussion in this regard 
as citeld by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 247. 
Amanullah-Chamberlain discussion in secret Despatch 
from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affair to His Majesty's Charge's d'Affaires at Kabul, 
No. 47, April 4, 1928, lOL, LPS/10/1203 P. 135, 1927. 
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protested to Italy about a projected commercial 
agreement with Afghanistan on the ground that 
Afghanistan lay within the British sphere of Influence. 
The British contained to impose sanction on the 
transit of goods through India to Afghanistan. During 
Mangal revolt the British stopped arms shipment from 
France and Germany to Afghanistan. Tarzihad termed it to 
2 . . be a flagrant violation of Afghan sovereignty. British 
regarded with great suspicion and displeasure the system 
of interlocking treaties between USSR, Turkey, Persia 
and Afghanistan that had as a common denomination 
3 hostile to Britain-
1. Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 248. 
2. See for detail, Adamec Ludwig, W. Afghanistan, 
1900-1923; A Diplomatic History. Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 1967, p. 136, 
Castagne, Joseph. Les Basmatchis. Paris E Leroux, 
1925, p. 13. Tarzi's statement in Paris of December 
17, 1923 is quoted in full in Melia op.cit- p.32. See 
also NAI foreign secretary Notes, F 356, 1919. 
3. In this treaty they had resolved to "oppose" any 
attack on any one of the parties by any imperialist. 
See for full document on the Turco-Afghan Treaty as 
reproduced in Adamec, Ludwig, op.cit. Appendix pp. 
192-193. Also Mustafa Chokhaieye,The Bolshievik and 
Afghanistan, Asiatic Review (London), July 1929. 
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Afghan exiles in India were the additional source 
of tension and suspicion between Amanullah and the 
British. The British used them by projecting as the heir 
apparent to the Afghan throne. They raised objection to 
Amanullah's efforts to initiate modernization programme 
in Afghanistan. Sir Francis Humphrys never considered 
Amanullah more than a mere kinglet. The slight and scorn 
was intolerable for the Amir and his people. Naturally 
2 it had its effect on Anglo-Afghan relations. 
The proposed rail project for Afghanistan 
3 
sponsored by Clemenceau was Humphry's target and did 
The appearance of exiled Abdul Karim (son of Amir 
Yakub) in the 1924 Khost revolt and Mohammad Umar 
(decendant of Sardar Ayub) during 1928-29 were 
indication of British involvement in subversive 
activities against Afghanistan See. Secret Telegram 
to AIB, Quitta, to the chief of the general staff. 
New Delhi, no,. lQ-9 January 4, 1929, IOL/10/1203 
P.135, 1927 as citeld by Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. 
p.249. 
Sir Francis Humphrys's stay in Kabul covers whole of 
Amanullah's reign (1919-1929) and from all known 
sources Sir Humphryshad developed utter dislike for 
the amir and was responsible in more deteriorating 
relation-. See Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. pp. 252-253 
and also Telegrams from Sir Francis Humphrys in the 
British Legation, Kabul to the foreign office, London 
no. 39, 1927-1929 and Minute of the India Office, 
London, prepared by A. Wakeley , no. 1178, Feb. 16, 
1929. 
Michael Clemenceau was leading the Kabul Qandhar, 
Railway Project and conducted survey of the area in 
summer 1928. 
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everything to discourage and scuttle it. During Baccha 
saqqao's attack on Kabul Humphrys arbitarily and 
without consulting Amanullah's government caused British 
Airforce planes to violatle Afghan space by flying over 
Kabul and distribute pamphletes hostile to Amanullah and 
1 his regime. 
Although Amanullah was accorded a cordial and 
dignified reception in London during his visit, sending 
positive signal and hope for better relations in future. 
His relation with the British remained; unsatisfactory. 
The biame for the rebellion of 1928 was put on the 
2 
shoulders of the British. The press of the Soviet Union 
. . 3 France and Germany, laid the blame on the British. The 
suspicion of British intrigue was evident and focussed 
on the presence of Col. T.E. Lawrence of (Lawrence of 
Arabia) fame in the tribal area during the Revolt. 
1. Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 253. See also Fraser 
Tytler, op.cit. pp. 210-211. 
2. Whether the British were behind the revolt of which 
ousted Amanullah or not is altogether different 
question but since the Anglo-Afghan relations never 
improved suspicion continued to prevail. 
3. See the Press review done by Leon B. Poullada, 
op.cit. p. 256 of the Morning Post, Jan. 31, 1929 the 
Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 19, 1929; the Indian National 
Herald, Jan. 14, 1929; and the Chicago Daily Tribune, 
Jan. 16, 1929. A good summary of the French and 
German press view is given in the Times (London) of 
January 16, 1929. For an example of Russian attitude, 
see the Sunday Worker of April 21, 1929. 
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It was not a mere coincidence, rather a definite 
link could be seen. Humphrys unsympathetic report about 
the rebellion led the British to adopt a neutral 
attitude between the Amir and rebels. Undoubtedly the 
declaration of neutrality operated dangerously against 
Amanullah in a number of ways. It deprived him of the 
support which could have saved him. When Amanullah 
appealed for British help, the British explained their 
2 
"neutrality" m this regard. 
Amanullah later on regretted that it was his 
failure in forging close relations with the British due 
to his "hands off" policy. 
Still the British never wanted any chaos in 
Afghanistan or a vacuum of power which would have given 
3 the Bolshiveks a chance to expand in the region. 
1. When facing the final outbreak Amanullah was 
ironically expecting support from the British who 
wanted the ouster of the Amir. See Leon B. Poullada, 
op.cit. p. 257 and Fraser Tytler, op.cit. pp. 
210-212, also Raja, Anwar, The Tragedy of 
Afghanistan, Verso, London, 1979, p. 21. 
2. The British neutrality worked well and saw Amanullah 
loose his throne to bandit named Baccha-i-Saqqao. See 
Secret Telegram from the Foreign Office, London, to 
the British Minister, Kabul, no. 36 Feb. 6, 1929, 
lOL, LPS/10/1288 P. 53, 1929 as cited by Leon B. 
Poullada op.cit. p. 259. See also Gregorian Vartan, 
The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Palo Alto, 
Stanford Press, 1969, for the British neutrality 
question. 
3. Cited from Ludwig Ademae, W. op.cit. p. 4. Ludwig has 
given an incifive concluding remark on Anglo-Afghan 
relation and its intricacies. 
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To sum up the failure lay on both the British 
and Amanullah because in the given geopolitical 
circumstances old perception continued to influence 
their policies. 
They differed almost on all issues and sometimes 
personal ego was involved. Anglo-Afghan tension 
undoubtedly hampered the full development of the 
modernization programme of Amanullah. 
Social resistance to a process of modernization 
and change is understandable. It gathers political 
overtones when such a resistance receives foreign 
assistance. But, for the British sympathy, the conflict 
between amanullah and tribal interests against the 
central authority would have never succeeded. 
1. Leon B. Poullada, had worked extensively on 
Afghan affairs with all minute details See from 
Anglo-Afghan Relation- The Reform and Rebellion in 
AfqhanistanC 1919-1929) . Cornell, 1963. 
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Section - C 
Response to Gemnan interest in Afghanistan 
In between the two world wars there appeared on 
the Afghan scene, Germanyf about which neither the 
British nor the Russian at first took any serious note 
ofi German interests in Afghanistan was right from the 
beginning motivated by the "wishful strategic 
consideration". The 1915 adventurous expendition led by 
Warren Otto, Von Hentig and Oskar Von Nidermayer, 
reached Kabul with the intention of using Afghanistan 
. . . . . . . 2 
for subversive activities against the British India. 
Warner Otto Von Hentig had led in 1915-16 with the 
purpose wining over Amir Habibullah towards the Central 
powers. The ultimate aim of Hentig/Neidermayer Mission 
was to direct from Afghanistan an anti-British as well 
as Pan-Islamic propaganda into India to help foment 
1- Cited from L.W. Adamec et.al., Afghanistan - Some New 
Approaches, Ann Abor 1969, pp. 204-259. 
2. There is a recent study on the Turco-German Intrigue 
and pan-Islamic interest in Afghanistan, see R.K. 
Trivedi, The Critical Triangle - India, Britain and 
Turkey. Infact German's were so much interested in 
Afghan affairs that they had offereld Amir Habibullah 
a treaty without precedent, besidels the assurance of 
Afghanistan's complete independance the treaty 
provided for military assistance in personnel and 
equipment on a fantastic scale, quoting 10,000 modern 
rifles, 300 Artillery pieces a free gift of $ 10 
million. See Text of draft treaty between the German 
Empire and Afghanistan, dated 24.1.1916 and signed by 
Hentig and Neidermayer (Cf. Vogel R. , Die Persien, 
pp. 292-294) as quoted from India in Axis Strategy, 
Milan Hauner, p. 70, 1980. 
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disorder and sedition among Indian troops. German 
strategists also hoped that by the involvement of Afghan 
tribals,substantial number of British and Indian troops 
could be tied up on the NWF and thus prevented them from 
reinforcing their forces in the European war threatre. 
The Mission was not a success as made out by 
Trivedi/ yet the idea of using the dissenting section 
persisted. Germany even after its surrender and being 
reduced to second grade power; continued to have 
2 interests in Afghanistan. Germany gave Afghanistan full 
diplomatic support and encouragement whenever possible. 
Several scientific expeditions were sent by them to the 
Central Asia via Afghanistan. German High School in 
Kabul was opened by them to prepare Afghan students for 
1. See L.O.V. Hentig/ Mein Leben eine Dienstreise 
(Gottingen/ 1962), pp. 91-199; O.V. Niedermeyer, Im 
Weltkrieq von Indians Toren (Hamburg, 1942); R. 
Cogel, Die Persien und Afghanistan-expedition, Oskar 
Ritter V. Neidermeyers 1915/16 (Osnabruck) See. also 
Hentig's private papers (Aufzeich nungen 1934-196), 
3 vols. Institut fur Zeit geschichte, Munich), as 
cited Milan Hauner, The Soviet threat to AFghanistan 
and India 1938-1940, Modern Asian Studies, 1981 (15) 
2, pp. 287-88. 
2. Even after the Allies had won the war, the Aman -i-
Afghan continued to publish articles praising Germany 
and featuring large pictures of top German military 
officers as though they were victors. See Adamec pp. 
lOlff. Report by the CID on Aman-i-Afghan, NAI, Home 
and Political Deptt. Secret Deposits no. 53, 1919. 
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further education in German universities and technical 
colleges. Gradually commercial contacts developed and 
intensified untill Germany became not only the most 
important promoter of industrialisation in Afghanistan 
but also chief supplier of arms to her armed forces. 
German experts and advisers came in large numbers and 
outnumbered the other Europeans, working for similar 
ends in Afghanistan.. <5ermans for example were about ten 
2 times more in numbers than the British. The German had 
nearly acquired monopoly and willingly setout to build 
the Afghan communication network/ the roads"bridges, 
civil aviation and telecommunication works. The German 
pattern of penetration during the 1920's and 30's indeed 
offers the most striking parallel with the systematic 
soviet inflitration of Afghanistan* later on since the 
1950's, which culminated in the complete military take 
3 
over of that country. 
Amir Amanullah's project of reforms and his 
political manoeuvring between Britain and Soviet Union 
resulted in establishing Germany as the most important 
1. See Milan Hauner; Soviet Threat to AFghanistan 
and India (1938-40), Modern Asian studies, vol. 15, 
1981, p. 287. 
2. Ibid., p. 290. 
3. Ibid., p. 291. 
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third power in Afghanistan. It was in December of 1923, 
that Fritz Grobba , the German, charge d'Affairs arrived 
in Kabul and the German colony rapidly increased in 
numbers. By August 1924, seventy two German experts not 
counting their families resided in Afghanistan, 
constituting the largest European colony in the country. 
It is notable that on the occasion of Grobba's first 
audience with Amir Amanullah, the Afghan ruler had 
expressed his appreciation for all that Germany had 
accompalished in Afghanistan. Amanullah had indicated 
that he would rely largely on German skill and experties 
2 in his efforts to modernize Afghanistan. He wanteld 
that the Afghan graduate studying in German schools in 
Kabul should be admitted in the German universities 
which he thought was the best in the world. Infact the 
1. Dr. Fritz Grobba was very manipulating diplomat who 
got the German interests established in the very 
beginning of his arrival. See F. Grobba, Manner and 
Machte in Oriednt, 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tatigkeit 
in orient Gottingen^-1967, pp. 14-59; lOR L/P & S/12 
1878; German Minister at Kabul 1922-1947 as cited by 
Milan Hauner; India in Axis Strategy, London 1980, 
p.73. 
2. A special Afghan diplomatic mission reached Berlin 
with a long list of wishes, amonigst which 
predominated the desire to establish diplomatic 
relation between the two countries to purchase 
machinery, to sent Afghan student for training to 
Germany and to acquire German experts. Cf. H. 
Glaesner, Das Dritte Reich und der Mittlere Osten. 
Politische und Wertschaftliche Bezichungen 
Deutschlands Zur Turkei 1933-1939, Zu Iran 1933-1941 
und Zu Afghanistan 1933-1941 Diss. Weirzburg 1976 pp. 
421-424 as cited by Milan Hauner, op.cit. p. 73. 
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Afghan sent to Germany had made quick progress than 
those students studying in other countries. Amanullah 
had ^seen that the stature of Germany had not declined 
inspite of her defeat in the war. He attributed this to 
be internal strength of Germany. 
Grobba cautiously dealt with the other European 
diplomats in the Afghan capital and made friendly 
gestures to British mission led by Humphrys. The German 
were indeed motivated by economic rather than political 
consideration in establishing relations with 
Afghanistan. Germany's economic well being depended on 
the success of her foreign trade and even in areas as 
2 
remote as Afghanistan. In 1923 German trading interests 
in Bremen founded an export- import company for the 
purpose of developing trade with Afghanistan. The 
company was at first called Deustch Orientalische 
Handelsgese Uschaft, A.G. but a year later the name was 
changed to Deustch Afghanische Company (DACOM). 
In the summer of 1923, DACOM opened a branch 
office in Kabul which was staffed by three Germans, Kurt 
Wagner (a member of the Hestig-Neidermayer expedition) 
Emil Trunkker, a geologist, explorer and author and 
1. See for detail, Adamec, Ludwig, op.cit. p. 218. id, 
New Approaches, p. 224. 
2. See W.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan ; A Study of 
Political Developments in Central and southern Asia, 
Oxford 1953 p. 252. 
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Gottiff Blaich, a\. technical consultant. Thereafter two 
German directions of the firms namely Fritzebner and S. 
Silbermann, arrived in Kabul. A year later DACOM 
imported to Afghanistan such items as cast irons, pipes, 
telegraph poles. Cement, and various types of machinery. 
Until July 1925 DACOM was exclusively engaged in 
importing the products and equipments needed by the 
Afghan government for its various development projects. 
The fortunes of the German company took a turn 
for the worse, fearing an unfavourable trade balance, 
began to restrain its activities and imposed certain 
limitations. DACOM was prohibited from dealing with 
merchants other than those designated by the Afghan 
Government. For maintaining balance of trade company 
waia to be regulated accordingly to AFghan laws-. The 
measure was not appreciated by the company and their 
profit went down. 
Grobba observed that the company, always lived 
2 
from hand to mouth. 
Considering Amir Amanullah's respect for German 
experties in military science and weapon's technology it 
was natural that he hoped to obtain German military 
1. See details on the affairs of the Company. Milan 
Hauner, op.cit. p. 74. 
2. Ibid., p. 133. 
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supplies and instruction from Afghanistan's military 
academy. But Germanywas prohibited by Article 176 of the 
treaty of Versailles from giving military aid to any 
country. Consequently the Germans were replaced by 
Russians for military supplies and the British had 
heaved a sigh of relief. Still in April 1924 a group of 
41 Germans had arrived in Kabul (some former military 
officers' ) who were to be employed as teachers and 
military advisers. 
The most important among the officers were .JVIajor 
A. Christian, Freiherr Roland, Von Kalternborn Stachau 
and Karl G. Von Plater. Inspite of a lot of objections 
German entered into Afghan government services. Germans 
were employed by the Afghan govt, as pilots and aircraft 
mechanics. They had contributed greaty in the success of 
the Afghan government against the tribal forces during 
3 the Khost uprising of 1924-25. British had visualised 
the cementing of Russian interest in Afghanistan as a 
4 
counterpoise to the German threats. 
1. Milan Hauner, op. cit. p. 134. 
2. See Adamec. op.cit. p. 214. 
3. Ibid, p. 215. 
4. See W.A.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan of Political 
Development in Central and southern Asia, Oxford, 
1953, p. 253. 
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Amanullah had tried to invite people from 
different nationalities so that no particular country 
could monopolise or dominate in Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless by 1924 German had gained a predominant 
position in wireless construction, electric plants and 
irrigation projects. They got more chances after the 
famous piperno incident (in which an Italian engineer 
was sentenced to death on the charge of murdering an 
Afghan national) in July 1924 in which most of the 
Italian engineers had left Afghanistan. The incident 
greatly affected the prospects of Italians in 
Afghanistan as well as their diplomatic ties with them. 
More significantly it affected German relations as it 
served as a precedent to a similar case involving a 
German Strati 1 Sauer and a Afghan citizen. Though sauer 
was pardoned but that made Grobba to leave Afghanistan. 
August Feizel came to Kabul on June 18, 1926 after his 
departure. German interest did not decline but there was 
no advance in their bilateral relation hereafter. 
1. See Adamec, op.cit. p. 218 
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AN ASSESSMENT 
Amir Amanullah possessed a mystifying personality. 
He had been brought up and had been influenced by various 
forces and factors v*iich was tD_ open up a new chapter in the 
history of Afghanistan and mould the country into a modern 
and progressive state. He sought to bring a revolution 
from the above. 
Rulers sometimes failed to understand the psyche of 
the people they ruled. Instead they had to face the wrath 
of their own people. The retrogressive forces remained 
powerful and easily undid the whole revolutionary 
programme undertaken by him. 
Afghanistan was unique in terms of its people, so 
sharply divided on tribal lines. The tribal division were 
deceptive and sometimes the rulers perceptions could not 
detect them. Amanullah had taken for granted their unity 
which was never there. Pushtun domination though was 
there, but the other prominent tribes like that of Tajik 
Hazaras, Shinwari's never had recognised their superiority 
and had always tried to overthrow the regime that was in 
Kabul, finding it weak in nature. 
Combined with this tribal disunity was the 
religious fanaticism. Religion when applied without 
reason it gives way to orthodoxy, in which nothing short 
of basic tenets of the religion are acceptable. The tribes 
153 
of Afghanistan were mostly followers of Islam (both Shia 
and sunni sect) but, were mostly illiterate, nomads and 
never foresaw change in their life styles. The 
modernizing pattern of Amanullah mainly hit upon the old 
customs and traditions of the tribal society which had 
taken deep religious colours. To do away with them meant 
a direct challange to their belief which aroused their 
"revenge" motif of tribal codes. 
Amanullah went against the religious beliefs which 
was enshrined in the tribal life style. No one could have 
succeeded against them in that condition. 
Amir Amanullah was mild in nature, he was 
persuasive and believed in reason rather than force. 
Afghans were primarily tribal illiterate and enveloped in 
the gun culture. To rule them on the basis of reason was 
the biggest mistake of Amanullah such hardy people 
required an iron man in Kabul. Amir Amanullah's reform 
programme could have transformed the whole tribal Afghan 
state into a modern nation, provided he would have dealt 
sternly, with the help of a strong and standing army and 
could have easily quelled revolts. His plan of 
modernization was detested by the ever freedom loving 
tribal Afghans. "From the above" imposition was destined 
to fail. He wrongly perceived and expected from his wild 
nation to follow the most enlightened ideology and 
programme of the age .-
154 
It was greatest thing for the medieval looking 
Afghanistan to have a modernizer like Amanullah, but it 
was most tragic for the Afghan nation that the same 
people rose against this grand man of the century in 
Afghanistan, for whom the Amir was bent upon delivering 
the good. 
Brought up in an age of radical, changes 
Amanullah received a set of ideologies for his own future 
course of actions. He was nurtured in an atmosphere of 
Pan-Islamic Movement, anti-Imperialist stance and in the 
company of persons like Tarzi. The influences are best 
reflected in his foreign relations with the imperialists. 
A staunch anti-Imperialist, freed Afghanistan from the 
British tutelege, asserted Afghan stances whenever chance 
occured, never gave way to the Imperial designs to 
succeed on Afghan soil as far as buffer state theory was 
concerned. Russia too had seenvith interest the new 
Amir's actions and plans and for feai of British 
complicity kept Afghanistan a friendly country. Amanullah 
improved relations with Germans and French and got their 
assistance in various modernization programme. This was 
astute diplomatic move which kept other parties guessing 
the next move of the Amir. 
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, Amanullah's naivete 
in his own internal matters; he had to call it a day 
leaving his whole plan in tantrum. Afghanistan remained 
uncertain and turbulent thereafter. 
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BARAKZAI DYNASTY 
PAINDA KHAN (22 sons in all) 
DOST Mohammad (1826-1963) Sultan Mohammad 
Amir Muhammad Afzal (186 5-67) Yahya 
Amir Abdur Rahman (1881-1901) Mohammad Yusuf 
T 
Nasrullah Amir Habibullah "^^^^ ^anab Nadir Khan 
Ullaya Hazrat ] I 
I T 
I 1 Asadullah 
Inayatullah Hayatullah Amanullah 
















Mahmud (1800-03, 1809-1818) 
Kamran Mirza 
(ruler of Herat) 
Fateh Juny (1842) 
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APPENDIX - II 
Rulers of Modern Afghanistan 
Sadozai Dynasty (Ahmad Shah Abdali) 1747-1773 
Timur Shah 1773-1793 
Zaman Shah 1793-1799 
Muhammad Shah 1799-1803 
Shah Shuja 1803-1810 
Mahmud Shah 1810-1818 
Civil War 
Barakzai Dynasty 
Dost Mohammad 1826-1839 
First Anglo-Afghan War 1839-1842 
Shah Shuja (Sadozai) 1839-1842 
Dost Mohammad 1842-1863 
Civil War 
Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1879 
Sher Ali 1870-1879 
Yaqub Khan 1879 
Abdur Rahman Khan 1880-1901 
Habibullah Khan 1901-1919 
Third Anglo-Afghan War 1919 
Amanullah Khan* 1919-1929 
Habibullah Khan (Bacbha-i-Saqao) Jan.17 - Oct.13,1929 
Muhammad Nadir 1929-1933 
Muhammad Zahir 1933-1973 
* Sardar Nasrullah Khan was king for about five days in 
FEb. 1929 and Sardar Inayatullah was king for 3 days 
in Jan. 1929. 
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APPENDIX - III 
Chronology of Events Preceding Amanullah 
1747 - Nadir Shah Conquers Persia, Sacks Delhi and is 
assassinated in Camp. 
1773 - Timur Shah assumes power and transfer capital 
from Kandhar to Kabul. 
1809 - Proposed invasion of Napolean and Czar to India, 
Mr. Ellphinston is sent by British Government to 
Kabul. 
1826 - Accession of Dost Mohammed, Amir of 
Afghanistan. 
1833 - Unsuccessful Persian expedition against Herat. 
1837 - Persian on Russian instigation marches onto 
Herat. 
1838 - Rupture of relations of Dost Mohammad with 
British, Recall of Burnes. 
1838 - Beginning of first Afghan War, Nov. 1838. 
1839 - Capture of Kabul, flight of Dost Mohammed and 
restoration of Shah Shuja. 
1840 - Rising of Dost Mohammad 
1840 - Defeat and surender of Dost Mohammad at Bainian 
(Nov.) 1840. 
1841 - Assassination of Sir A. Burnes at Kabul (Nov.). 
1842 - Seize of British forces at Kabul (December, 1841 
to January 1842). 
1842 - Advance of British relief column under General 
Pollock (April). 
78 
1842 - Evacuation of British forces from Afghanistan 
(Oct.). 
184 2 - Dost Mohammad restored to throne. 
1855 - First treaty between Great Britain and Dost 
Mohammad (January). 
1856 - Surrender of Herat to the Persians (Oct.). 
1857 - Meeting between sir John Lawrence and Dost 
Mohammad at Peshawar. 
1857 - Second treaty between Great Britain and Dost 
Mohammad. 
1857 - Grant of subsidy of 12 lakh to Dost Mohammad. 
1857 - Maj. Lunsden's mission to Kandhar. 
1857 - War between Great Britain and Persian on behalf 
of Afghanistan (Nov. 1856 - March 1857). 
1858 - Sher Ali nominated successor to the Afghan 
throne. 
1863 - Death of Dost Mohammad. 
1872 - Gorkhakov-Granville Agreement as to boundaries 
of Afghanistan-
1873 - Abdullah Jan proclaimed heir apparent, Yakub 
Khan revolts. 
187 4 - Imprisonment at Kabul of Yakub Khan. 
1878 - Kauffmann threatens invasion of India and 
Afghanistan (June). 
1878 - Denunciation of Alliance with Dost Mohammad by 
Lord Lytton (Nov. 21). 
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1878 - Second Anglo-Afghan War began. 
1878 - Flight of Sher Ali from Kabul and release of 
Yakub Khan. 
1879 - Treaty of Gandamak with Yakub Khan (June 8). 
1879 - Yakub Khan deported to India. 
1880 - Recognition of Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir (July). 
1880 - Disaster of Maiwand(July 27). Defeat of General 
Burrows by Ayub Khan. 
1880 - March of Sir F. Roberts to the relief of Kandhar 
(leaving Kabul August, 8, arriving Kandhar 
August 31) . 
1880 - Rejection of Ayub's terms by Sir F. Roberts and 
defeat of Ayub at Mazra (or Battle of Kandhar on 
Sept. 1). 
1881 - Evacuation of Kandhar and entry of Abdur Rahman 
(Sept. 30). 
1883 - Subsidy of 12 lakhs, granted by Lord Ripon to 
Abdur Rahman, due. 
1886 - Return of British Commission through Kabul to 
India. 
1887 - Failure of rebellion of Afghanistan, Escape of 
Ayub Khan from Persia. 
1887 - Surrender of Ayub Khan to General Maclean, 
Viceroy's agent at Meshhe<j[, and detention in 
India. 
1988 - Revolt of Ishak Khan against Abdur Rahman Khan 
(July to Sept.). 
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1891 - Abdur Rahman appoints Habibullah to hold Public 
Durbars. 
1893 - Sir Mortimer Durand goes to Kabul to explain 
drift of negotiations between Great Britain and 
Russia in connection with Northern frontier and 
Pamir region. 
1901 - Death of Abdur Rahman (Oct. 1) Habibullah 
proclaimed king (Oct. 3). 
1902-1903- Re-erection of boundary pillar on Perso-Afghan 
border. 
1903 - Construction of Quetta-Nushki Railway begin. 
1905 - Resignation of Lord Curzon of Keldeston, 
Appointment of Earl of Minto as Viceroy of 
India. 
1905-1906 - Extension of Railway to Dakka. 
1906 - Habibullah rejects the award made by McMohan in 
respect of the waters of Helmund. 
1906 - Visit of Habibullah to India. 
1919 - Assassination of Amir Habibullah. 
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APPENDIX- IV 
Chronology of the events of Amanullah's period 
1802 - Birth of Amanullah Khan 
19 Feb. 1919 - Assassination of AmirHabibullah while on 
hunting trip. 
1907 - Amanullah's first marriage at 15. 
1907 - Second marriage with Shahzada Khanum who 
died while giving birth to Hidayatullah. 
1913 - Third marriage at 21 with Soraya Tarzi. 
13 April 1919 - Accession of Amanullah Khan at a Public 
Durbar and declaration of Afghanistan's 
complete Independence. 
April 1919 - Amanullah's declaration of Holy War 
(Jihad) against the British India. 
6 May, 1919 - Beginning of the Third Anglo-Afghan War or 
so called 'the War of Independance'. 
May 1919 - End of the Third Anglo Aghan War. 
1920 - Formation of "Anjuman-i-Himayate-i-Niswan" 
(Women's protective Association) headed by 
Qubra Jan (one of Amir Amanullah's sister) 
1921 - Organising of AFghan Air Force. 
1922 - Modernisation of Accounting system. 
March, 1924- - The famous Khost Uprising. 
January 19 25 
14 August 1924 - The Afghan Parliament Approves of Holy War 
against the rebels. 
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19 28 - National Board and a chamber of Commerce 
established. 
2 Oct, 19 28 >- Violent Anti-Govt. demonstration in Kabul. 
Oct. 1928 - Franco-German Railways comes to 
Afghanistan. 
Sept. 1, 1928 - Convention of Third Loya Zirgah in which 
1000 tribal representatives participated. 
14 Nov.1928 - Tribal army was looted at Pesh Bolak on 
Achin passes. 
Dec. 6, 19 28 - Escape of Umar Khan from Ambala. 
Dec. 8, 1928 - Ali Ahmad Jan lift for Jalalabad to 
arrange for peace. 
Dec.10, 19 28 - Baccha and the rebel group's direct attack 
on Kabul. 
Dec.21, 1928 - Evacuation of Amanullah's family members 
from Kabul by air. 
Jan. 1929 - Issuing of proclamation in which he 
offered to release the religious leaders 
to reinstate Friday as day of rest to 
close the girls school, to cancell ban on 
Mullahs. 
8 Jan. 19 2 9 - Amanullah's counter proclamation in which 
he rescinded most of the actual and 
proposed programme. 
Jan. 11, 1929 - Defeat of Mohammad Khan Yawar (Amanullah's 
last post). 
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Jan.14, 1929 - Amanullah's abdication in favour of 
Inayatullah and leaving for Kandhar. 
Jan.16, 1929 - Bacha-i-Saqqao became king after 
Inayatullah's abdication. 
Jan.20, 1929 - Ali Ahmad Jan's fatwa against Amanullah 
and declaration of his kingship to Loya 
Jirgah. 
Jan.25, 1929 - Amanullah again sought to wear the robes 
of legitimacy by rescinding his abdication 
on 25, 1929. 
Jan.27, 1929 - Inayatullah left Kabul and arried 
Khandhar and tendered his submission to 
Amanullah. 
Feb. 7, 1929 - Khugiani' s betrayal to Ali Ahmad Jan by 
wrecking his army from within. 
Feb. 24, 1929 - Amanullah's impassioned appeal for Bacha's 
overthrow at the loyal jirgah at the 
mosque of the Robe of the Prophet. 
April 19,1929 - Four thousand Sulaiman Kheil rushed to 
Amanullah's position in Ghazni. 
May 23, 1929 - Amanullah's secret flight to Chaman. 
May 24, 1929 - Amanullah crossed Indian border. 
July 22, 1929 - Amanullah and his most of his party sailed 
from Bombay to Europe. 
Nov. 16, 1929 - End of Rebellion and formal recognition of 
Nadir Shah's govt. 
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APPENDIX - V 
PRINCIPAL TRIBES OF AFGHANISTAN 













































































APPENDIX - VI 
SPOKEN LANGUAGES OF AFGHANISTAN 
Iranian Languages 
Persian 
Pushtu 
Baluchi 
Pamir Languages 
Shughuri-Roshani 
Wakhi 
Munji-yidga 
Ishkashmi 
Others 
Ormuri 
Parachi 
Dardic Languages 
Kafir languages 
Kati 
Waigeli 
Ashkun 
Prasun 
Others 
Pasahi 
Gwar Bati 
Tirahi 
Turkic Languages 
Uzbek 
Turkoman 
Kirgiz 
Karakalpak 
Others 
Mongolian 
Kurdish 
Arabic 
T.ahnda 
